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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court properly rejected Hipwells5 attempt to amend and re-
allege their meaningless fraudulent concealment claims after resolution of the statute of 
limitations defense and the Supreme Court's ruling on the first appeal. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 663 
P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). 
2. Whether Hipwells5 fraudulent concealment claims are nevertheless moot 
given the jury's verdict of no negligence. 
Standard of Review: De novo, Tensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 334, 
338 (Utah 1997). 
3. Whether the trial court's exclusion of Hipwells3 proffered evidence of 
"admissions by conduct55 had some reasonable basis under Rules 402 and/or 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Review: Clear abuse of discretion. See Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 
P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996). 
4. Whether Hipwells have demonstrated that any of the alleged errors by the 
trial court were sufficiently harmful to support a probability of a different verdict, given 
the overwhelming medical evidence supporting Dr. Healy's care. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 402 (See Addendum at 1.) 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (See Addendum at 2.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical negligence/wrongful death case arising from medical care rendered 
in 1988, which was tried to a jury in March and April of 2001. After three weeks of trial, 
and hearing all of the medical evidence and expert testimony, the jury returned a special 
verdict, finding IHC Hospitals, Inc, dba McKay-Dee Hospital, and Michael J. Healy 
(collectively referred to herein at "Defendants") were not negligent in their treatment and 
care of Shelly Hipwell ("Shelly55). [R. 1-15; R. 4930-32.] 
Sherry Jensen, Shane Hipwell, all other heirs of Shelly Hipwell, Ashley Hipwell, 
and Kaycie Hipwell (collectively referred to as "The Hipwells55), through their current 
counsel, first commenced this case against Defendants in 1992, alleging one cause of 
action: "Medical Negligence/Wrongful Death55 [R. at 1-15.] In 1993, the Defendants filed 
motions for summary judgment on the ground that the Hipwells5 claims were barred by 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's ("Malpractice Act55) two-year statute of 
limitations. The Hipwells responded by filing a Rule 56(f) affidavit requesting further 
discovery be done before determination of the motions and by amending their Complaint. 
[R. 140-166; R. 254-279.] HipwelPs third version of the Complaint included, for the 
first time, allegations of fraud/fraudulent concealment of medical malpractice in an obvious 
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attempt to circumvent the statute of limitations. [R. 254-279.] (For the Court's 
convenience, the full text of the Third Amended Complaint is included at Addendum 3.) 
After further discovery, the Defendants renewed their motions for summary 
judgment, and the trial court granted them, dismissing the Complaint on the ground that 
all of the Hipwells3 claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Hipwells 
appealed and, in 1997, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling as to the 
Hipwells3 medical malpractice and wrongful death claims, remanding the case for a trial on 
the statute of limitations issue. See Tensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1997). (For the Court's convenience, the full text of the Tensen case is included at 
Addendum 4.) The Supreme Court, however, expressly held that the Hipwells3 newly 
pled fraud/fraudulent concealment claims related only to the statute of limitations issue and 
did not constitute independent substantive fraud claims. See id. at 336. 
On remand, a bifurcated trial was held on the statute of limitations issue. In a 
special verdict, the jury effectively found that the statute of limitations had not run on the 
Hipwells5 medical malpractice/wrongful death claims against Dr. Healy. [R. 2423.] 
The case then proceeded to a three week jury trial on the medical 
negligence/wrongful death claims. The Hipwells now appeal from the judgment on the 
jury verdict of no negligence. [R. 4930-32.] 
A. Statement of Facts. 
1. During 1988, Michael J. Healy, M.D. ("Dr. Healy33) was caring for Shelly as 
her obstetrician during her second pregnancy [R. 5006 at 915.] 
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2. During the pregnancy Dr. Healy noted that Shelly's baby was not growing 
at a normal rate and he appropriately referred Shelly to maternal-fetal specialists Dr. 
Greggory DeVore ("Dr. DeVore") and Dr. Steven Clark ("Dr. Clark55) for more frequent 
and comprehensive monitoring during the remainder of her pregnancy. [R. 5009 at 
1371-72; R. 5006 at 918.] 
3. Drs« Healy DeVore, and Clark consistently monitored Shelly^ blood 
pressure throughout her pregnancy. Her blood pressure was always within normal limits. 
Dr. Healy also conducted numerous tests to ensure Shelly and her baby stayed healthy 
during the pregnancy [R. 5004 at 390; R. 5009 at 1127, 1372-73.] 
4. Other than sub-optimal fetal growth, Shelly had no significant medical 
problems with her pregnancy until December, 1988. [R. 5009 at 1371-74.] 
5. On December 12, 1988, Shelly went to the emergency department of 
McKay-Dee Hospital "(McKay-Dee55) complaining of chest pain. [R. 5004 at 403-4; R. 
5009 at 1374-78.] Her blood pressure and all blood tests were normal. [R. 5009 at 
1374-78.] She was treated by Dr. King for her chest pain and released with an instruction 
to follow up with Dr. Healy [R. 5004 at 407-11.] Dr. Healy was never informed of 
Shelly5s visit to the emergency department. [R. 5006 at 935; R. 5007 at 1111, 1114.] 
6. On the day after the emergency room visit, Shelly was seen again by Dr. 
DeVore. In his examination of Shelly, Dr. DeVore noted a significant lack of fetal growth 
and, based upon his impression that the fetus was not tolerating the utero environment, he 
recommended that she be scheduled for delivery that day. [R. 5004 at 430, 432-33; R. 
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5006 at 935; R. 5007 at 1128; R. 5009 at 1375.] Dr. Healy followed Dr. DeVore's 
recommendation and delivered Shelly's baby by cesarean section promptly, appropriately, 
and without complication on that same day. [R. 5006 at 814; R. 5009 at 1378-79.] 
There was no medically indicated reason to deliver Shelly^ baby earlier than Dr. Healy 
did. [R. 5009 at 1380-81.] 
7. Shelly^ recovery following the cesarean section was unremarkable until the 
following day when she began to develop symptoms of hemolytic anemia, elevated liver 
enzymes, and low platelets. ("HELLP Syndrome55). [R. 5009 at 1383-86; R. 5010 at 
1567.] HELLP Syndrome is thought to be a rare form of preeclampsia that affects a 
small percentage of pregnant women. Among other complications, HELLP Syndrome 
can be associated with cardiopulmonary problems, cerebral hemorrhage, kidney problems, 
and, rarely, liver problems. [R. 5009 at 1358-60.] In extremely unusual cases, HELLP 
Syndrome can lead to liver rupture. [R. 5009 at 1363-64.] 
8. There is no cure for HELLP Syndrome. The only treatment is delivery of 
the baby accompanied by basic medical support. [R. 5009 at 1360-61; R. 5004 at 444.] 
Once Dr. Healy delivered Shelly5s baby, there was nothing whatsoever that he could have 
done to have prevented Shelly from developing HELLP Syndrome or to change her 
medical outcome. [R. 5009 at 1380.] 
9. In response to Shelly^ rapidly deteriorating condition, Dr. Healy 
immediately and appropriately transferred Shelly to the McKay-Dee Hospital ICU where 
her care was managed by Michael Baughman, M.D. ("Dr. Baughman55), an internist and a 
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critical care specialist. [R. 5009 at 1386-87.] In the ICU, Shelly was closely monitored 
and remained stable until approximately 5:00 p.m., when her liver ruptured. [R. 5009 at 
1389-90, 1393-94, 1488.] The diagnosis of liver rupture was made quickly and her liver 
was repaired by a general surgeon, Richard Alder, M.D. ("Dr. Alder55). The surgery was 
done that same evening, "about as fast as it could be done.55 [R. 5009 at 1393-94, 1396; 
R. 5010 at 1564-65.] 
10. There was absolutely nothing Dr. Healy or Dr. Baughman could have done 
to prevent Shelly's liver rupture. [R. 5009 at 1395-96.] 
11. Following the successful repair of her liver, Shelly developed a number of 
complications including sepsis, Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (CCARDS55), and 
possible necrotizing fasciitis. [R. 5010 at 1563, 1641; R. 5011 at 1874-77.] Necrotizing 
fasciitis is a very aggressive infection. It is sometimes referred to as the flesh-eating 
bacteria and, if not expertly treated, can lead to death. [R. 5012 at 1970-71.] Diagnosis 
of necrotizing fasciitis can be very difficult. [R. 5012 at 1974.] 
12. Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman were concerned that Shelly had necrotizing 
fasciitis, and because Shelly's critical condition was not improving, Dr. Healy consulted 
with James Warenski, M.D., Vice Chair of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of 
Utah. In accordance with Dr. Warenski5s recommendation, Shelly was transferred to the 
University of Utah Hospital Intermountain Burn Unit under the care of Jeffrey Saffle, 
M.D. This special facility is a regional referral center for treatment of burns and skin 
diseases, such as necrotizing fasciitis, and receives patients from about one-fifth of the 
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geographical area of the United States. [R. 5012 at 1975, 1981; R. 5009 at 1400, 
1402-03; R. 5008 at 1215, 1321; R. 5011 at 1883-84.] The Intermountain Burn Unit 
was the right place for Shelly to be at that time, and, in fact, her condition improved 
following her transfer. [R. 5009 at 1403; R. 5007 at 1069-70; R. 5012 at 1981, 1990, 
1993.] 
13. On or about, January 18, 1989, some 25 days after Shelly was transferred 
from McKay-Dee Hospital, a hematology fellow at the University Hospital mistakenly 
pierced her heart while attempting a sternal bone marrow biopsy. Blood immediately 
filled the pericardial sac surrounding the heart, preventing the heart from pumping blood. 
As a result, Shelly suffered severe brain damage, leaving her in a comatose state for the rest 
of her life. [R. 5005 at 625; R. 5013 at 2285-89, 2292; R. 5012 at 2037-39, 2048-49; 
R. 5007 at 1087.] Shelly survived approximately three years before dying from 
complications of her brain injury. See Tensen, 944 P.2d at 329. 
14. Following Shelly^ catastrophic injury at the University Hospital, the 
Hipwells retained attorney Roger Sharp ("Attorney Sharp55), who associated attorney Tim 
Healy ("Attorney Healy55), Dr. Heal/s brother, to represent them in their claims arising 
out of Shelly^ injuries. See Tensen, 944 P.2d at 329. The Hipwells settled with the 
University of Utah for their claims arising out of Shelly's medical treatment. See id. 
15. Subsequently, the Hipwells became dissatisfied with the amount they 
received in settlement, and they retained Simon Forgette and Richard Burbidge. These 
lawyers filed suit against Sharp and Attorney Healy for legal malpractice. See id.; see also, 
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Hipwell v. Sharp. 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993). (For the Court's convenience, the full text 
of the Hipwell v. Sharp case is included at Addendum 5.) These claims were later setded 
as well. [R. 3651.] 
16. The Hipwells filed their original Complaint in this case on July 29, 1992. It 
asserted only one cause of action: "Medical Negligence/Wrongful Death" and contained no 
allegations of fraud or fraudulent concealment of any kind. [R. 1-15.] On August 19, 
1992, the Hipwells filed an Amended Complaint which also contained only one cause of 
action: "Medical Negligence/Wrongful Death" and contained no allegations of fraud or 
fraudulent concealment. [R. 22-36.] 
17. In the spring of 1993, Defendants each filed motions for summary 
judgment, arguing that the Hipwells' medical negligence claims were barred by the two-
year medical malpractice statute of limitations. [R. 85 at 124, 133-34.] 
18. In opposition, the Hipwells filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit and, in an obvious 
attempt to escape the statute of limitations bar, amended their Complaint to allege, for the 
first time, fraud/fraudulent concealment of medical negligence. [R. 140-166; 254-279.] 
They alleged that Dr. Healy, along with his brother, Attorney Healy, Attorney Sharp, and 
Dr. Healy's sister, Diane DeVries ("Ms. DeVries") had engaged in an effort to conceal the 
facts of the Hipwells' medical malpractice claim against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. [R. 
140-66, 254-79.] 
19. Following further discovery, Defendants renewed their motions for summary 
judgment, arguing that the Hipwells' counsel at the time, Simon Forgette, had knowledge 
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of the medical malpractice claims against Defendants over two years prior to filing the 
Hipwells' notice to commence action. [R. 535-784.] 
20. The district court granted Defendants5 motions on all claims, ruling that the 
Hipwells' claims were barred by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's ("Malpractice 
Act") two-year statute of limitations. The Hipwells appealed, contending, among other 
things, that they had "made a general fraud claim and constructive fraud claim in addition 
to, and distinct from, their claims of fraudulent concealment." Tensen, 944 P.2d 327, 336-
37. 
21. The Supreme Court explicidy rejected this part of the Hipwells3 argument, 
holding "we can find nothing in their allegation of fraud or constructive fraud diat is in 
any way different from their claims of fraudulent concealment." Id. at 336. Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Hipwells could not "proceed" with their fraud claims. 
See id. at 331. However, on different grounds, the Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the trial court "for a factual finding as to whether Shelly's family's claims of fraudulent 
concealment will toll the statute of limitations as to their wrongful death and survival 
claims? Id. at 337. (emphasis added.) 
22. On remand, in a bifurcated trial addressing only the statute of limitations 
issue, a jury determined that the Hipwells' medical malpractice claims were not barred by 
the two-year statute of limitations. This left the Hipwells free to proceed to trial on the 
medical negligence/wrongful death claims. [R. 2423.] 
23. After the trial court had set a date for a jury trial on the Hipwells5 medical 
negligence/wrongful death claims, the Hipwells attempted to amend their Complaint for 
the fourth time. [R. 2624-47.] (For the Court's convenience, the full text of the Fourth 
Amended Complaint is included at Addendum 6.) The proposed Fourth Amended 
Complaint re-asserted the Hipwells5 prior claims of fraud/fraudulent concealment of 
medical malpractice. [R. 2628.] 
24. The Hipwells had moved to amend their Complaint without removing the 
fraud claims, Defendants therefore, opposed the amendment and filed a "Joint Motion to 
Confirm Dismissal of Fraud Claims.55 [R. 2668-2677.] 
25. On May 19, 2000, the district court granted the Defendants5 motion, 
concluding: "[I]t is clear the Supreme Court in Tensen rejected the existence of plaintiffs5 
independent fraud claim.55 [R. 2750-55.] (For the Court's convenience, the full text of 
the court's ruling is included at Addendum 7.) 
26. Shortly before the trial set to begin March 27, 2001, the Hipwells filed a 
"Motion to Allow Evidence of Admissions by Conduct on the Part of Dr. Healy55 in a 
further attempt to get alleged evidence of fraudulent concealment into the medical 
malpractice trial. [R. 3666-68.] 
27. On March 21, 2001, the trial court gave a preliminary ruling on the 
Hipwells5 motion, granting it "to the extent plaintiffs have evidence of direct conduct from 
which a reasonable inference could be drawn that such conduct amounted to an 
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obstruction of justice." [R. 4565.] (emphasis in original.) (For the Court's convenience, 
the full text of the court's ruling is included at Addendum 8.) 
28. On the following day, still prior to trial, the trial court clarified its ruling as 
stating "that the only evidence plaintiffs will be permitted to introduce in this regard is 
evidence of things Dr. Healy personally did or said, and this will be allowed only if it is 
sufficient to create a reasonable inference of unlawful obstruction of justice. And the 
evidence, direct or indirect, of written or oral statements or things done by others is not 
allowed as evidence of admission by conduct." [R. 5016 at 1.] (For the Court's 
convenience, the full text of the court's ruling is included at Addendum 9.) 
29. During the Hipwells' opening statement, in plain disregard for the trial 
court's direction, the Hipwells' counsel made repeated reference to conduct and statements 
of persons other than Dr. Healy in an effort to paint a picture of conspiracy. [R. 5003 at 
223-24.] Moreover, much of the alleged evidence of conspiracy to which counsel referred 
could not possibly have been admitted without the testimony of Attorney Sharp, Attorney 
Healy, and Ms. DeVries, none of whom had been designated as trial witnesses. [R. 
4380-81.] 
30. Judge Iwasaki sustained Defendants' objections to the Hipwells' 
overreaching opening statement, and gave a cautionary instruction to the jury. [R. 5003 
at 223-24.] 
31. After several days of trial, the district court heard further argument and 
accepted Hipwells' proffer of the specific evidence that they argued constituted admissions 
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by conduct. [R. 5008 at 1226-59.] The trial court concluded that the so-called evidence 
of admissions by conduct was not admissible because, inter alia, the court found that there 
was no direct factual nexus between Dr. Healy's conduct and the alleged cover-up of 
medical malpractice. [R. 5008 at 1254-57.] The trial court further ruled that the alleged 
evidence of admissions by conduct was also not admissible under Rules 402 and 403 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence because it was not relevant, was likely to confuse issues before 
the jury, and would be unfairly prejudicial and inadequately probative. [R. 5008 at 1253-
59.] 
32. At trial, the Hipwells presented the testimony of only one retained medical 
expert, Dr. DeVore, a perinatologist specializing in ultrasound. Dr. DeVore offered 
"expert35 testimony on obstetrical prenatal care, hypertension, HELLP Syndrome, delivery, 
critical care management of ICU patients, surgical repair of a ruptured liver, infectious 
disease, necrotizing fasciitis, transfer of patients to the University Hospital's burn center, 
and hematology. [R. 5004-5006.] 
33. Dr. DeVore has not delivered a baby or performed a c-section since 1987. 
The last time Dr. DeVore performed common gynecological procedures, such as a 
hysterectomy, a pap smear, bladder suspension, or laparoscope was some 15 or 20 years 
ago. Dr. Devore admitted that if his own daughter needed a gynecologic surgeon or an 
obstetrician to deliver a baby, he would send her to someone with more experience than 
he. [R. 5006 at 751, 754-57.] 
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34. Dr. DeVore also admitted that he lacked the education, training, and 
experience to be certified in critical care medicine. He has never had privileges granted to 
him by any hospital to work in critical or intensive care. The last time Dr. DeVore 
operated on a non-pregnant patient was over 20 years ago. He has never operated or 
assisted in operating on a liver. The only experience Dr. DeVore has had in treating 
necrotizing fasciitis was over 20 years ago with a couple of patients. Since that time, Dr. 
DeVore has never been consulted to offer advice on about necrotizing fasciitis and has 
never managed a patient with that condition. [R. 5004 at 492-95; R. 5006 at 736-37, 
740-42; R. 5005 at 577-79, 711.] 
35. Not only does Dr. DeVore lack current experience and credentials in the 
areas of his broad ranging "expert" testimony, but he has a notable history of personal 
conflict with Defendant IHC. IHC employed Dr. DeVore as a perinatologist until it 
terminated his employment in the early 1990s. Dr. DeVore claims that he was forced to 
resign under duress. He sued IHC, and ultimately lost, with IHC obtaining a judgment 
against him for approximately $250,000. To collect the judgment, IHC ultimately 
garnished Dr. DeVore's wages. Since then, Dr. DeVore has frequently offered his services 
to provide expert medical testimony for plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits against IHC. 
[R. 5005 at 639-40; 5006 at 742-50, 885.] 
36. Central to Dr. DeVore's criticism of Dr. Healy's care was his testimony that 
Shelly was hypertensive based on a discredited definition that had long since been 
abandoned and never been used by practitioners. [R. 5009 at 1365-68.] Nevertheless, he 
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testified that Dr. Healy negligently failed to apply this rule and thus failed to diagnose 
Shelly as hypertensive and at risk for HELLP Syndrome. [R. 5006 at 785-86.] 
37. Unfortunately for Dr. DeVore, Defendants proved that Dr. DeVore did not 
himself use the definition of hypertension he claimed Dr. Healy was required to use. Dr. 
DeVore, as one of Shelly's treating perinatologists, had seen more than a dozen 
measurements of Shelly^ blood pressure and had never diagnosed or treated Shelly for 
hypertension. Dr. DeVore's testimony on the hypertension issue was destroyed on cross-
examination, along with Dr. DeVore's credibility. [R. 5006 at 783-809, 924.] Dr. 
DeVore was the only expert witness Hipwells presented to testify in support of their 
allegations of negligent care. 
38. Defendants presented several witnesses who testified to the excellent care 
Shelly received from Dr. Healy and IHC. Among these witnesses was James Martin, 
M.D., a professor and chief of obstetrics for the University of Mississippi Medical Center 
in Jackson, Mississippi. The University of Mississippi Medical Center probably sets the 
highest number of patients with HELLP Syndrome in the world. In stark contrast to Dr. 
DeVore, Dr. Martin is involved in approximately 1,000 deliveries a year. He cares for 30 
to 50 patients with HELLP Syndrome every year. Dr. Martin has conducted medical 
research on HELLP Syndrome, and has published extensively in books and periodicals in 
the area of obstetrics, gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine. Included in his 
publications, are approximately 50 or 60 articles relating to hypertensive disorders in 
pregnancy and a number of articles on HELLP Syndrome. Further, Dr. Martin was 
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president of the Society of Maternal-Fetal Medicine and was the immediate past president 
of the North American Society for the Study of Hypertension in Pregnancy which focuses 
on hypertensive complications of pregnancy including, preeclampsia and HELLP 
Syndrome. [R. 5009 at 1343-61.] 
39. Dr. Martin testified that Dr. Healy's obstetrical care of Shelly complied in all 
respects with the standard of care. He testified that there was no indication that Shelly 
was hypertensive prior to delivery that there was no indication of HELLP Syndrome prior 
to the delivery that Dr. Healy performed the delivery by c-section appropriately and 
timely that nothing could have been done to prevent Shelly's ruptured liver, that Dr. 
Healy's management of Shelly post-delivery and that his transfer of her to the ICU was all 
appropriate and timely He also testified that it was appropriate under the later 
circumstances to transfer Shelly to the Burn Center at the University based on concerns 
over Shelly^ critical condition and possible necrotizing fascitis. [R. 5009 at 1369-74, 
1376-77, 1379-80, 1385-87, 1391-92, 1394, 1396, 1386, 1400, 1402-03.] 
40. Another expert testifying in support of Defendants3 care was Joseph Civetta, 
M.D. Dr. Civetta is board certified in general surgery as well as in surgical critical care 
medicine. He is the chairman of surgery at the University of Connecticut School of 
Medicine Health Center and serves as the director of surgery at Hartford Hospital. Dr. 
Civetta has been editor of eleven or twelve books on critical care medicine and trauma and 
has written chapters in about 100 textbooks. Unlike Dr. DeVore, Dr. Civetta has actually 
operated on the liver and observed liver hematomas. He has also treated and diagnosed 
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necrotizing fasciitis. Dr. Civetta, testified, among other things, that the care Shelly 
received in the ICU was "exemplary." [R. 5010 at 1555-56, 1558-59, 1562-63, 1584.] 
41. Dr. Richard Alder is the general surgeon who repaired Shelly's ruptured 
liver at McKay-Dee Hospital. He testified at trial that he was timely called to consult on 
Shelly^ case for possible surgery, and that there was no need to have performed the 
surgery any earlier. [R. 5008 at 1294-95.] 
42. Defendants also called Jeffrey Saffle, M.D. to testify. Dr. Saffle is board 
certified in general surgery and in critical care medicine. He is a professor of surgery and 
the director of the Intermountain Burn Center at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
The Intermountain Burn Center is a tertiary referral center for the care of people with 
burns and other soft-tissue infections and problems, including necrotizing fasciitis. The 
Burn Center and Dr. Saffle have substantial experience in diagnosing and treating 
necrotizing fasciitis. Dr. Saffle has published articles and spoken at professional meetings 
on the subject of nectrotizing fasciitis. Dr. Saffle testified unequivocally that "it was a very 
appropriate decision" by Drs. Healy and Baughman to transfer Shelly from McKay-Dee to 
the Intermountain Burn Unit and that it was "the right place for her to be.53 [R. 5012 at 
1964-68, 1981, 1993.] 
43. After hearing all of the medical evidence regarding Dr. Healy and Dr. 
Baughman, the jury rendered a special verdict finding that the Defendants were not 
negligent in their treatment and care of Shelly. [R. 4930-32.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal from a jury verdict finding that neither Defendant was negligent in 
medical treatment of Shelly Hipwell, Plaintiffs do not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the verdict. In fact, they raise only one principal argument pertaining 
to Dr. Healy: specifically that Judge Iwasaki committed reversible error by excluding 
inferential evidence relating only to extraneous allegations that Dr. Healy and IHC 
attempted to conceal their alleged malpractice. The Hipwells attempted to inject their 
irrelevant fraudulent concealment "evidence35 into the medical malpractice case in several 
ways, each of which was properly rejected by Judge Iwasaki. 
Judge Iwasaki ruled properly in denying Hipwells3 motion to amend their 
Complaint a fourth time and in confirming dismissal of the fraud/fraudulent concealment 
claims. The Hipwells3 proposed amendments were clearly futile and moot, given that the 
statute of limitations defense had been resolved and they were now free to proceed to trial 
on their medical negligence claims, which had allegedly been concealed. Furthermore, 
Judge Iwasaki3s decision on this issue was mandated by the Utah Supreme Courtis prior 
holding in this very case. 
The Hipwells also fail to establish on appeal that Judge Iwasaki abused his 
discretion in excluding their proffered "evidence33 of admissions by conduct. The proffered 
evidence, which was primarily hearsay, did not qualify as direct evidence of admissions by 
conduct on the part of Dr. Healy, and it was nevertheless properly excluded under both 
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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Finally Hipwells fail to meet their burden of demonstrating that the alleged errors 
of which they complain were harmful. In fact, the jury listened over three weeks of trial to 
all of the medical evidence and it overwhelmingly supported the verdict of no negligence. 
There is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been any different even if 
the Hipwells3 attenuated evidence of alleged fraudulent concealment had been admitted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE HIPWELLS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT THE COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THEIR MOTION TO AMEND AND 
REJECTING THEIR NOW MEANINGLESS "FRAUD" CLAIMS. 
The Hipwells falsely assert that cc[t]he Defendants3 fraudulent conduct is at the heart 
of the HipwelPs case.53 (App. Br., at 4). They now attempt to frame the case in this 
manner because diey cannot admit — what has always been true — that this is a medical 
negligence case. Such an admission would end all inquiry because of one simple fact: the 
jury considered all of the medical evidence and found that the Defendants were not 
negligent in their treatment of Shelly. Indeed, the Hipwells have "concede [d]33 that the 
jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. (See App. Br., at 25). The Hipwells3 
misleading characterization of this as a fraud case does not withstand scrutiny. 
The Hipwells3 original Complaint, filed in July 1992, asserted only one cause of 
action: "Negligence/Wrongful Death.33 It contained no allegation of fraud or concealment. 
[R. 1-15.] In August of 1992, the Hipwells filed an Amended Complaint. It, too, 
asserted no allegation of fraud or concealment. [R. 22-36.] 
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Only after the Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the ground that 
the Hipwells' Complaint was barred by the Malpractice Act's statute of limitations did the 
Hipwells first present an allegation of fraudulent concealment for the obvious purpose of 
escaping the statute of limitation's bar. [R. 140-66; R. 254-79.] The trial court, hearing 
the evidence related to the Hipwells' claim of fraudulent concealment, concluded that the 
allegations were insufficient to toll their claims of medical malpractice. The trial court also 
specifically held that the two-year statute of limitations of the Malpractice Act "governed 
Shelly's family's claims for fraud." Tensen, 944 P.2d at 335. The Hipwells appealed the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 327. 
In their first appeal, the Hipwells made exactly the same argument as they make 
today. In that appeal, "Shelly's family argue [d] that it ha[d] made a general fraud claim 
and constructive fraud claim in addition to, and distinct from, their claims of fraudulent 
concealment [made for the purposes of tolling the medical malpractice limitations 
period.]" lensen, 944 P.2d at 336. The Supreme Court explicitly and implicitly rejected 
that argument. Id. at 336-37. 
On remand, a bifurcated trial was held on the statute of limitations defense. The 
jury concluded that the statute of limitations did not bar the Hipwells' medical negligence 
claims and they were free to proceed to a second trial on their substantive claims of 
medical negligence/wrongful death. Fraudulent concealment of medical negligence was no 
longer an issue. [R. 2423; Jensen, 944 P.2d at 336-37.] 
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Despite all of this, the Hipwells moved to amend and proposed a Fourth Amended 
Complaint, which once again asserted the fraud/fraudulent concealment claims. [R. 2624-
47.] Naturally, Defendants opposed that amendment and asked the court to confirm the 
that such claims were now meaningless and the Supreme Court had already rejected them 
as substantive claims. [R. 2668-77.] The trial court agreed and properly denied the 
amendment, confirming the dismissal of the fraud/fraudulent concealment claims. [R. 
2750-55.] 
A. The District Court Correctly Denied the Hipwells3 Motion to Amend 
Their Complaint And Confirmed Dismissal of the Fraudulent Concealment 
Claim. 
Whether to grant leave to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
See Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exchu 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). cc[L]eave to file an 
-amended complaint should be denied when the moving party seeks to assert a new claim 
that is legally insufficient or futile.55 Andalex Resources v. Myers. 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). In the present case, the trial court properly 
denied Hipwells5 motion to file a Fourth Amended Complaint because the proposed 
amendments related almost exclusively to Hipwells5 claims for fraud (fraudulent 
concealment), which had already been rejected by the Supreme Court. The proposed 
Fourth Amended Complaint made no new fraud allegation. The relevant allegations are, 
in fact, identical to those appearing in the Third Amended Complaint, which was the 
subject of Hipwells5 first appeal. (Compare Addendum at 3 with Addendum at 6) (See 
also Addendum, at 10, comparing Third and Fourth Amended Complaints). Hence, the 
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proposed amendments were futile and contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Tensen. 
[R. 2750-55.] 
1. The Proposed Amendments Were Futile. 
As part of its ruling on Defendants' Joint Motion to Confirm Dismissal of Fraud 
Claims, the trial court ruled that the Hipwells' "fraudulent concealment claim has been 
mooted by the recent jury verdict" finding that the Hipwells' medical negligence claims 
were not barred by the statute of limitations. [R. 2753 n.L] The trial court recognized 
that the fact that the Hipwells were to be afforded a trial on the merits of their medical 
malpractice claims necessarily meant that the Hipwells had suffered no damages from any 
alleged attempt to conceal medical negligence. See id. The trial court's ruling is consistent 
with the Supreme Court's holding in the first appeal that cc[t]he only damages arising out of 
Shelly's family's claims for fraud and constructive fraud relate to the possibility that they 
were prevented from discovering the facts constituting their claim for medical malpractice." 
Tensen, 944 P.2d at 336. It is axiomatic that a cause of action may not be maintained if 
there are no damages.1 Put another way there is no cause of action for "attempted fraud" 
or "attempted concealment." 
1A necessary element of fraud or fraudulent concealment based on a fiduciary duty 
is that a plaintiff suffer damages as a result of reliance on the false statement or failure to 
disclose. See Taylor v. Gason Inc.. 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980). 
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2. Rejection of the Re-alleged Fraudulent Concealment Claims Was 
Mandated by the Supreme Court's Prior Ruling. 
denying the Hipwells' motion to amend, the trial court carefully and expressly 
the Supreme Court's prior ruling this very case: 
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the Tensen 
decision, the Court is persuaded defendants are correct in their 
analysis of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, despite some 
rather contradictory dicta, it is clear the Supreme Court in 
Tensen rejected the existence of plaintiffs' independent fraud 
claim. Notably, the Supreme Court stated the following in its 
original opinion: 
Shelly's family argues that it has made a general fraud 
claim and a constructive fraud claim in addition to, and 
distinct from, their claims of fraudulent concealment 
discussed above. However, we can find nothing in 
their allegation of fraud or constructive fraud that is in 
any way different from their claims of fraudulent 
concealment. All the allegations raised by Shelly's 
family surround their claim that Dr. Healy acted to 
divert the family's attention away from his alleged 
malpractice when he had a duty to disclose the facts of 
his relationship with attorney's Healy and Sharp. The 
only damages arising out of Shelly's family's claims for 
fraud and constructive fraud relate to the possibility 
that they were prevented from discovering the facts 
constituting their claim for medical malpractice. While 
we acknowledge that there may be cases where a 
doctor commits fraud on a patient in a way that would 
not be covered by the medical malpractice act's 
fraudulent concealment provision, this is not such a 
case. Given the specific facts alleged in this case, we 
cannot agree that Shelly's family's fraud claims amounts 
to anything more than or is different from a claim of 
fraudulent concealment of medical malpractice. See 
Gillman v. Dep't of Fin. Inst.. 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-
12 (Utah 1989) (rejecting attempts to recast claim for 
damages arising out of regulator's licensing decision as 
claim for negligence to avoid governmental immunity). 
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Based upon this wording, it is apparent that the Supreme 
Court intended to allow allegations of fraud to continue in this 
case only to the extent they related to the provisions of the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations. Indeed, their citing 
of the Gillman case seems to confirm this. [R. 2751-52.] 
Because the Hipwells can provide no meaningful response to the Supreme Court's 
opinion, cited by the trial court above, they dismiss it as mere "dicta" in a footnote. (See 
App. Br., at 33). In that footnote, the Hipwells declare that the "scope and amount of 
damages were not before the Court" and, further, that if the Court's analysis turned on that 
issue it would have been a violation of due process. (See App. Br., at 33 n.l.) Of course, 
the Hipwells provide no support for their due process challenge which, as this Court has 
repeatedly recognized, justifies its denial.2 Further, the Hipwells' argument here is 
disingenuous. As is readily apparent in the actual language of the opinion, the Supreme 
Court was not making a finding as to the "scope and amount" of damages but, rather, was 
considering their nature for purposes of determining what claims had actually been alleged. 
See Iensen, 944 P.2d at 336. 
This reading is also supported by the Supreme Court's opinion on rehearing on the 
issue of constructive fraud, where the Court summarized its holding in the prior opinion as 
follows: 
In our prior opinion in this case, we reversed the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment as to all defendants and remanded 
2See jjensen, 944 P.2d 366 n.6. ("a reviewing court is entided to have issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.") (quoting Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996)). 
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on the issue of whether defendant Michael J. Healy's ("Dr. 
Healy") alleged fraud in collaborating with plaintiffs' original 
attorney was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations on their 
medical malpractice claims once they had retained an 
independent attorney. We further held that Jensen and 
Hipwell's attempt to recharacterize their medical malpractice 
wrongful death claim as a claim for fraud'was not sufficient to 
avoid the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. 
Id. at 337 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Further, the Supreme Court on rehearing 
reiterated that: 
In our original opinion, we upheld the trial court's finding that 
Jensen and Hipwell's claim for constructive fraud amounted to 
nothing more than a claim for medical malpractice^ which 
would be barred by the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations. 
Id. at 339. (citing Tensen at 337) (emphasis added). 
In sum, it is clear from the explicit language of Tensen, that the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Hipwells could not "be allowed to proceed on their separate claims for 
common law fraud," and the trial court correctly interpreted the Supreme Court's opinion 
in its ruling. Id. at 331. The Supreme Court's ruling supported and, indeed, mandated 
denial of the Hipwells' last motion to amend. 
B. As a Matter of Law, the Hipwells3 Claims of Fraudulent Concealment of 
Medical Negligence Are Now Moot Because the Jury Has Rendered a 
Verdict That Defendants Were Not Negligent. 
During the jury trial on the Hipwells' medical negligence claims, the jury was 
presented with all of the medical testimony relating to Dr. Healy's and Dr. Baughman's 
care of Shelly. Based on all the medical evidence, including the testimony of numerous 
medical experts, the jury returned a verdict that the Defendants were not negligent. [R. 
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4930-32.] Further, as the HipweWs concede, that verdict was supported by sufficient 
evidence. (See App. Br., at 25.) Even if the Hipwells had advanced substantive claims of 
fraudulent concealment of medical negligence, those claims would necessarily require proof 
of their claim for medical negligence. The Defendants were not negligent, therefore, no 
negligence could be concealed. 
To put it a different way, in order to prevail on a claim for fraudulent concealment, 
a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to disclose and that he failed to do so. 
See Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson. 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980). It begs reason 
to assert that Dr. Healy had a duty to disclose that he was not negligent in his treatment of 
Shelly. What the Hipwells effectively ask the Supreme Court to do is remand this case to 
allow them to pursue a claim that Defendants attempted, but failed, to conceal non-
negligent conduct. 
As other courts have recognized, this request must fail. Where, as here, there has 
been a finding of no negligence, "plaintiffs lack the requisite predicate for their fraudulent 
concealment claim/5 whether as a substantive claim or a claim to toll the statute of 
limitations. See Wurzberg v. Lapid? 1993 WL 362374 at *3 (See Addendum at 11). 
Thus, in order to prevail on an independent claim for fraudulent concealment of medical 
negligence, a plaintiff must first demonstrate negligence. See id. In other words, 
"maintenance of a fraud action against a physician for concealing sub-standard medical 
treatment necessarily involves a finding of malpractice." See id. In this case, the jury found 
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that the Defendants were not negligent. [R. 4930-32.] Accordingly their substantive 
fraud claims (assuming they actually existed) would plainly fail as a matter of law. 
H. THE HIPWELLS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THEM TO 
PRESENT SO-CALLED EVIDENCE OF ADMISSIONS BY CONDUCT. 
The Hipwells next argue that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding 
their proferred evidence of admissions by conduct. They fall far short, however, of meeting 
their burden on appeal. 
This Court: has recently stated, "the trial court has a great deal of discretion in 
determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its ruling will not be overturned 
unless there is an abuse of discretion." Gorosteita v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99 11 14, 17 P.3d 
1110, 1114. A trial court can only be said to abuse its discretion if there is "no reasonable 
basis for the decision.55 Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). As 
is clear from the trial court's rationale, discussed below, its rejection of the Hipwells5 
purported admission by conduct evidence was well-reasoned and grounded in fact and law. 
Here, the Hipwells5 proffered evidence did not qualify as admissions by conduct 
evidence and was further inadmissible under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. (See Addendum at 1 and 2.) 
A. The District Court Had a Reasonable Basis For Ruling that the Proferred 
Evidence Did Not Rise to the Level of Admissions By Conduct. 
On June 5, 2000, as discussed above, the trial court ruled that the Hipwells5 
' allegations of fraudulent concealment were now moot and had no place in the final trial on 
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the merits of the Hipwells5 negligence claims. [R. 2750-55.]3 In a further effort to 
circumvent the Supreme Court and trial court's rulings, the Hipwells next filed a "Motion 
to Allow Evidence of Admissions by Conduct on the Part of Dr. Healy55 to bring their 
fraud claims through the backdoor. [R. 3666-67.] 
In support of their motion, the Hipwells made an "offer of proof/3 which 
constituted bare allegations without any cites to the record. [R. 3670-72.] Presented with 
this unsupported material and without the benefit of sworn testimony the trial court 
granted the Hipwells5 motion "to the extent plaintiffs have evidence of direct conduct from 
which a reasonable inference could be drawn that such conduct amounted to an obstruction 
of justice." [R. 4567-68.] (emphasis in original). Subsequently and still prior to trial, the 
Court offered a clarification of the meaning of its ruling, stating 
that the only evidence plaintiffs will be permitted to introduce 
in this regard is evidence of things Dr. Healy personally did or 
said, and this will be allowed only if it is sufficient to create a 
reasonable inference of unlawful obstruction of justice. And 
the evidence, direct or indirect, of written or oral statements 
made or things done by others is not allowed as evidence of 
admission by conduct. 
[R. 5016 at 1.] (emphasis added). 
Despite this ruling, in opening statement, the Hipwells5 counsel made several 
references to statements and conduct of others, besides Dr. Healy to demonstrate the so-
3On August 25, 2001, the Supreme Court denied the Hipwells5 petition for 
interlocutory appeal on that issue. [R. 2993.] 
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called conspiracy4 This was done despite the fact that none of the so-called co-conspirators 
had been identified as trial witnesses. [R. 5003 at 197-98; R. 4380-81.] 
During trial, the district court heard further argument and proffer regarding the 
specific evidence the Hipwells desired to present of Dr. Healy's direct statements or 
conduct that they contended constituted admissions by conduct. After a full opportunity to 
present all such evidence, the Hipwells could identify only three categories of "things Dr. 
Healy personally did or said.335 [R. 5008 at 1231; R. 5004 at 271-2.] 
First, the Hipwells pointed to the fact that shortly after Shelly was stabbed in the 
heart at the University Hospital, Dr. Healy and his wife met his brother, Attorney Healy, 
and his wife for dinner. At dinner, Dr. Healy mentioned the tragic stabbing to his brother 
and stated that "some attorney is really going to clean up on this one." [R. 5004 at 271; R. 
5008 at 1229.] 
Second, the Hipwells expressed their desire to put on alleged evidence that Dr. 
Healy originally did not provide Shelly^ entire medical file to Attorney Sharp when it was 
requested, but allegedly withheld the left side of the file, containing financial and insurance 
4
 Defendants3 counsel objected to these statements and the objections were 
sustained, with a cautionary instruction to the jury [R. 5003 at 223-24.] 
5
 The Hipwells identified six items of evidence that they wanted to get into 
evidence. [R. 5008 at 1231; R. 5004 at 271-72.] These six items, however, fall into four 
categories: 1) Dr. Healy's dinner conversation with his brother; 2) materials Dr. Healy 
allegedly did not produce to Attorneys Sharp and Healy; 3) a letter written by Attorney 
Healy to Attorney Sharp; and 4) Dr. Healy's visit to Shelly after the catastrophic sternal 
aspiration and his report to his brother that her prognosis was "grim33. Obviously, the 
letter from Attorney Healy to Attorney Sharp of February 13, 1989 could not reasonably 
be considered Dr. Healy's direct conduct or statement. [R. 5004.] 
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information, including two letters, dated February 20, 1989 and April 27, 1989, to 
insurance companies that contained information that was allegedly damaging to Dr. Healy6 
[R. 5004 at 271; 5008 at 1229-31.] 
Third, at Attorney Healy's request, Dr. Healy visited Shelly after her heart had been 
punctured and brain damage rendered her in a comatose state to give an opinion about 
Shelly^ prognosis. Dr. Healy told Attorney Healy that he believed her prospects to be 
"grim." [R. 5004 at 271; R. 5008 at 1230.] 
After hearing full and lengthy argument and proffer, the trial court properly 
concluded that the "evidence" was not admissible as evidence of admissions by conduct. 
The trial court explained: 
This is not an issue in which Fm hearing for the first 
time, it is not one which I didn't take considerable time to 
think about prior to making the rulings on the motions in 
limine. I knew it would be coming back up at this time. I was 
waiting for the facts and foundation to present itself in such a 
way that I would be able to make a ruling in context. 
In review of the other cases that the Court is aware of 
and the ones that I have been able to find in my own research 
was the Garcia case in which there was direct evidence, 
6
 In fact, there was no competent testimony that Dr. Healy withheld any 
documents from the Hipwells' prior attorneys. First of all, there was no one on the 
Hipwells5 trial witness list who could have laid the foundation as to what the file provided 
to Attorneys Sharp and Healy actually contained. [R. 4380-81.] Second, Dr. Healy did 
not himself prepare, copy, or provide the documents, but rather directed a member of his 
staff to do so. Third, the letters allegedly withheld were not even prepared and did not 
exist until after the documents had been produced to Attorneys Sharp and Healy In 
addition, all of the materials were produced by Dr. Healy at his deposition in this case. 
Finally, Defendants did not object to Hipwells3 use of the letters for purposes of proving 
the Hipwells3 medical malpractice claims and, indeed, the letters were admitted. [R. 5008 
at 1237-40, 1254; R. 5004 at 272.] 
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statements by the defendant Garcia to a bypasser. When the 
University of Utah off-duty police officer was trying to 
effectuate an arrest, Mr. Garcia threatened the bystander 
directly with, "I will kill you.53 That was allowed by the 
Supreme Court as admission, as conduct relative to admission, 
and it was allowed. 
The other case that I was able to recall is one which a 
person, a defendant, directly solicited from another person an 
alibi which was untruthful and direcdy encouraged that person 
to lie in favor and on behalf of the defendant. The reason I am 
giving these examples are these are the types of evidence that 
have been allowed to support this kind of proposition. 
The other more circumstantial case is that of a flight 
instruction in a criminal matter where there is sufficient 
evidence to indicate that the defendant fled the scene and the 
jurisdiction shortly after the commission of the crime with the 
supporting evidence to support the direct inference that he fled 
the jurisdiction in an effort to avoid being caught for the crime 
that he did. 
Now, those are the types of cases that have been allowed 
to indicate conduct in a circumstantial way. Also, however, the 
gist of the cautionary types of language that I found contained 
in those cases is similar to my thoughts in that I acknowledge 
that ifs recognized, there are some circumstances where such 
admissions can be made by conduct, a showing of which would 
have to be supported by competent evidence. And that's what 
I have ruled. 
Now, the cautionary language seems to appear in most, 
if not all, of these cases, this exception to the rule should be 
applied with caution, and even more so because there is 
involved the uncertainty of interpreting that conduct. When I 
gave those examples of that direct conduct that had been 
allowed, there seemed to be little interpretation as to that 
conduct. There seemed not to be a lot of argument as to what 
was meant or what was intended by going, asking someone to 
lie for you for an alibi[,] by threat[en]ing a bystander with 
threats of killing them if they assist. These are direct things. 
The character of the evidence, as I indicated, should be only 
allowed when the trial judge, myself, is satisfied that it 
constitutes a clear and unequivocal expression and is therefore 
credible and can be sustained by the jury in making a 
determination. 
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In applying that language and those standards to the 
present situation, I see that while there my be direct evidence 
of conduct and direct — and stretching it even to the benefit of 
[the Hipwells5 counsel] in this matter, even assuming there is 
direct conduct? I cannot see a direct nexus between the 
conduct and what is being asked here, that is, coverup of a 
medical malpractice. There are some inferences, there appears 
to be some connection, some connection between the 
statements and the inferential result, but is that enough under 
what I consider the cautionary language of these cases to allow 
the testimony? 
What I was[,] not hoping to find, not expecting to find, 
but in order to aid the court in making this decision what I was 
hoping was that there would be a smoking gun, that there was 
some bombshell out there in all the testimony that Dr. Healy 
sat down with Brother Healy and said, Hey, youVe got to pull 
my fat out of the fire and youVe got to do this by getting the 
— involved in it and you and Sharp have to cover everything 
up and get me out of here. That is, in the very worst situation, 
the smoking gun that would make this a very easy call. That's 
not there. 
[R. 5008 at 1254-1257.] 
As is plain from the above-quoted language, the trial court's ruling to exclude the 
so-called evidence of admissions by conduct was carefully and well reasoned. It is also 
wholly consistent with Utah law regarding admissions by conduct. As the Supreme Court 
has held: 
It is recognized that there are some circumstances where such 
an admission can be made by conduct, a showing of which 
would be competent evidence. However, for the same reasons 
stated above, this exception to the rule requiring sworn 
testimony should be applied with caution; and even more so 
because there is involved the uncertainty of interpreting the 
conduct. This character of evidence should be allowed only 
when the trial judge is satisfied that it constitutes a clear and 
unequivocal expression and therefore a credible substitute for 
verbal expression. 
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State v. Sanders, 496 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah 1972). (emphasis added.) 
The Hipwells point to several cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld a trial 
court's decision to admit evidence of admissions by conduct. That, however, is not the 
point. As the trial court noted, "[t]he parties [to this action] do not dispute the law in 
Utah that wrongdoing by a party amounting to an obstruction of justice can be regarded as 
an admission by conduct." [R. 4568.] The issue presented was whether the conduct of Dr. 
Healy could be said to amount to wrongdoing such that it could be competent evidence of 
admissions by conduct. In contrast to the case at bar, all of the cases cited by the Hipwells 
involved situations where the evidence of admissions by conduct was clear and 
unequivocally inconsistent with innocence.7 
None of die incidents involving Dr. Healy amount to wrongdoing, much less lead 
to a clear and unequivocal inference of liability for medical malpractice. The fact that Dr. 
Healy had dinner with his brother, an attorney, and discussed the tragic recent event of a 
former patient stabbed in the heart at the University Hospital is entirely natural and 
7
 For example, in State v. Garcia. 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983) — a case cited by 
the trial court as well — the defendant threatened to kill a bystander if the bystander aided 
a policemen in the defendant's apprehension. It is hard to see that conduct as anything 
but an admission of guilt. Similarly, in Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Ali? 425 N.E.2d 
1359, 1366 (111. App. Ct. 1981), the appellate court upheld the admission of undisputed 
testimony that the defendant physician altered his medical records before trial. In so 
doing, the court noted that cc[i]t is textbook law that the fabrication of false documents is 
an admission by conduct in the person fabricating the documents gives grounds for 
believing that his case is weak.35 Id. In State v. Allen. 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992), 
the Utah Supreme Court denied the appeal of a defendant charged with murdering a 
three-year-old boy, who objected to the trial court's admission of evidence that the day 
following the murder the defendant destroyed portions of the victim's mother's diary 
"which related prior incidents of defendant's abuse of the victim." Id. at 303. 
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innocent. Indeed, it would be more unusual if he had not mentioned the recent tragedy. 
Similarly the fact that someone in Dr. Healy's office may not have copied and produced 
insurance records in response to Attorney Sharp's request for medical records is innocuous. 
Indeed, the only documents not produced that the Hipwells3 attorneys believe are 
important were not in existence at the time records were copied. [R. 5008 at 1239-40.] 
Finally the fact that Dr. Healy, at his brother's request, visited Shelly while she was in a 
persistent coma and reported that her situation was "grim" cannot reasonably be interpreted 
as a falsehood, much less amount to wrongdoing or obstruction of justice. 
In sum, the trial court's determination that Dr. Healy's conduct did not amount to 
evidence sufficient to be considered admissions by conduct is utterly reasonable and cannot 
be viewed as arbitrary, capricious, or a clear abuse of discretion. Quite the contrary, the 
trial court's decision was solidly grounded in reason, fact, and law. 
The Hipwells cannot reasonably show that evidence of Dr. Healy's own conduct 
amounted to an admission by conduct, therefore, for the first time on appeal they point to 
a new body of case law relating to evidence of what the so-called "co-conspirators. Attorney 
Healy, Attorney Sharp and Dr. Healy's sister, DeVries, did and said in furtherance of the 
conspiracy35 (App. Br., at 38). This legal argument was not presented to the court below, 
and for that reason alone should be dismissed. In any event, the case law cited does not 
avail the Hipwells. When one actually reads the cases cited by the Hipwells in their string 
cite, one discovers they are utterly inapplicable. 
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The cases cited by the Hipwells are criminal cases and stand for the proposition that 
out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator are considered non-hearsay "if the statements 
were made during the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy.'5 State v. Tohnson, 774 
P.2d 1141, 1143 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986)). 
However, the Hipwells overlook a critical precondition to the admission of such evidence 
that is made clear in the very cases they cite. Namely, before such statements can be 
admitted as non-hearsay, the trial judge must find that the "conspiracy and the defendant's 
participation therein [have been] established by independent proof and by a preponderance 
of the evidence" Iohnson, 774 P.2d at 1143 (emphasis added); see also, Cirios v. 
Commonwealth, 373 S.E.2d 164, 167-68 (1988) ("[B]efore the court allows evidence of 
statements made by one defendant against another under the co-conspirator exception, it 
must find cthe existence of and the [defendant's] participation in the conspiracy5 by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence.") (citations omitted). The trial court made no such finding 
and, indeed, no such evidence was ever introduced at trial. Quite the contrary, the judge 
explicitly found that, despite making full proffer, and after several days of trial testimony, 
the Hipwells had demonstrated "no direct nexus between [Dr. Healy's] conduct and what 
is being asked here, that is, coverup of medical malpractice."8 [R. 5008 at 1255.] As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, to utilize the co-conspirator exception, there must not only 
8The Court here made a factual finding which should properly be overturned only if 
it is "clearly erroneous, that is, if the trial court's 'ruling contradicts the great weight of the 
evidence or if a court reviewing the evidence is left with a definite and form conviction 
that a mistake has been made.'" England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997) 
(citations omitted). 
34 
be independent proof of the fact of a conspiracy to a preponderance of the evidence, but 
there must also be independent proof of "the defendant's participation therein." Tohnson. 
774 P.2d at 1143. The court made neither finding. 
In sum, Judge Iwasaki's determination that the evidence did not amount to 
admission by conduct was based on careful and well-reasoned consideration and was not an 
abuse of discretion. Accordingly the ruling should be affirmed. 
B. Judge Iwasaki's Exclusion of the So-called Evidence of Admissions by 
Conduct Based on Rules 402 and 403 Was Proper and Did Not Constitute 
an Abuse of Discretion. 
Not only did Judge Iwasaki properly conclude that the proffered evidence did not 
constitute evidence of admissions by conduct, the trial court also correctly excluded the 
evidence on the basis of Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. As die district 
court ruled: 
I have to be mindful and I have to be cautious not to 
confuse the issues nor the jury with whatever the conduct, and 
my judgment and my opinion on what conduct Attorney Healy 
and Sharp did is irrelevant, but not to confuse that conduct 
with the central issues here of a wrongful death and medical 
malpractice. And I see that that is something that even by 
instruction may not fairly allow IHC involvement to be out of 
the conundrum of this type of evidence that would certainly be 
detrimental to Dr. Healy, but by flowover, in spite of 
instruction, I tend to agree that that would be futile in that 
IHC may very well suffer from the allowance of the testimony. 
Taking all of those things into consideration, I have to 
then look at 403. And while I appreciate Mr. Williams 
pointing that out to me, please rest assured that that was one of 
the very first issues that the Court examine [d] as to the 
admissibility of this type of evidence. 
Based upon my analysis of 403 and what I've indicated 
in my reasonings, it appears to me that even if this evidence 
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were admissible, even assuming that it was admissible and 
assuming that there may be some inferential and maybe even 
direct consequences of certain statements, which the Court does 
not find, but even assuming that that's so, and the balancing 
that is required on the 403 analysis, the Court finds that all of 
this conduct that the Court is being asked to allow to show 
admissions of a wrongdoing or a coverup is too prejudicial and 
inadequately probative to be allowed, and it also has the end 
effect of causing confusion to the jury and [that is] one of the 
factors in 403. 
[R. 5008 at 1257-59.] 
"The trial court is 'granted broad discretion in determining the relevance of 
proffered evidence, and its determination will be reversed only if the trial court abuses its 
discretion.335 Slisze v. Stanley-Bostich, 1999 UT 20, 11 17, 979 P.2d 317, 321 (quoting 
Hall v. Process Instruments & Control 890 P2d 1024, 1028 (Utah 1995)). Here, Judge 
Iwasaki properly found that the proffered conduct of Attorney Sharp and Attorney Healy 
was irrelevant to this case. [R. 5008 at 1257-59.] 
Neither Attorney Healy nor Attorney Sharp were parties to the case — having 
already settled an independent legal malpractice case for an undisclosed amount. [R. 
3651.] Neither Attorney Healy nor Sharp had been designated as a witness in this case by 
the Hipwells or the Defendants. [R. 4380-81.] Further, after full proffer, the trial court 
concluded that tliere was no evidence of a "direct nexus between [Dr. Healy's] conduct and 
any so-called "coverup of a medical malpractice.33 [R. 5008 at 1254-57.] Given the factual 
underpinnings, it is not credible to assert — as the Hipwells must to prevail on appeal — 
that there was "no reasonable basis for the [trial court's] decision33. CrookstonT 860 P.2d at 
938. 
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In addition, on appeal, the Hipwells have not even challenged the trial court's 
ruling on this Rule 402 ground. As is well recognized, that "failure to raise an issue on 
direct appeal when one had the opportunity to do so results in waiver" of the issue. 
Bentley v. West Valley City. 2001 UT 23,11 5, 21 P3d 210 (quoting Kolbach v. 
McCotter. 872 P2d 1033, 1034-36 (Utah 1994)); See also Pasquin v. Pasquin. 1999 UT 
App 245, 11 6, 988 P.2d 1, 6; (quoting American Towers Owner's Ass'n v. CCI Mech.. 
Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed by an appellant are 
deemed waived and abandoned")). Furthermore, "it is well established that [the Supreme 
Court] may affirm a judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record.'" Orton v. Carter, 970 P2d 1254, 1260 
(Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 
(1969)). The Hipwells have waived any objection to Judge Iwasaki's ruling on this ground 
and it must be affirmed on this basis alone. 
Judge Iwasaki, however, also based his exclusion of evidence on Rule 403. In so 
doing, he expressed two additional grounds: unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. 
As the trial court ruled: 
Based upon my analysis of 403 and what I've indicated in my 
reasonings, it appears to me that even if this evidence were 
admissible and assuming that there may be some inferential and 
maybe even direct consequences of certain statements, which 
the Court does not find, but even assuming that that's so, and 
the balancing of this conduct that the Court is being asked to 
allow to show admissions of a wrongdoing or a coverup is too 
prejudicial and inadequately probative to be allowed, and it 
also has the end effect of causing confusion to the jury and 
[that is] one of the factors in 403. 
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[R. 5008 at 1226-59.] (emphasis added.) 
As with the trial court's determination of irrelevance, the Hipwells5 brief is utterly 
silent regarding the trial court's conclusion that admission of the alleged evidence of 
coverup of medical malpractice would confuse the issues before the jury. This silence is 
dispositive. Having failed to even challenge the court's ruling on this ground, Hipwells 
have plainly waived objection to it on appeal. See Orton, 970 P.2d at 1260; Pasquin, 988 
P.2d at 6; American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1185 n.5. Moreover, this Court has repeatedly 
refused to consider arguments that are not briefed. See Iensen, 944 P2d at 366 n.6; State 
v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 242 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling that the evidence should be excluded under Rules 402 and 
403 because it is irrelevant and would confuse issues presented to the jury. 
Even if a challenge to the 403 ruling on the confusion basis had not been waived, 
Judge Iwasaki was correct in his determination. Of course, confusion of the jury is 
precisely what the Hipwells had in mind. As they could not win their negligence case on 
the medical evidence, the Hipwells hoped to confuse the medical issues with far-fetched and 
attenuated allegations of concealment. As the Supreme Court recognized in Jensen, this is 
a medical malpractice case. The trial court properly limited it to just that. 
While the Hipwells have failed to challenge the trial court's rulings based on 
relevancy and confusion of issues, they do challenge the trial court's ruling under Rule 403 
that admission of the proffered evidence would be unfairly prejudicial. This challenge, 
however, falls far short. 
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The trial court found the proffered evidence of what Dr. Healy "actually did or said35 
was benign and did not reasonably lead to a conclusion that he was in any way involved in 
a coverup. [R. 5008 at 1254-57.] The fact, however, that evidence lacks significant 
probative value does not mean it is not unfairly prejudicial. As is evident from the 
Hipwells3 brief, they intend to utilize argument, innuendo, and improper inference to 
provide a frame in which they can paint their picture of conspiracy. In their brief, the 
Hipwells argue that "[t]he jury could have reasonably inferred from the cover up evidence 
summarized above (SOF Nos. 13-30) that Dr. Healy had engaged in a fraudulent 
conspiracy to cover up his malpractice." (App. Br., at 41-42.) However, when one looks 
carefully at the so-called "cover up evidence" to which the Hipwells refer, it is clear that 
much of it was hearsay evidence that could not have been presented - even assuming, 
arguendo, that it were true — without the testimony of Attorney Healy, Attorney Sharp, 
and Ms. DeVries.9 
9
 Consider a sampling: 
18. Thereafter, Attorney Healy discussed this matter 
with the Healy's sister, DeVries. DeVries was the Mormon 
Church Relief Society President for the Hipwells3 L.D.S. ward 
and knew the Hipwell family through her church work. 
DeVries was also at the time an employee of Dr. Healy. 
DeVries contacted the Hipwells and urged them to see Sharp 
in Salt Lake City. DeVries did not tell the Hipwells that she 
was Dr. Healy's sister. 
19. The Hipwells met with and retained Sharp. 
Subsequently, and without the knowledge of the Hipwell 
family, Sharp associated Attorney Healy on the case, agreeing 
to give him forty percent of the fee for little or no work. 
20. In a letter dated February 13, 1989, Attorney 
Healy wrote to Sharp .... 
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This same pattern of unsupported and inadmissible innuendo was evident in the 
Hipwells5 opening "statement53 where the Hipwells argued "evidence55 regarding the 
"conspiracy55 that had nothing to do with Dr. Healy's personal conduct and that could not 
possibly be admitted without the testimony of Attorney Sharp, Attorney Healy, or Ms. 
DeVries. The obvious effect and purpose of this approach was to indelibly taint Dr. 
Heal^s innocent conduct with the arguably less savory conduct of Attorney Sharp and 
Attorney Healy. Clearly Judge Iwasaki5s concern about unfair prejudice had a reasonable 
basis. 
Finally the trial court properly could not and did not focus solely on the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence of admissions by conduct on Dr. Healy alone. The trial court also 
recognized the danger that the web of inferences that the Hipwells sought to weave would 
improperly ensnare IHC as well. [R. 5008 at 1226-59.] It was in this context that the 
trial court ruled that the so-called evidence of admissions by conduct would be unfairly 
prejudicial and would confuse the jury. Accordingly it was not an abuse of discretion for 
Judge Iwasaki to exclude the evidence under Rule 403. 
21 After being associated as co-counsel on Shelly's 
case, Attorney Healy began communicating privileged 
information to Dr. Healy specifically that the Hipwell family 
did not suspect Dr. Healy of medical negligence in his care of 
Shelly. 
22. ...Sharp and Attorney Healy did not obtain a 
complete set of medical records from McKay-Dee. 
(App. Br., at 15-18.) 
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III. JUDGE IWASAKFS EXCLUSION OF DR. DEVORFS TESTIMONY 
REGARDING THE STANDARD OF CARE OF AN EMERGENCY 
MEDICINE SPECIALIST WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND, 
IN ANY EVENT, DOES NOT AFFECT THE VERDICT AS TO DR. HEALY 
The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony is 
admissible, and appellate courts will not disturb such decisions absent an abuse of 
discretion. See Gerbich v. Numed Inc.. 1999 UT 37, H 16, 977 P.2d 1205, 1208. 
Here Judge Iwasaki correctly prohibited Dr. DeVore from testifying as to the 
standard of care governing an emergency medicine specialist. [R. 4567-70; R. 5004 at 
456-61.] Dr. DeVore last worked in an emergency room some 25 years earlier. Moreover, 
Dr. DeVore admitted that when he worked the emergency room, the speciality of 
emergency medicine did not even exist as such and emergency rooms were staffed by 
doctors of multiple, distinct specialties. [R. 5004 at 385.] Even these two facts alone 
demonstrate that Judge Iwasaki did not abuse his discretion in excluding the testimony. 
More importantly, the treatment Shelly received under Dr. Bang's care in the 
emergency room is immaterial and irrelevant to the care Dr. Healy provided. The 
testimony is clear that Dr. Healy was not even made aware of the emergency room visit, 
much less did he play a role in that treatment. [R. 5006 at 935; 5007 at 1111, 1114.] 
For this reason, even if Dr. DeVore had been allowed to testify as to the standard of care 
applicable to Dr. King, it could have had no bearing on the jury's verdict that Dr. Healy 
was not negligent. Accordingly, the Judge's exclusion of this testimony cannot be 
reversible error as to the verdict in favor of Dr. Healy. 
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IV THE HIPWELLS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE, AS IS REQUIRED, 
THAT THE TRIAL COURTS ALLEGED ERRORS WERE HARMFUL. 
An erroneous ruling by a trial court cannot be reversible error unless it is harmful. 
State v. Lafferty. 2001 UT 19, 11 35, 20 P3d 342, 356; Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods.. 939 
P2d 1213, 1219 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989)); 
Tones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp.. 944 P2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997) ("Under Utah law, 
c[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error 
unless it is harmful."') (quoting. Touflas v. Fox TV Stations. 927 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 
1996). "Harmful error occurs where cthe likelihood of a different outcome in the absence 
of the error is sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict."5 Tones, 944 
P2d at 360 (quoting Touflas, 927 P2d at 173). In their brief, the Hipwells make only the 
conclusory allegation that any of the purported errors complained of might have resulted in 
a different outcome. (See e.g., App. Br., at 43.) 
Utah law requires more. "Mere speculation" that the outcome would be different is 
not sufficient. See Tones, 944 P2d at 357, 360 (Utah 1997).10 The Hipwells have failed 
10As the Tones Court held, "In the instant case, Jones offers the mere speculation 
that the jury concluded that a citation may have been issued to Jones in connection with 
the Jones's accident. Jones does not show any probability that the outcome would have 
been different had the evidence of MSHA's failure to cite Jones had been admitted. 
Because Jones has not demonstrated that it was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling to 
exclude this evidence, we need not consider its other contentions." Tones, 944 P.2d at 
360-61. 
Here, the Hipwells offer mere speculation, for instance, declaring that with the 
excluded evidence the "jury could have reasonably inferred35 there was a coverup, that the 
"jury may have rejected" Dr. Healy's testimony, and that the "evidence could have had a 
profound impact on Dr. Healy's credibility." (App. Br., at 41-42.) 
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to demonstrate that there was a "probability that the outcome would have been different" if 
the alleged errors had not been made. See id. In order to demonstrate such a probability 
die Hipwells must essentially marshal all of the evidence supporting the verdict and show 
diat all of the other evidence is not sufficient to maintain confidence in the jury's verdict of 
no negligence. This, the Hipwells have failed to do. This reason alone, justifies affirmance 
of the verdict and judgment as discussed below. See Tones, 944 P.2d at 360-61. 
Even a cursory review of the evidence demonstrates conclusively that the Hipwells' 
allegations of fraud and admissions by conduct would not have changed the outcome of the 
case. The medical evidence and expert testimony in favor of the Defendants was 
overwhelming. 
At trial, the Hipwells advanced three principal criticisms of Dr. Healy's medical care, 
relying almost exclusively on Dr. DeVore's "expert" testimony11 First, the Hipwells 
alleged, through the testimony of Dr. DeVore, that Shelly had severe preeclampsia when 
she visited the emergency room at McKay-Dee and suggested that, therefore, Dr. Healy 
should have prompdy delivered her at that time. [R. 5006 at 797, 811-12; R. 5004 at 
423.] Second, the Hipwells contended - again through testimony of Dr. DeVore — that 
on the morning after her delivery, Shelly's liver ruptured and that Dr. Healy should have 
seen to it that a surgeon repaired her liver at that time. [R. 5004 at 478, 485, 491; R. 
5005 at 508.] Finally, the Hipwells' argued, once again through the testimony of Dr. 
11
 As noted in the Statement of Facts, paragraphs 32 through 37, the jury had a 
myriad of reasons to discount entirely the credibility of Dr. DeVore in this case. 
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DeVore, that the transfer to the University Hospital Intermountain Burn Unit was 
inappropriate. Consider some of the evidence regarding each issue: 
A. Earlier Delivery. Dr. DeVore contended that, when Shelly presented to the 
emergency room on December 12, 1988, she was severely preeclamptic and, therefore, Dr. 
Healy should have delivered her at that time. [R. 5006 at 797, 811-12; R. 5004 at 423.] 
There are a number of fatal problems with Dr. DeVore's theory. First, the overwhelming 
evidence demonstrated that Shelly was not preeclamptic in the emergency room. Dr. 
Martin, a preeminent expert in pregnancy related hypertension and HELLP Syndrome, 
(See SOF at 11 68), testified that Shelly was not hypertensive at the time of the emergency 
room visit and that there was no indication to deliver Shelly prior to the time Dr. Healy 
did. [R. 5009 at 1343-61, 1380-81]. In fact, through cross examination it was 
demonstrated that, in his practice, Dr. DeVore did not himself use the definition of 
hypertension he was advancing and relying upon at trial. [R. 5006 at 783-809, 924.] 
Second — and absolutely dispositive of this issue — is the un-rebutted simple fact 
that Dr. Healy was never informed of Shelly's visit to the emergency room or the 
findings of Dr. King, the emergency room doctor. [R. 5006 at 935; R. 5007 at 1111, 
1114.] Obviously, Dr. Healy cannot be held accountable for failing to act on information 
he never received. In fact, it was Dr. DeVore who saw Shelly first on December 13, 1988, 
the morning following the emergency room visit. [R. 5004 at 430, 432-33.] Dr. DeVore 
examined her. Dr. DeVore performed an ultrasound examination of her baby. Dr. 
DeVore did not diagnose hypertension. Dr. DeVore did not diagnose preeclampsia. Dr. 
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DeVore did not note that Shelly had epigastric pain. Dr. DeVore did not diagnose 
HELLP Syndrome. In fact, Dr. DeVore recommended that Shelly be delivered at that 
time, not because Shelly was at any risk, but because the baby was now demonstrating 
signs of fetal distress. [R. 5006 at 430-34.] Finally - as even Dr. DeVore was forced to 
concede - Dr. Healy followed Dr. DeVore's recommendation and delivered Shelly 
promptly and appropriately at that time. [R. 5006 at 814.] 
On this point, the Hipwells5 failed to provide the jury with factual predicate 
necessary to maintain their claim. They cannot fix this on appeal. 
B. The Liver Rupture. The Hipwells3 second allegation, that Shelly^ liver 
ruptured on the morning following her delivery and that it should have been repaired at 
that time, is likewise contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Once again the only 
"expert" testimony the Hipwells advanced on this issue was that of Dr. DeVore. Dr. 
DeVore is a man whose practice has been almost exclusively limited to maternal-fetal 
ultrasonography for some 15 years. [R. 5006 at 754-58.] Further, Dr. DeVore has never 
operated on a liver or assisted in the operation on a liver. He is not board certified in 
critical/intensive care or internal medicine. He has never had privileges in intensive or 
critical care medicine. He has not read critical care or intensive care literature. In fact, the 
last time he operated on a non-pregnant patient for any condition was some twenty years 
ago when he was a medical resident. [R. 5004 at 492-95, 711; R. 5006 at 737, 742.] The 
fact that the Hipwells chose not to call a critical care specialist, or even a general surgeon, 
to support their claims is telling. 
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In contrast, several highly-qualified surgical and critical care specialists, testified that 
the care Shelly received prior to the actual time of liver rupture, approximately 5:00 p.m., 
was appropriate - even "exemplary" - and that the surgical repair of the liver was timely. 
[R. 5010 at 1562,] Dr. Civetta, chairman of surgery at the University of Connecticut 
School of Medicine, director of surgery at Hartford Hospital in Connecticut, and a 
nationally renowned, widely published expert in surgical critical care who, unlike Dr. 
Devore, has actually operated on and treated patients with ruptured livers, testified that 
Shelly's liver did not rupture until 5 p.m and was prompdy and appropriately repaired. [R. 
5010 at 1556-60, 1563, 1565.] Drs. Baughman and Alder, board certified in 
internal/critical care medicine and general surgery, respectively, testified to the same effect. 
It is hard to imagine that the jury would have disregarded the direct testimony of such 
highly-qualified experts based on the weakly inferential allegations of fraudulent 
concealment. 
C. The Transfer. The Hipwells, again through Dr. DeVore, alleged that Shelly^s 
transfer to the University of Utah Hospital for treatment of her complicated condition, 
including possible necrotizing fasciitis, was a breach of the standard of care. Of course, Dr. 
DeVore has no expertise in necrotizing fasciitis. The only time he has treated a patient 
with necrotizing fasciitis was over twenty years ago when he was still receiving his medical 
training. Since that time, Dr. DeVore has never been consulted to offer advice on a patient 
with suspected necrotizing fasciitis. [R. 5005 at 577-79; R. 5006 at 740, 742.] 
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Moreover, the claim that it is a breach of the standard of care to transfer a critically 
ill patient with very serious, complicated medical conditions from a community hospital to 
a tertiary care facility of nationally recognized excellence is ridiculous on its face. It is all 
the more incredible, given the testimony of Dr. Saffle, an expert in the treatment of 
necrotizing fasciitis who was not retained by either party Dr. Saffle, who treated Shelly, 
testified, without any reason for bias, that the University Hospital Burn Center was the 
right place for her to be. [R. 5012 at 1993.] Even the Hipwells5 own causation witness, 
Dr. Raines, admitted testifying that the University Hospital was the "best place for [Shelly] 
to be." [R. 5007 at 1027.] A tenuous chain of inferential allegations of fraudulent 
concealment, could not create a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have 
changed on this issue either. 
The Hipwells have failed to offer more than mere speculation that their inferential 
"evidence" might have changed the outcome of the case. Further, it is clear that when the 
actual direct evidence that was admitted is considered, the Hipwells5 chain of inferences 
could not, to any reasonable degree of probability, have changed the outcome of the case. 
Accordingly, because none of the alleged errors was "harmful,35 as defined by Utah law, the 
judgment on the verdict should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout a three week trial, the jury in this medical negligence case heard all of 
the Hipwells5 medical evidence relating to Dr. Healy's care and considered the substantial 
testimony of numerous medical experts. They returned a considered verdict of no 
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negligence. On appeal, the Hipwells fail to meet their burden of demonstrating any error 
which could possibly justify overturning the jury's verdict. For all the reasons set forth 
above, Defendant/Appellee Michael J. Healy, M.D. respectfully requests that the judgment 
be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lF day of March, 2002. 
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the 
United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Tab 2 
1 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Tab 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and 
SHAYNE HIPWELL, individually, 
and on behalf of all other 
heirs of Shelly Hipwell, 
and Ashley Michele Hipwell and 
Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell 
appearing by Shayne Hipwell 
as Guardian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba 
McKay-Dee Hospital, MICHAEL 
J. HEALY, M.D., and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Jury Trial Demanded) 
Civil No. 920904182 CV 
Judge Glen K. Iwasaki 
Plaintiffs complain of Defendants and, demanding trial 
by jury, allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Shayne Hipwell is the surviving spouse 
and an heir of Shelly Hipwell ("Shelly"), who died at age 29 
on May 27, 1992, as a direct and proximate result of 
Defendants1 negligence. Plaintiffs bring this action on 
behalf of all adult and minor heirs of the decedent. 
2. Plaintiff Sherry Jensen is the surviving mother, 
former guardian and an heir of Shelly. 
3. Plaintiff Ashley Michele Hipwell, appearing by and 
through her Guardian Ad Litem, Shayne Hipwell, is a surviving 
daughter and heir of Shelly. 
4. Plaintiff Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell, appearing by 
and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Shayne Hipwell, is a 
surviving daughter and heir of Shelly. 
5. Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. ("IHC"), is a Utah 
corporation in the business of owning and operating hospitals. 
IHC is the owner/operator of McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee") 
in Ogden. 
6. Defendant Michael J. Healy ("Dr. Healy") is a 
physician who, at all times relevant hereto, practiced as an 
obstetrician and gynecologist at McKay-Dee, and was the 
attending obstetrician to Shelly. 
7. Does I through X are individuals or entities who 
were in active concert with Defendants in the provision of 
medical services to Shelly and in the commission of the 
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negligent acts that directly and proximately caused her 
damages and death, recovery for which is sought in this 
Complaint. Does I through X are jointly and severally liable 
to Plaintiffs with other named Defendants. The true identify 
of Does I through X is presently unknown to Plaintiffs and 
when their true identity is known, the Complaint will be 
amended to identify them by name. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
8. This court has jurisdiction of this action in 
accordance with the general jurisdictional provisions of § 78-
3-4 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. Venue of this action is 
proper in this court in accordance with the provisions of § 
78-13-7 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, on the grounds and 
for the reasons that IHC is a resident of Salt Lake County. 
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS 
9. Plaintiffs seek recovery from Defendants herein 
for: (a) Defendants' negligence in failing to properly 
diagnose and treat medical complications, including those 
associated with a condition known as HELLP Syndrome suffered 
by Shelly during the latter stages of her pregnancy during 
1988, which resulted in devastating injuries to Shelly and 
ultimately caused her death in May, 1992; (b) for Dr. Healy's 
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fraud and fraudulent concealment of Shelly1s negligence claims 
against Defendants, including a conspiracy to steer Shelly's 
case for medical malpractice to Dr. Healy's brother, Attorney 
Timothy Healy ("Attorney Healy") and to attorney Roger Sharp 
("Sharp"), the brother-in-law of Dr. Healy's sister, and by 
making it appear that an investigation of Defendants' possible 
negligence had been conducted when in fact any investigation 
was a sham; and (3) Defendants' constructive fraud in failing 
to disclose their malpractice to Plaintiffs despite the 
confidential relationship which existed between them, 
especially given Dr. Healy's conduct in obtaining counsel to 




10. In 1988, Shelly and her husband, Shayne, were 
expecting their second child. Around the thirty-seventh week 
of Shelly's pregnancy, Defendant Michael Healy ("Dr. Healy"), 
Shelly1s obstetrician and gynecologist, decided to induce 
Shelly's labor because Shelly and the baby were exhibiting 
intrauterine growth retardation. Induction of labor was 
scheduled for December 13, 1988. 
11. On December 12, 1988, a day prior to the 
scheduled induction of her labor, Shelly reported to the 
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emergency room at McKay-Dee looking and feeling extremely ill 
and complaining of severe abdominal pain along the costal 
margin. She informed the emergency room personnel of the 
severity of her pain and that it definitely was not heartburn. 
In fact, Shelly was exhibiting and complaining of symptoms of 
HELLP Syndrome (hemolysis, elevated liver function and low 
platelet count), which, if not properly diagnosed or properly 
treated, can cause severe injury or death. 
12. The emergency room personnel at McKay-Dee 
summarily diagnosed musculo-skeletal pain and abjectly failed 
to analyze and properly diagnose Shelly1s severe abdominal 
pain. They sent Shelly home with Tylenol that evening, where 
her pain continued, and told her to report back to the 
hospital the following day for the scheduled induction of her 
labor. 
13. Although severe abdominal pain is a symptom 
identified in basic internal medicine texts as something to be 
carefully analyzed and diagnosed, and with an expectant mother 
as a symptom of the onset of HELLP Syndrome, the emergency 
room personnel at McKay-Dee performed none of numerous simple 
and non-invasive diagnostic tests to determine if the 
abdominal pain was incident to the onset of HELLP Syndrome or 
some other serious affliction. 
14. Although Shayne Hipwell had contacted Dr. Healy 
the night of Shelly's visit to the emergency room, Dr. Healy 
did not seek or receive any report from the emergency room 
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personnel, did not order tests of any kind, and did not go to 
the hospital to examine Shelly; nor did Dr. Healy determine 
whether Shelly had a tender liver, even in view of the higher 
incidence of HELLP Syndrome among pregnant women exhibiting 
intra-uterine growth retardation. 
15. Shelly1s pain did indeed evidence the onset of 
HELLP Syndrome, but Defendants entirely overlooked the 
diagnosis until Shelly's health and well-being were grievously 
compromised. If Defendants had diagnosed HELLP Syndrome and 
immediately delivered Shelly's baby, they could have precluded 
the catastrophic developments and events that followed. 
16. On December 13, 1988, the day scheduled to induce 
Shelly's labor and the day after she reported to the emergency 
room, Shelly reported to McKay-Dee still complaining about the 
same severe abdominal pain. Upon information and belief, by 
that time the capsule of Shelly*s liver had begun to stretch 
preparatory to rupture and catastrophic sequelae. 
17. Prior to her baby's delivery by caesarean 
section, Defendants performed a complete blood count on Shelly 
showing her platelet count had dropped from 172,000 the night 
before to 128,000 the next day, which was yet another symptom 
pointing directly to HELLP Syndrome. 
18. While Shelly's abdomen was open during the 
caesarean delivery, Dr. Healy did not examine her liver or her 
other viscera to determine the source of the serious pain 
about which she had been complaining. 
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19. At approximately 9:00 p.m. on December 13, 1988, 
Shelly was received in the recovery room from the delivery 
room still complaining of severe chest and abdominal 
discomfort. By that time her blood pressure had risen 
markedly, signaling pre-eclampsia, a diagnosis that should 
have been obvious by that time and, if Defendants had obtained 
liver function tests from the night before, would have been 
unquestionable. 
20. Sherry Jensen asked Defendants why Shelly was 
still suffering from intense abdominal pain following the 
delivery. Mrs. Jensen was told that the pain was "due to the 
epidural" that had been administered to Shelly. 
21. Shelly's blood pressure continued to rise and on 
December 14, 1988, she was noted to be groggy and pale at 9:00 
a.m. Half an hour later, the attending nurses noted that 
petechiae were apparent --a clear signal of low platelet 
count and another clear marker of the onset of HELLP Syndrome. 
Dr. Healy had seen Shelly half an hour earlier, but failed to 
notice the appearance of petechiae and overlooked the 
implications of Shelly1s tender liver and her plummeting 
platelet count. 
22. By the time the charge nurse was summoned with 
reference to the petechiae, at 10:30 a.m. on December 14, 
1988, Shelly was pale, the petechiae were all the more 
apparent and Shelly was suffering from tachycardia, or rapid 
heartbeat. Her pulse was recorded at 160 beats per minute. 
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23. Upon information and belief, at least by 10:30 
a.m. on December 14, 1988, Shelly's liver had ruptured and she 
was bleeding internally. Her abdomen was distending and 
Defendants should have suspected internal bleeding, whether by 
hepatic rupture or some other cause. Nonetheless, Defendants 
made no such diagnosis, notwithstanding the ease with which 
said diagnosis could have been accomplished with ultra-sound, 
CT scanning, percussion tests on the abdomen or a sample of 
abdominal fluid. 
24. Defendants had all of the necessary information 
to have realized that they had failed to properly diagnose 
HELLP Syndrome and that Shelly was massively hemorrhaging 
internally no later than 11:00 a.m. on December 14, 1988. By 
1:00 p.m. on December 14, 1988, Dr. Baughman, an intensivist 
at McKay-Dee, had concluded that Shelly was suffering from 
probable HELLP Syndrome. From approximately 10:30 a.m. until 
6:30 p.m. on December 14, 1988, Shelly's blood pressure and 
blood platelet count continued to plummet and Shelly continued 
bleeding internally, suffering from progressive hypovolemic 
shock. 
25. As Shelly's condition worsened, Sherry Jensen 
spoke with Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman before they reopened 
Shelly's abdomen. Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman told Mrs. Jensen 
that they had no idea what was wrong with Shelly. 
26. Notwithstanding Shelly!s rapidly worsening 
condition, Defendants waited until 6:30 p.m. on December 14, 
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1988, before they finally performed corrective surgery. At 
that time the surgeon reported finding 3,000 cc's of blood in 
Shelly's abdominal cavity, or approximately two-thirds of her 
entire blood volume, at which time Defendants attempted 
corrective surgery to patch her ruptured liver. 
27. Following corrective surgery, Dr. Alder told Mrs. 
Jensen that Shelly1s liver had in fact ruptured. Nothing was 
said to Mrs. Jensen or Mr. Hipwell by Dr. Healy or anyone on 
behalf of McKay-Dee regarding Defendants' failure to perform 
the cesarean section delivery sooner, Defendants' failure to 
properly and timely diagnose and treat HELLP Syndrome or the 
resulting internal hemorrhaging from which Shelly suffered. 
28. By the time Defendants took steps to address 
Shelly's internal hemorrhaging, they had set in motion and 
directly and proximately caused a series of major afflictions 
and medical complications. Defendants allowed Shelly to 
suffer such prolonged hypertensive shock that oxygen 
deprivation damaged her bodily tissues, which, along with 
hypovolemic shock to Shelly1s lungs, caused Shelly to develop 
Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome CARDS"). Moreover, with 
severely compromised internal organs, Shelly had to be 
respirated. Because of her body's diminished ability to fend 
off micro-organisms and the many new avenues for them to enter 
her, Shelly developed sepsis, fever and nosocomial (hospital-
borne) infections. 
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29. If Defendants had properly and timely diagnosed 
and treated the HELLP Syndrome from which Shelly suffered, and 
had arrested Shelly's internal hemorrhaging and prevented her 
substantial hypovolemic shock, Shelly would not have suffered 
the severe injury to which she was subjected, would not have 
developed complications such as ARDS, would not have acquired 
the infections and sepsis and thus would not have required 
extensive additional medical treatment and exposure to the 
later medical malpractice hereinafter described directly and 
proximately related to Defendants' acts and omissions. 
30. After Shelly*s condition had deteriorated, Dr. 
Healy and the physicians with whom he was consulting at McKay-
Dee decided she should be shipped to the burn center at the 
University of Utah Hospital on what was, on information and 
belief, a mere pretext, i.e., to determine whether she was 
suffering from necrotic fascitis (dead tissue at the surgical 
incision site). The doctors at the University of Utah 
Hospital found no evidence of necrotic fascitis. On 
information and belief, the presence of necrotic fascitis 
could have been diagnosed at McKay-Dee and the negative 
finding would have made it apparent that there was no reason 
to ship Shelly to the University of Utah Hospital. 
31. While Shelly was at the University of Utah 
Hospital, however, a hematology resident decided that a marrow 
biopsy would aid the diagnosis of her thrombocytopenia, or low 
platelet count, and infections. Toward that end, the resident 
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attempted to aspirate Shelly1s sternum and he negligently 
pierced and tore a hole in her heart in the process. 
32. By the time another surgeon was able to perform 
emergency open chest heart massage, Shelly had suffered anoxic 
brain damage, leaving her in a pain-sensitive comatose state. 
The Conspiracy to Conceal Shelly's Claims 
33. Upon learning of Shelly1s injuries, Dr. Healy 
embarked upon a conspiracy with his brother, Attorney Healy, 
and attorney Roger Sharp ("Sharp") (hereinafter collectively, 
referred to as the "Conspirators"), in or about December, 
1988, to fraudulently conceal Shelly1s causes of action 
against Defendants as is hereinafter alleged. The conspiracy 
had the following primary objectives: (a) to solicit Shelly1s 
case against the University of Utah Hospital for Attorney 
Healy and Sharp; (b) to create the appearance that potential 
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee had been duly 
investigated by Shelly1s attorneys, thus commencing the 
running of the statute of limitations; (c) to settle Shelly1s 
case against the University of Utah Hospital as quickly as 
possible, irrespective of Shelly's actual financial and 
medical needs; (d) to convince Shelly's guardians, Sherry 
Jensen and Shayne Hipwell, that neither Dr. Healy nor McKay-
Dee had committed any medical malpractice; and (e) to create 
the appearance, with Sherry Jensen's and Shayne Hipwell's 
signatures on a "Release of All Claims" that all of Shelly1 s 
claims against these Defendants had indeed been released. 
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34. Upon information and belief, the actions and 
omissions of the Conspirators hereinafter alleged were 
intentionally performed or omitted as part of the conspiracy 
and within the scope thereof intentionally to further the 
purposes of the conspiracy. 
35. On information and belief, following learning 
that Shelly's sternum being punctured and her heart lacerated, 
Dr. Healy contacted his brother, Attorney Healy, and the two 
engaged in what Attorney Healy later described, in a letter 
dated February 13, 1989, as in-depth discussion of the case. 
36. After the Healy brothers' discussions of Shelly's 
case, Attorney Healy spoke with their sister, Diane DeVries, 
who was the Relief Society President in Shelly's LDS Ward. At 
the behest of her brothers, DeVries made an unsolicited phone 
call to Sherry Jensen in order to solicit Shelly's malpractice 
case for Sharp. 
37. DeVries did not tell Sherry Jensen that she was 
the sister of Dr. Healy and at no time did DeVries intimate to 
Mrs. Jensen that DeVries' brothers had put her up to making 
the phone call. Nor did DeVries tell Mrs. Jensen that her 
other brother, Attorney Healy, would be involved with Sharp on 
the case. 
38. In the company of Shayne Hipwell, Mrs. Jensen met 
and entered into a Retainer Agreement with Sharp on or about 
February 10, 1989, by which Sharp purported to agree to 
investigate and pursue any and all causes of action on 
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Shelly's behalf as against her numerous care providers. Upon 
information and belief, Sharp and Attorney Healy later agreed 
to divide any fee as between them with 60% going to Sharp and 
40% going to Attorney Healy. They kept their fee-splitting 
arrangement secret from Plaintiffs. 
39. Although Attorney Healy acted with Sharp as 
counsel for Shelly at all pertinent times, neither Sharp nor 
Attorney Healy nor Dr. Healy informed Sherry Jensen or Shayne 
Hipwell about Attorney Healy's involvement until Sharp 
mentioned it for the first time just before Sherry and Shayne 
were appointed as Shelly's guardians by the probate court. At 
that time, Sharp told Mrs. Jensen that there was absolutely no 
conflict of interest or problem presented by Attorney Healy's 
involvement in the case because neither Dr. Healy nor McKay-
Dee had committed any medical malpractice. 
40. Upon information and belief, as part of the 
conspiracy alleged herein, Sharp and Attorney Healy never 
conducted a genuine investigation of the care provided Shelly 
by Defendants. In the letter dated February 13, 1989, in 
which Attorney Healy proposed the above-referenced fee-
splitting arrangement with Sharp, Attorney Healy, prior to any 
investigation of his brother or McKay-Dee, stated the 
following to Sharp: "I have alerted my brother to the fact 
that you may be requesting copies of his medical records which 
is a routine procedure at this point. I have advised him that 
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Shellie's [sic] family had not expressed any concern or 
dissatisfaction over this treatment." 
41. In. fact, Sharp conspired to create the appearance 
that he had obtained the entire set of Shelly1 s medical 
records for the subject period by sending to Shayne Hipwell 
copies of the requests for medical records from Dr. Healy and 
McKay-Dee. Sharp engaged only one expert to review medical 
records from Defendants for the subject period, however, and 
in Sharp's letter of transmittal of medical records to that 
expert, Sharp stated he was sending only a "very abbreviated 
set." Sharp did not send to Plaintiffs a copy of the records 
transmittal letter he sent to the expert. 
42. Upon information and belief, the "very 
abbreviated set" of medical records Sharp sent to the expert 
was carefully selected to steer that expert away from opining 
that Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee had breached the standard of 
care. Upon information and belief, the purported 
"investigation" of Defendants by Sharp and Attorney Healy was 
merely a sham and in fact was part and parcel of the 
conspiracy initiated by Dr. Healy and his brother, Attorney 
Healy, to shield Dr. Healy and, in the process, McKay-Dee, 
from liability for their breach of the standard of care in 
treating Shelly, while enriching Attorney Healy with a share 
of Shelly1 s settlement with the University of Utah Hospital. 
43. For the remaining three years of her life 
following the puncture of her heart, Shelly struggled 
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miserably in a pain-sensitive comatose state. As a direct and 
proximate result of Defendants' negligence, Shelly died while 
at St. Benedicts Hospital, on May 27, 1992. As a direct 
result of the conspiracy to fraudulently conceal Defendants1 
malpractice and/or of Defendants' constructive fraud, as 
alleged herein, no cause of action was asserted against 
Defendants for their malpractice until this lawsuit was filed. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence/Wrongful Death) 
44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 43 of this Second Amended 
Complaint. 
45. Defendants were negligent in their treatment of 
Shelly while a patient at the McKay-Dee emergency room on 
December 12, 1988. Defendants' negligence continued through 
Shelly's stay at McKay-Dee prior to her shipment to the 
University of Utah Medical Center. Defendants' negligence 
included, but is not limited to, Defendants' failure to 
properly diagnose Shelly1s reports of abdominal pain when she 
reported to the emergency room, Defendants' failure to perform 
the necessary examination and diagnosis that would have 
revealed the presence of HELLP Syndrome, Defendants' failure 
to properly diagnose Shelly's severe internal hemorrhaging 
after the rupture of her liver, Defendants' failure to respond 
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to Shelly's state of hypovolemic shock within a reasonable 
time and Defendants' exposure of Shelly to further foreseeable 
medical complications and medical malpractice at the 
University of Utah burn center. 
46. The standard of care applicable to Defendants was 
to properly diagnose a serious internal problem and to conduct 
further diagnostic procedures to identify or rule out the 
serious problem from which Shelly in fact suffered. The 
above-referenced facts, at a minimum, clearly called for 
consultation in the emergency room with an obstetrician in 
consideration of possible HELLP syndrome. Post-operatively, 
the applicable standard of care called for Defendants to 
properly diagnose Shelly as suffering from some manner of 
hepatic dysfunction and, after her liver ruptured, of internal 
hemorrhaging and to properly treat those complications. 
47. Defendants' negligence directly and proximately 
caused Shelly to suffer severe pain and anguish for the three 
years following her treatment at McKay-Dee and the University 
of Utah Hospital burn center, and directly and proximately 
caused her death. 
48. Shelly's entitlement to damages for three years 
of suffering, and her loss of ability to enjoy and live her 
life, survived her death. Plaintiffs are entitled, in 
Shelly's stead to recover from Defendants all damages incurred 
and suffered by Shelly including, but not limited to, damages 
for Shelly's suffering, loss of ability to enjoy and live her 
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life for three years, loss of income and the cost and expense 
of proper medical and custodial treatment, all in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
49. As a direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of Defendants, as set forth above, Plaintiffs and 
Shelly's other heirs have suffered severe losses and are 
entitled to recover against Defendants for such losses, 
including, but not limited to, the loss of support, loss of 
assistance and services to the family, loss of probability of 
inheritance and loss of society, companionship, happiness of 
association, care, support, advice, guidance and nurturing of 
wife and mother, and financial losses and expenses of medical 
and custodial care and burial expenses. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Fraud/Fraudulent Concealment Against Dr. Healy) 
50. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 4 9 of this Second Amended 
Complaint. 
51. The Conspirators conspired to commit fraud and to 
fraudulently conceal Shelly's claims against Dr. Healy and 
McKay-Dee by omitting to state material facts and making 
numerous misrepresentations regarding material facts, for 
which Dr. Healy is responsible and culpable as if he had made 
said representations or omissions himself. The Conspirators1 
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misrepresentations and omissions concerned presently existing 
material facts including, but not limited to, the following: 
(a) Dr. Healy's intentionally omitting to inform 
Plaintiffs, at any time while he was Shelly1s 
physician, of the particulars of Defendants1 breach of 
the standard of care as alleged hereinabove, and his 
representation that he did not know what was wrong 
with Shelly at the time she was under his care; 
(b) Dr. Healy's representation to Sherry Jensen 
and Shayne Hipwell, in or around December, 1988, that 
it was necessary to ship Shelly to the University of 
Utah Burn Center for diagnosis and treatment of 
necrotic fascitis when, in fact, the purported 
presence of necrotic tissue could have been diagnosed 
at McKay-Dee and would have obviated any purported 
need to ship Shelly to the University of Utah 
Hospital; 
(c) Dr. Healy's repeated failure, despite 
regular contact with Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell 
following Shelly's heart puncture, to inform Sherry or 
Shayne of his role in shepherding the case into the 
hands of his brother, Attorney Healy, and Sharp; 
(d) Dr. Healy's failure to disclose the 
conversations with his brother, Attorney Healy, 
respecting Shellyfs legal claims; and 
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(e) The failure of Dr. Healy to disclose the 
express or tacit understanding that only certain 
records relating to Dr. Healy's care of Shelly would 
be reviewed and that Dr. Healy would be assured only a 
"routine" review of his care would be made. 
52. The Conspirators knew that the misrepresentations 
were false when they were made, knew the omissions were 
material, and knew, or should have known, of their duty to 
inform Shelly and Plaintiffs of the material facts relating to 
Defendants' various breaches of the standard of care. The 
Conspirators made those misrepresentations and omissions for 
the purpose of concealing the claims against Defendants and 
intended Plaintiffs to rely upon the misrepresentations and 
omissions. 
53. Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of the omissions and the falsity 
of the representations, did in fact rely upon those 
representations and were thus induced to sign a contingency 
agreement on behalf of Shelly with Sharp, to forego the 
prosecution of a malpractice action against Dr. Healy and 
McKay-Dee. 
54. As a direct and proximate result of the fraud of 
Dr. Healy, as set forth above, Shelly, as well as her heirs, 
have suffered severe losses and are entitled to recover 
against Defendants for such losses including, but not limited 
to, the pain and suffering of Shelly in the last months of her 
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life and all damages accrued as a result of Defendants' 
negligence as alleged above. Additionally, the heirs of 
Shelly are entitled to recover against Defendants for their 
severe losses including, but not limited to, the loss of 
support, loss of assistance and services to the family, loss 
of probability of inheritance and loss of society, 
companionship, happiness of association, care, support, 
advice, guidance and nurturing of wife and mother, and 
financial losses and expenses of medical and custodial care. 
55. Based upon the intentionally false 
misrepresentations as alleged above, Plaintiffs are entitled 
to punitive damages in the amount that is reasonable according 
to the proof adduced at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Constructive Fraud Against All Defendants) 
56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the 
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Second Amended 
Complaint. 
57. Defendants held a special position of trust and 
confidence with respect to Shelly and her guardians, which 
position arose by virtue of their relationship to Shelly as 
her caretakers and physicians. Additionally, Dr. Healy 
assumed further fiduciary responsibilities to Shelly and her 
guardians when he undertook affirmative actions directly and 
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indirectly to obtain and secure legal counsel for Shelly in 
the form of his family members and relations who purportedly 
agreed to represent Shelly in possible claims against Dr. 
Healy, McKay-Dee and the University of Utah Hospital. 
58. Defendants knew, or should have known, that they 
had breached the standard of care with respect to their 
failure to properly and timely diagnose and treat the HELLP 
Syndrome and internal hemorrhaging from which Shelly suffered. 
59. Despite the fiduciary and confidential 
relationship they had with Shelly, Defendants failed to inform 
Shelly, or Shelly1s guardians, of the material facts relevant 
to Defendants' breach of the standard of care. Plaintiffs 
further allege, on information and belief, that Drs. Healy and 
Baughman affirmatively misrepresented to Sherry Jensen that, 
prior to reopening Shelly's abdomen, they did not know what 
was wrong with her. Defendants1 failure to disclose the 
material facts relevant to that malpractice constitutes a 
breach of the trust and confidence Shelly placed in 
Defendants. 
60. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants1 
breaches and violations of the confidence and trust placed in 
them by Shelly, Shelly and Plaintiffs, her family, have been 
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
61. In performing the actions hereinabove alleged, 
Defendants acted maliciously and with the intent of injuring 
Shelly, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to recover punitive 
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damages in an amount that is reasonable according to the proof 
adduced at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief against 
Defendants as follows: 
1. For special damages, including the costs and 
expenses of medical and custodial treatment, funeral and 
burial, lost income and other economic losses in amounts to be 
proven at trial; 
2. For general damages, including damages for the 
loss of a wife and mother, damages for the conscious pain and 
suffering of decedent Shelly suffered by her prior to her 
death as a result of the negligent treatment of Defendants, 
and other general damages, all in amounts to be proven at 
trial; 
3. On the Second and Third Causes of Action, for 
punitive damages in the amount that is reasonable according to 
the proof adduced at trial. 
4. For Plaintiffs' costs herein and attorney's fees 
as allowed by law; and 
5. For such other and further relief as is 
appropriate and just in the circumstances. 
DATED this /^T day of September, 1993 
BURBIDj3g^~^TQ4ELL 
RICftARD D. B U R S T O G E - — ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
js hipwell.3\amcom.3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a 
copy of the within Third Amended Complaint to the following 
parties by depositing the same in U.S. mails, postage prepaid, 
this £7 day of September, 1993: 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
(IHC Hospital) 
Attn: Legal Department, James Gilson 
36 South State, 21st Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sherry JENSEN and Shayne Hipwell, individually 
and on behalf of all 
other heirs of Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele 
Hipwell and Kaycie Shaylene 
Hipwell appearing by Shayne Hipwell as guardian ad 
litem, Plaintiffs, 
Appellants, and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, 
and Michael J. Healy, M.D. and 
Does I through X, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-
Appellant. 
No. 950164. 
April 4, 1997. 
Opinion Granting Rehearing 
Aug. 22, 1997. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1997. 
Patient's family sued physician and hospital for 
wrongful death arising out of medical malpractice. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Division I, Glenn 
Iwasaki, J., granted summary judgment for 
defendants on limitations grounds. Family appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) 
wrongful death claims were governed by two-year 
statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions; 
(2) limitations period began running when plaintiffs 
discovered, or should have discovered, underlying 
injury; (3) genuine issue of fact as to whether 
physician's fraudulent concealment tolled statute of 
limitations precluded summary judgment; (4) 
patient's children were not entitled to bring wrongful 
death claim such that they were not entitled to 
provisions of tolling statute; on motion for rehearing; 
(5) genuine issues of fact existed as to whether 
physician's alleged fraudulent concealment could be 
impute to hospital so as to toll limitations period on 
claim against hospital; and (6) family did not present 
evidence to support constructive fraud claim against 
hospital, and thus such a claim could not toll 
limitations period. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
HI Statutes €=>188 
361kl88 
HI Statutes €^>223.2(.5) 
361k223.2(.5) 
HI Statutes €=>223.4 
361k223.4 
When faced with two statutes that purport to cover 
same subject, Supreme Court determines legislature's 
intent as to which statute applies by following 
general rules of statutory construction, which provide 
both that best evidence of legislative intent is plain 
language of statute and that more specific statute 
governs instead of more general statute. 
[2] Physicians and Surgeons ^ ^ 1 8 . 1 5 
299kl8.15 
Two-year statute of limitations governing medical 
malpractice actions covered action by patient's family 
for wrongful death arising out of medical 
malpractice. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4. 
131 Death € = > 3 9 
117k39 
Statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death 
claims arising out of medical malpractice begin to 
run at time patient or plaintiff discovers or, through 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs. U.C.A.1953, 78-
14-4. 
141 Death € = > 3 9 
117k39 
Absent any reason to toll two-year statute of 
limitations governing deceased patient's medical 
malpractice claims, patient's family could not bring 
survival claim, where statute had run by time patient 
died. U.C.A.1953, 78-11-12, 78-12-37, 78-14-4. 
151 Judgment €^>181(7) 
228kl81(7) 
Genuine issue of fact as to whether physician's 
alleged fraudulent concealment prevented patient's 
family from inquiring into possibility of medical 
malpractice on part of physician and hospital 
precluded summary judgment in favor of physician 
and hospital on statute of limitations grounds in 
family's wrongful death action arising out of medical 
malpractice. U.C.A.1953, 78- 14-4. 
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161 Death € = ^ 3 9 
117k39 
Deceased patient's minor children were not entitled to 
bring action for wrongful death because patient had 
appointed guardian at time of her death, such that 
tolling statute did not prevent statute of limitations 
from running on children's claims against physician 
and hospital for wrongful death arising out of 
medical malpractice. U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7, 78-12-
36,78-14-4. 
121 Fraud €=^>38 
184k38 
Patient's family's claim of fraudulent concealment of 
medical malpractice was governed by two-year 
medical malpractice statute of limitations, even 
though complaint alleged common-law fraud; 
common-law fraud allegations surrounded fraudulent 
concealment claim that physician acted to divert 
family's attention away from his alleged malpractice. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4. 
181 Limitation of Actions € ^ 1 0 4 ( 1 ) 
241kl04(l) 
"Fraudulent concealment doctrine" is mechanism 
whereby plaintiff can avoid full operation of 
discovery rule by making prima facie showing of 
fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that 
given defendant's actions, reasonable plaintiff would 
not have discovered claim earlier. 
191 Limitation of Actions €^>104(1) 
241kl04(l) 
Generally, fraud committed by third party in 
concealing a cause of action against another 
defendant will not toll statute of limitations as to that 
defendant; however, where there is agency or privity 
relationship between third party committing fraud 
and defendant, liability for third party's fraud can be 
imputed to defendant if third party acts whole or in 
part to carry out purposes of defendant. 
[101 Judgment €=^181(7) 
228kl81(7) 
Genuine issues of fact as to whether physician was 
hospital's agent and whether physician acted in whole 
or in part to further aims of hospital when he 
allegedly colluded with attorneys to conceal medical 
malpractice action precluded summary judgment 
action for hospital on statute of limitations grounds in 
wrongful death action arising out of medical 
malpractice. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4. 
[Ill Fraud €^=>7 
184k7 
[111 Fraud € ^ > 1 6 
184kl6 
Constructive fraud requires confidential relationship 
between parties and failure to disclose material facts. 
[12] Limitation of Actions € ^ 1 9 7 ( 2 ) 
241kl97(2) 
Patient's family failed to present evidence to support 
constructive fraud claim against hospital, based on 
claim that a hospital physician failed to disclose that 
he had committed medical malpractice in treating 
patient, and thus constructive fraud could not be used 
to toll statute of limitations on family's medical 
malpractice claims against hospital, where family did 
not present evidence to contradict physician's 
deposition testimony that patient received exemplary 
care. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4. 
*328 Richard D. Burbidge, Stephen B. Mitchell, 
Gary R. Johnson, Salt Lake City, and Simon H. 
Forgette, Kirkland, WA, for plaintiffs. 
James W. Gilson, Kathy A. Lavitt, Salt Lake City, 
forlHC. 
Elliott J. Williams, Kurt M. Frankenburg, Salt Lake 
City, for Dr. Healy. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
The trial court granted summary judgment for 
defendants IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee 
Hospital ("McKay-Dee"), and Michael J. Healy, 
M.D. ("Dr. Healy"), ruling that plaintiffs Sherry 
Jensen and Shayne Hipwell's action was barred by 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 
78-14-4 of the Utah Code. Jensen and Hipwell 
appealed the grant of summary judgment under 
section 78-2-2(3)(i) of the Utah Code. We reverse 
and remand to the trial court for resolution of a fact 
question relevant to the tolling of the statute of 
limitations. 
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A detailed recitation of the facts is necessary to 
understand the complex legal issues presented by this 
appeal. " 'Before we recite the facts, we note that in 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.' " 
K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 
1994) (quoting Hizzins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231, 233 (Utah 1993)). *329 Because McKay-Dee 
and Dr. Healy moved for summary judgment, we 
state the facts in the light most favorable to Jensen 
and Hipwell. 
Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell are, respectively, 
the surviving mother and husband of Shelly Hipwell. 
They seek to recover for Shelly's wrongful death on 
behalf of themselves and as legal guardians of 
Shelly's two minor daughters (collectively "Shelly's 
family"). On December 12, 1988, the day before a 
scheduled induced delivery of her second daughter, 
Shelly experienced severe abdominal pain and went 
to the emergency room of McKay-Dee Hospital. 
After being sent home, Shelly returned to McKay-
Dee on December 13th for a caesarian delivery of her 
baby. Shelly experienced various complications at 
McKay-Dee after the delivery, which Shelly's family 
claims were the result of malpractice and negligence 
on the part of McKay-Dee and Dr. Healy, Shelly's 
obstetrician. On December 23rd, Shelly was 
transferred to the University of Utah Hospital for 
further treatment. At University Hospital, Shelly 
suffered anoxic brain damage after a resident 
physician punctured her heart with a biopsy needle, 
leaving her in a coma, totally and permanently 
disabled. Shelly subsequently died some three and a 
half years later, on May 27, 1992. 
In early 1989, while Shelly was at University 
Hospital in a coma, Dr. Healy discussed Shelly's case 
with his brother, attorney Tim Healy. After this 
discussion, attorney Healy had discussions with the 
Healys' sister, Diane DeVries. In the course of those 
discussions, attorney Healy asked DeVries to call 
Shelly's family and recommend attorney Roger 
Sharp, a Salt Lake attorney who specialized in 
medical malpractice cases. DeVries had known 
Shelly's family for some time. DeVries contacted 
Shelly's family but did not tell them that the Healys 
were her brothers, nor did she tell them that she was 
also Dr. Healy's file clerk. Shelly's family retained 
attorney Roger Sharp on February 10, 1989, to 
represent Shelly in a medical malpractice case. 
Three days later, attorney Healy wrote to attorney 
Sharp, confirming a fee-splitting arrangement. 
Shelly's family was not aware of attorney Healy's 
Copr. © West 2002 No « 
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involvement in the case or of Diane DeVries' 
relationship with Dr. Healy and attorney Healy. The 
letter from attorney Healy to attorney Sharp makes 
clear that attorney Healy was communicating with 
Dr. Healy about attorney Sharp's investigation and 
implies that attorney Sharp's investigation of Dr. 
Healy's treatment was to be minimal. 
As part of his investigation, attorney Sharp sent a 
document request to Dr. Healy, seeking "a copy of all 
medical records regarding [Shelly] Hipwell." Dr. 
Healy did not produce a copy of all medical records, 
but instead produced a selective set of documents that 
he personally reviewed. Attorney Sharp never 
received a copy of Shelly's complete medical records 
from Dr. Healy. By letter, attorney Sharp also 
requested a copy of Shelly's complete medical 
records from McKay-Dee Hospital. However, he 
subsequently orally limited that request and 
ultimately received only limited medical records 
from McKay-Dee. On May 6, 1989, attorney Sharp 
and Shelly's family settled her case against University 
Hospital for $250,000, the amount of the previously 
effective statutory cap on damages against the 
University .JFN1J 
FN1. This court struck down the statutory 
cap on medical malpractice damages as 
unconstitutional on May 1, 1989, in 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 
P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), approximately five 
days before Shelly's family agreed to the 
$250,000 settlement offered by the 
University. Attorney Sharp knew of our 
decision in Condemarin when the settlement 
was agreed to, and his actions in that case 
have been the subject of litigation. See 
Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993). 
In mid-1989, Shelly was transferred from McKay-
Dee Hospital, to which she had returned from 
University Hospital on April 14, 1989, to the 
Greenery, a rehabilitation facility in Washington 
State. Carol Pederson, a social worker at the 
Greenery, contacted attorney Simon Forgette on 
August 10, 1989, to request that he provide an 
opinion of the settlement in Shelly's case and 
evaluate the conduct of her attorneys in settling the 
case. At that time, Forgette's memos to the file 
regarding the possible new case indicate that Forgette 
understood that Shelly's liver had been lacerated 
during her caesarian delivery at McKay-Dee. On 
August 29th, Forgette *330 contacted Pederson, who 
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assured him that she had the family's permission to 
discuss Shelly's case. She identified Sharp as Shelly's 
Utah attorney. That same day, Pederson wrote a 
letter to Forgette in which she stated, "Ms. Jensen 
[Shelly's mother] has requested you to offer an 
opinion on the settlement reached in this case, and 
advise the family regarding any further legal action 
which might be indicated." On September 18th, 
Forgette reviewed medical records provided by 
Pederson and asked that she arrange for a meeting 
with Ms. Jensen, Shelly's mother. His understanding 
at that time was still that Shelly's liver had been 
lacerated at McKay-Dee. Forgette's memo to his file 
also indicates that he needed to determine "the statute 
of limitations on bringing any claim against hospitals 
or against attorneys." 
On October 19, 1989, Ms. Jensen, Shelly's mother, 
traveled to Washington and met with Forgette to 
discuss Shelly's case. Ms. Jensen orally retained 
Forgette on this date and Forgette was to request a 
copy of attorney Sharp's file. Forgette's memo to the 
file at this time indicates that he was working with a 
Utah attorney who was doing some background 
investigations regarding Shelly's case and the 
settlement with University Hospital. This attorney 
wanted to "remain in the background" because he had 
worked with attorney Sharp in the past and received a 
significant amount of business from McKay-Dee. 
The memo to the file also indicates that, after 
meeting with Shelly's mother, Forgette's 
understanding was that Shelly's liver "had been either 
damaged or had burst" while she was at McKay-Dee. 
On October 20th, Forgette wrote to Sharp requesting 
a copy of his file on Shelly. By December 14th, Ms. 
Jensen still had not signed a formal retainer and 
Forgette had still not received Sharp's file. On that 
date, Forgette drafted a retainer agreement to send to 
Ms. Jensen, which provided that Forgette was to 
handle claims against McKay-Dee Hospital, 
University Hospital, Roger Sharp, attorney Healy 
and/or others. On December 26th, Forgette received 
a portion of Sharp's file, but he did not receive the 
entire file until February 15, 1990. In the meantime, 
the present plaintiffs, Ms. Jensen and Shayne Hipwell 
(Shelly's husband), signed Forgette's written retainer 
agreement on January 17, 1990. 
When Forgette received Sharp's file on February 
15th, he learned of attorney Healy's involvement in 
the case and learned that Sharp's file did not contain a 
complete set of medical records from Dr. Healy or 
McKay-Dee Hospital. Forgette did not file a notice 
of intent to commence suit in the instant case against 
McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy until almost two 
years later, on December 16, 1991.JTN2] Shelly 
Hipwell died on May 27, 1992, *331 and Forgette 
filed the complaint in this suit on July 29, 1992. 
FN2. Section 78-14-8 of the Utah Code 
provides that a medical malpractice action 
may not commence "unless and until the 
plaintiff gives the prospective defendant ... 
at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action." If the filing of the 
notice of intent comes less than 90 days 
before the end of the limitations period for 
filing a medical malpractice action, the 
limitation period "shall be extended to 120 
days from the date of service of notice." Id. 
Further, within 60 days of filing a notice of 
intent, the plaintiff must submit a request for 
prelitigation panel review. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14- 12(l)(c)(2)(a). But see 
Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131 (Utah 
1992) (holding that action may not be 
dismissed for failure to file request for 
prelitigation review within 60 days of notice 
of intent). That section also provides that 
upon filing a request for prelitigation 
review, the statute of limitations is tolled 
until 60 days after the prelitigation panel 
issues its opinion. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-12(3). 
We note that Shelly's family filed its notice 
of intent on December 16, 1991, but did not 
file its lawsuit until July 29, 1992, more than 
120 days after filing the notice of intent. 
Both parties before this court briefed the 
issues as if December 16, 1989, the date two 
years before the filing of the notice of intent, 
was the relevant date for statute of 
limitations purposes. We can only assume 
that Shelly's family's failure to file its 
lawsuit within 120 days of that date was due 
to their having filed a request for 
prelitigation review and waiting for the 
panel's decision. However, we find no 
indication of this in the record. If Shelly's 
family did not file a prelitigation review 
request, the filing of the lawsuit more than 
120 days after the filing of the notice of 
intent may be fatal to the entire suit. See 
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1980) (holding that where notice of 
intent was filed less than 90 days before 
running of limitations period and lawsuit 
was not filed within 120 days of filing notice 
of intent, suit was properly dismissed). We 
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do not address this issue because it was not 
presented to us. 
After allowing the parties to complete discovery, the 
trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Healy 
and McKay-Dee on February 21, 1995, ruling that 
the two-year statute of limitations governing medical 
malpractice actions contained in section 78-14-4 of 
the Utah Code had run by December of 1991, when 
Forgette filed his notice of intent. On appeal, 
Shelly's family makes a series of arguments, which 
are summarized below. 
First, Shelly's family contends that the wrongful 
death statute of limitations, section 78-12-28(2) of 
the Code, applies to their wrongful death claims. 
They argue that their claims cannot be barred until 
two years after Shelly's death because the wrongful 
death statute of limitations does not begin to run until 
the decedent's death. In the alternative, they argue 
that if the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
contained in section 78- 14-4 of the Code applies in 
cases of wrongful death due to medical malpractice, 
the two-year period it contains should not begin to 
run until the decedent's death. We reject both these 
claims. 
Second, Shelly's family asserts that the running of 
the statute of limitations on both Shelly's personal 
injury claims (which survived her death and are now 
asserted by her family) and their wrongful death 
claims should be tolled because of Dr. Healy's 
alleged fraudulent concealment of the facts upon 
which their claims are grounded. The trial court 
ruled that Shelly's family's oral retention of attorney 
Forgette on October 19, 1989, more than two years 
before the filing of the notice of intent, "demonstrated 
that Forgette was in possession of facts whereby he 
knew or should have known that [Shelly] Hip well's 
condition was caused or possibly caused by 
negligence on the part of McKay-Dee Hospital and 
Dr. Healy." We conclude that this is a disputed issue 
of fact that precludes summary judgment. 
Third, Shelly's family argues that Shelly Hipwell's 
minor children should be allowed to proceed with 
claims for wrongful death because the children's 
minority tolled the statute of limitations as to their 
claims. Last, Shelly's family argues that they should 
be allowed to proceed on their separate claims for 
common law fraud, which are governed by a three-
year statute of limitations. We reject both claims. 
Returning in depth to Shelly's family's first argument 
concerning the statute of limitations that applies to 
their wrongful death claims: Shelly's family reasons 
that because this is a claim for wrongful death, 
section 78-12-28(2) of the Code, which governs 
wrongful death, is the applicable statute of 
limitations, rather than the Medical Malpractice Act 
statute of limitations contained in section 78-14-4, as 
the trial court held. Shelly's family further argues 
that the two-year limit in the wrongful death statute 
does not begin to run until the decedent's death. 
[11 When we are faced with two statutes that purport 
to cover the same subject, we seek to determine the 
legislature's intent as to which applies. In doing this, 
we follow the general rules of statutory construction, 
which provide both that "the best evidence of 
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute," 
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 
(Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)), and that 
" 'a more specific statute governs instead of a more 
general statute.' " De Baritault v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1996) (quoting Pan 
Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1991) 
(citations omitted)). In this case, the Medical 
Malpractice Act's plain language indicates a 
legislative intent to have the statute apply to claims 
such as the ones Shelly's family seeks to bring. 
[2] The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
specifically provides, "No malpractice action ... may 
be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers ... the injury." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. The Act defines 
"malpractice actions" to which the Act was intended 
to apply as "any action against a health care provider, 
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, 
wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged 
personal injuries relating to or arising out of health 
care rendered or which should have been rendered by 
the health care provider." Id. *332 § 78-14- 3(14) 
(emphasis added). Clearly, the legislature intended 
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act apply to 
actions for wrongful death based upon personal 
injuries arising out of medical malpractice. Further, 
this statute is more specific than the general wrongful 
death statute of limitations, applying as it does only 
to wrongful death actions arising out of medical 
malpractice. Therefore, we hold that the two-year 
statute of limitations governing medical malpractice 
actions covers this action for wrongful death arising 
out of medical malpractice. 
Shelly's family next argues that if the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations governs their claims 
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for wrongful death, the event that begins the running 
of the statute is the decedent's death. The medical 
malpractice statute of limitations provides that a 
medical malpractice action must be brought "within 
two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
4(1) (emphasis added). Shelly's family argues that 
the "injury" in a wrongful death case arising out of 
medical malpractice is not the malpractice itself but 
is, rather, the death. They argue that because there 
can be no cause of action for wrongful death until 
death occurs, the statute of limitations on their claims 
cannot begin to run until Shelly's death. 
We have held that an action for wrongful death is an 
independent action accruing in the heirs of the 
deceased, Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 
189, 186 P.2d 293, 303(1947). This is conceptually 
compatible with Shelly's family's assertion of a right 
to proceed independent of any analysis of Shelly's 
predeath rights against her physicians. However, we 
have not entirely separated the heirs' right from the 
decedent's because the heirs' right is in major part 
based on rights of support, both financial and 
emotional, that run to them from the deceased. 
Accordingly, we have held that the wrongful death 
cause of action is based on the underlying wrong 
done to the decedent and may only proceed subject to 
at least some of the defenses that would have been 
available against the decedent had she lived to 
maintain her own action. See, e.g., Kelson v. Salt 
Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1989) 
(comparative negligence). The question here is 
whether we should separate the death from the 
causative wrong sufficiently to permit a wrongful 
death action where the decedent's personal injury 
cause of action had been barred at the time of death. 
We decline to adopt such a rule. 
r31T41 As one of the foremost authorities on the law 
of torts has observed, the rationale underlying the 
rule barring the heirs from bringing a wrongful death 
suit after the injured patient has brought suit on the 
underlying personal injury action is that "the injured 
individual is not merely a conduit for the support of 
others, he is master of his own claim and he may 
settle the case or win or lose a judgment on his own 
injury even though others may be dependent upon 
him." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5th ed. 1984). The 
majority of states refuses to allow a decedent's heirs 
to proceed with a wrongful death suit after the 
decedent has settled his or her personal injury case or 
won or lost a judgment before dying. Id. Given the 
underlying rationale, and given that the core purpose 
of any statute of limitations is to compel exercise of a 
right within a reasonable time to avoid stale claims, 
loss of evidence, and faded memories, Horton v. 
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 
1989), we see no reason to impose a different rule 
regarding the heirs' maintenance of a wrongful death 
suit where an injured patient has chosen to let the 
statute of limitations run on the underlying personal 
injury claim rather than settling or litigating the 
claim. Therefore, we hold that in wrongful death 
claims arising out of medical malpractice, the 
applicable statute of limitations is section 78-14-4 of 
the Code, and the statute begins to run at the time the 
"patient discovers or, through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs," meaning the time the patient 
discovers or should have discovered the medical 
malpractice injury. Thus, Shelly's family's wrongful 
death claims are barred by the statute of limitations, 
unless, as we discuss *333 below, the statute was 
tolled for some reason.JTN3] 
FN3. Shelly's family also argues that they 
are entitled to proceed with Shelly's personal 
injury/medical malpractice claims as her 
personal representatives and/or heirs under 
the survival statutes. The survival statutes 
provide that a deceased person's personal 
injury action does not abate when that 
person dies, but rather survives the person's 
death and may be brought by the deceased's 
personal representatives or heirs. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-11-12. However, if the 
person has not brought suit before her death, 
her personal representatives or heirs may 
bring suit only if the person died before the 
time allowed for bringing suit had expired, 
and then they must bring suit within one 
year of the person's death. See id. § 78-12-
37. 
Absent any reason to toll the statute, the 
two-year statute of limitations governing 
Shelly Hipwell's medical 
malpractice/personal injury claims, section 
78-14-4, had run by the time she died. If 
Shelly did not bring suit before the time 
allowed for doing so had expired, her 
personal injury cause of action did not 
survive her death, and thus her family 
cannot bring a survival claim. 
Notwithstanding the two-year statute of limitations 
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governing their claims, Shelly's family argues that 
they are entitled to maintain these actions because the 
statute of limitations was tolled by Dr. Healy and 
attorney Healy's fraud sufficiently long that attorney 
Forgette's notice of intent was timely. Disposition of 
this claim requires a rather in-depth discussion of the 
complex law of fraudulent concealment. 
Fraudulent concealment requires that one with a 
legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts 
remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material 
facts known to him. 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud & Deceit § 
145 (1968). Such a duty or obligation may arise 
from a relationship of trust between the parties, an 
inequality of knowledge or power between the 
parties, or other attendant circumstances indicating 
reliance. Id. The party's silence must amount to 
fraud, i.e., silence under the circumstances must 
amount to an affirmation that a state of things exists 
which does not exist, and the uninformed party must 
be deprived to the same extent as if a positive 
assertion had been made. Id. Such "[concealment or 
nondisclosure becomes fraudulent only when there is 
an existing fact or condition ... which the party 
charged is under a duty to disclose." Id. Making use 
of a device that misleads, some trick or contrivance 
that is intended to exclude suspicion and prevent 
inquiry, may also amount to fraudulent concealment. 
Id. It is this aspect of fraudulent concealment that is 
at issue in the instant case. 
Applying the facts of Shelly's case to these 
requirements, Shelly's family's argument must run as 
follows: (i) Dr. Healy was in a position of superior 
knowledge and was the beneficiary of Shelly's and 
her family's trust; (ii) this superior knowledge and 
position of trust created a duty to disclose material 
facts regarding Shelly's care; (iii) Dr. Healy knew of 
his brother's involvement with attorney Sharp and 
knew of the cursory nature of attorney Sharp's 
investigation but did not disclose these facts to 
Shelly's family or, alternatively, concealed them from 
Shelly's family to divert attention from his alleged 
malpractice; (iv) Dr. Healy knew that Shelly's family 
would rely on attorney Sharp's investigation to 
uncover any malpractice on his part, thus creating a 
duty on his part to disclose the facts of his association 
with attorneys Healy and Sharp; (v) in this manner, 
Dr. Healy used his position of influence with his 
brother and attorney Sharp to divert Shelly's family's 
attention away from his care of Shelly, thereby 
preventing them from discovering the facts 
constituting the alleged malpractice. 
Once this argument is reduced to its basic elements, 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim 
it is clear that attorney Sharp's investigation cannot 
be used to start the statute of limitations running 
against Shelly's claims. TFN41 What is not as clear is 
whether Dr. *334 Healy's alleged fraudulent 
concealment was sufficient to continue tolling the 
statute of limitations once Shelly's family retained 
attorney Forgette in the fall of 1989. As noted 
above, Shelly's family contends that they had no facts 
that could have led them to suspect malpractice by 
Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee until February of 1990, 
when they discovered the relationships among Dr. 
Healy, attorney Healy, Diane DeVries, and attorney 
Sharp. In contrast, Dr. Healy contends that attorney 
Forgette considered Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee as 
potential defendants in a medical malpractice suit on 
Shelly Hipwell's behalf as early as December 14, 
1989, as evidenced by his retainer agreement 
prepared on that date, which included references to 
Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. Shelly's family 
presented attorney Forgette's affidavit as evidence 
that he included Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee in his 
retainer agreement with Shelly's family merely to 
"cover all the bases" but was retained solely to 
investigate legal malpractice on the part of attorney 
Sharp in settling Shelly's claims against University 
Hospital for her punctured heart. 
FN4. Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee argue that 
attorney Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy 
and McKay-Dee Hospital in early 1989 
triggered the statute of limitations as to 
medical malpractice claims against Dr. 
Healy and McKay-Dee. We decline to 
follow this logic on the facts as they are 
presented to us. While under general 
principles of agency law, the knowledge of 
an agent is to be imputed to the principal, it 
is well established that, where the agent has 
interests in the transaction adverse to the 
principal's, or where the agent colludes with 
third parties whose interests are adverse to 
the principal's interests, knowledge of the 
facts at issue will not be imputed to the 
principal. See 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 290 
(1986). In the instant case, attorney Sharp's 
fee-splitting agreement with attorney Healy 
and the implication in attorney Healy's letter 
to attorney Shaip that Sharp's investigation 
of Dr. Healy's care of Shelly was to be 
minimal indicate that attorney Sharp was, at 
the least, acting in concert with third parties 
whose interests were adverse to Shelly 
Hipwell's. Therefore, his investigation of 
Dr. Healy and his consideration of Dr. Healy 
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and McKay-Dee as potential defendants in a 
malpractice action cannot be used to start 
the statute of limitations running on Shelly's 
claims. 
The trial court made what amounts to a mixed 
finding of fact and conclusion of law on disputed 
evidence, to wit, that Forgette's "oral retention of 
October 19, 1989 clearly demonstrated that Forgette 
was in possession of facts whereby he knew or should 
have known that [Shelly] Hipwell's condition was 
caused or possibly caused by negligence on the part 
of McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy." (Emphasis 
added.) This finding and conclusion is inappropriate 
on a motion for summary judgment. "Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues 
of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." K & T, Inc., 888 
P.2d at 626-27 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Higzins, 855 P.2d at 235). " 'We determine ... 
whether the trial court ... correctly held that there 
were no disputed issues of material fact.' " IcL 
(quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989)). Here, the trial court erred. 
The error committed here directly parallels that 
made by the trial court in Berenda v. Lang ford, 914 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1996). In Berenda, we specifically 
stated: 
The application of this legal rule [of fraudulent 
concealment] to any particular set of facts is 
necessarily a matter left to trial courts and finders 
of fact.... [W]e explicitly acknowledge that 
weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs 
conduct in light of the defendant's steps to conceal 
the cause of action necessitates the type of factual 
findings which preclude summary judgment in all 
but the clearest of cases. Thus, summary 
judgment is appropriate only when the facts fall on 
two opposite ends of a factual continuum: either 
(i) when the facts are so clear that reasonable 
persons could not disagree about the underlying 
facts or about the application of the governing legal 
standard to the facts or (ii) when the facts 
underlying the allegation of fraudulent 
concealment are so tenuous, vague, or 
insufficiently established that they fail to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to concealment, 
with the result that the claim fails as a matter of 
law. 
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54. In that case, we held 
that the plaintiffs letters to his partner/defendant 
reflecting the plaintiffs suspicion that the partner was 
misappropriating partnership assets were insufficient 
to underlie a trial court finding that the plaintiff was 
under a duty to make inquiries, which would have led 
to discovery of the cause of action. Id^ We found 
that the letter equally supported the plaintiffs 
contention that he voiced his suspicions in the letters 
in an attempt to find out if the company "was really 
broke." M We said that "while it may be 'a close 
call,' ... we cannot agree that, as a matter of law, the 
two letters demonstrate that [plaintiff] should have 
suspected [defendant's] wrongdoing or, more 
importantly, that an inquiry would reasonably *335 
have led to discovery of the misappropriation." Id. at 
55. 
\5] The issue before the trier of fact in this case is 
whether attorney Forgette discovered or reasonably 
should have discovered the legal injury done to 
Shelly Hipwell before December 16, 1989. In other 
words, the jury must determine whether the facts in 
this case indicate that Dr. Healy's fraudulent 
concealment somehow prevented Shelly's family, 
who, by retaining attorney Forgette, had defeated the 
collusion of Dr. Healy with his brother and attorney 
Sharp, from inquiring into the possibility of medical 
malpractice on the part of Dr. Healy and McKay-
Dee. The question becomes: Would a reasonable 
attorney, presented with the facts that attorney 
Forgette knew in December of 1989, have considered 
investigating a medical malpractice case against Dr. 
Healy and McKay-Dee? This is a genuine issue of 
material fact, which precludes summary judgment in 
this case. Therefore, we remand to the trial court on 
this issue, the outcome of which will determine 
whether Shelly's family is entitled to proceed on both 
their survival claims and their wrongful death claims. 
Shelly's family's next argument is that even though 
the statute of limitations bars the adult plaintiffs, 
Shelly's children were minors at the timeof her injury 
and death and, therefore, section 78-12-36, the tolling 
statute, came into play and prevented the statute of 
limitations from running on their claims against Dr. 
Healy and McKay-Dee. 
[6] This argument fails because the children's 
situation does not fit within the tolling statute's terms. 
Section 78-12-36 provides, "If a person entitled to 
bring an action ... is at the time the cause of action 
accrued, [i] either under the age of minority or 
mentally incompetent and [ii] without a legal 
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (bracketed material 
added). Shelly's children were not entitled to bring 
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an action for wrongful death because Shelly had an 
appointed guardian at the time of her death._[FN5] 
The wrongful death statute provides: 
FN5. A separate question we do not address 
is whether the tolling statute would have 
applied to save the children's wrongful death 
claims even though the statute of limitations 
had run on Shelly's underlying personal 
injury claims by the time she died. 
When the death of a person not a minor is caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, 
or his personal representatives for the benefit of his 
heirs, may maintain an action for damages against 
the person causing the death.... If such adult 
person has a guardian at the time of his death, only 
one action can be maintained for the injury to or 
death of such person, and such action may be 
brought by either the personal representatives of 
such adult deceased person, for the benefit of his 
heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of the 
heirs.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (emphasis added). The 
statute thus clearly provides that if a guardian has 
been appointed, only the personal representative or 
guardian may bring suit and the heirs are no longer 
entitled to maintain an action. In this case, Shayne 
Hipwell and Sherry Jensen were appointed as Shelly's 
guardians. Under the statute's plain language, 
Shelly's children were not entitled to bring an action 
for her wrongful death, and the tolling statute 
becomes irrelevant as the children had no claims. 
[7] As a final argument, Shelly's family seeks to 
avoid the two-year medical malpractice statute of 
limitations by bringing their claim within the three-
year fraud statute of limitations. During the 
pendency of the litigation below, Shelly's family 
amended their complaint to allege common law 
fraud. Shelly's family argues that the statute of 
limitations for fraud, section 78-12-26(3), governs 
these fraud claims, giving them three years from the 
time they discovered the facts constituting the fraud 
in which to bring their action. The trial court ruled 
that section 78-14-4(l)(b), the two- year medical 
malpractice statute of limitations, governed Shelly's 
family's claims for fraud. Alternatively, the court 
held that if the three-year statute applies, Shelly's 
family had established sufficient issues of material 
fact to withstand summary judgment on their fraud 
claims. Shelly's family seeks reversal of the first 
prong of *336 this holding, and Dr. Healy and 
McKay-Dee seek reversal of the second. We uphold 
the trial court's ruling that the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations governs Shelly's family's fraud 
claims, and we need not reach the second ruling. 
[81 As stated above, when faced with two statutes 
that purport to cover the same subject, our primary 
duty "is to determine legislative intent, and the best 
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of 
the statute." Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879. A settled rule 
of statutory construction, which helps us determine 
legislative intent, provides that "a more specific 
statute governs instead of a more general statute." De 
Baritault, 913 P.2d at 748 (citation omitted). The 
medical malpractice statute of limitations provides a 
two-year limit on bringing medical malpractice 
actions. The statute includes a discovery rule, 
providing that the two-year limitations period does 
not begin to run until the "patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1). In Utah, the discovery 
rule includes the judicially created doctrine of 
fraudulent concealment. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at 
51. The fraudulent concealment doctrine is a 
mechanism whereby a plaintiff "can avoid the full 
operation of the discovery rule by making a prima 
facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then 
demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a 
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the 
claim earlier." M The medical malpractice statute of 
limitations, with its discovery rule and that rule's 
fraudulent concealment doctrine, applies to every 
"malpractice action against a health care provider." 
As noted above, the statute defines "malpractice 
action against a health care provider" to include 
actions for wrongful death "based upon alleged 
personal injuries relating to or arising out of health 
care rendered or which should have been rendered by 
the health care provider." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
3(14). Thus, the medical malpractice act's two-year 
statute of limitations applies to cases of fraudulent 
concealment arising out of medical malpractice. 
In contrast, the three-year fraud statute of 
limitations, section 78- 12-26, applies to any action 
"for relief on the ground of fraud." The fraud statute 
of limitations is thus far broader than the medical 
malpractice act, and our rules of statutory 
construction provide that the more specific medical 
malpractice act applies instead of the more general 
fraud statute of limitations. 
Shelly's family argues that it has made a general 
fraud claim and a constructive fraud claim in addition 
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to, and distinct from, their claims of fraudulent 
concealment discussed above. However, we can 
find nothing in their allegation of fraud or 
constructive fraud that is in any way different from 
their claims of fraudulent concealment. All the 
allegations raised by Shelly's family surround their 
claim that Dr. Healy acted to divert the family's 
attention away from his alleged malpractice when he 
had a duty to disclose the facts of his relationship 
with attorneys Healy and Sharp. The only damages 
arising out of Shelly's family's claims for fraud and 
constructive fraud relate to the possibility that they 
were prevented from discovering the facts 
constituting their claim for medical malpractice. 
While we acknowledge that there may be cases 
where a doctor commits fraud on a patient in a way 
that would not be covered by the medical malpractice 
act's fraudulent concealment provision, this is not 
such a case. Given the specific facts alleged in this 
case, we cannot agree that Shelly's family's fraud 
claim amounts to anything more than or is different 
from a claim of fraudulent concealment of medical 
malpractice.JFN6] See *337Gillman v. Department 
of Fin. Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989) 
(rejecting attempts to recast claim for damages 
arising out of regulators' licensing decision as claim 
for negligence to avoid governmental immunity). 
FN6. Shelly's family claims that this reading 
of the statutes would violate their right to 
uniform operation of laws under article I, 
section 24 of the Utah Constitution. They 
argue that, read as outlined above, the 
medical malpractice statute creates two 
classes of people, those defrauded by health 
care providers and those defrauded by 
others, and provides a shorter statute of 
limitations for the former than for the latter. 
We decline to address this issue as it is 
inadequately researched and briefed. See 
Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 
(Utah 1996); Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. 
Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 
909 P.2d 225, 234 (Utah 1995); State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); 
Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. 
Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 
1079 (Utah 1988); State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
As we recently noted in Monson v. Carver, 
we may refuse to address a claim of 
unconstitutionality where the party making 
the claim has failed to make the requisite 
showing to support the claim. 928 P.2d 
1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). " '[A] reviewing 
court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is 
not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research.' " Id, (quoting 
Butler, 909 P.2d at 230-31) (additional 
citations omitted). In this case, as in 
Monson, we are particularly loath to address 
a. claim of unconstitutionality of a statute 
where the outcome would "critically depend 
on factual research" into the effectiveness of 
these differing statutes of limitations in 
furthering the legislature's purported goals. 
In conclusion, we hold that Shelly's family's 
wrongful death claims are governed by the two-year 
statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions 
contained in section 78-14-4 of the Utah Code. We 
further conclude that the limitations period starts 
running when the patient or plaintiff discovers, or 
through the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, the underlying injury and its origins in 
medical malpractice. We remand this case for a 
factual finding as to whether Shelly's family's claims 
of fraudulent concealment will toll the statute of 
limitations as to their wrongful death and survival 
claims. We hold that the deceased's children were 
not entitled to bring a wrongful death claim because 
their mother had a guardian appointed at the time of 
her death and thus the children were not entitled to 
the provisions of the tolling statute. Finally, we hold 
that Shelly's family's claims for common law fraud 
are also governed by the two-year medical 
malpractice statute of limitations found in section 78-
14-4 and decline to reach their claims of the 
unconstitutionality of this reading of the statute. 
RUSSON, HOWE, EVES, and HALLIDAY, JJ., 
concur in Chief Justice ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
Having disqualified themselves, Associate Chief 
Justice STEWART and Justice DURHAM do not 
participate herein; District Judge J. PHILLIP EVES 
and District Judge BRUCE K. HALLIDAY sat. 
On Petition for Rehearing 
This court now grants rehearing and issues this 
opinion without hearing oral argument. We address 
whether we should uphold summary judgment in 
favor of defendant McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-
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Dee") because plaintiffs Shayne Hipwell and Sherry 
Jensen's wrongful death action against McKay-Dee 
was barred by the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. In our 
prior opinion in this case, we reversed the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment as to all defendants and 
remanded on the issue of whether defendant Michael 
J. Healy's ("Dr. Healy") alleged fraud in collaborating 
with plaintiffs' original attorney was sufficient to toll 
the statute of limitations on their medical malpractice 
claims once they had retained an independent 
attorney. Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 
337 (1997). We further held that Jensen and 
Hipwell's attempt to recharacterize their medical 
malpractice wrongful death claim as a claim for fraud 
was not sufficient to avoid the two-year medical 
malpractice statute of limitations. Id. at 337. In its 
petition for rehearing, McKay-Dee now claims that 
summary judgment in its favor should have been 
upheld because (i) Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the 
statute of limitations as to Jensen and Hipwell's 
claims against McKay- Dee; and (ii) Jensen and 
Hipwell's allegations of fraud on the part of McKay-
Dee were properly dismissed by the trial court. 
We begin with a brief review of the facts relevant to 
our decision on rehearing. Because we are 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
parties, Jensen and Hipwell. Id. at 328. Jensen and 
Hipwell allege that Dr. Healy, who had staff 
privileges at McKay-Dee but was not employed by 
McKay-Dee, committed malpractice on Shelly 
Hipwell (Jensen's daughter and Hipwell's wife) while 
she was a patient at *338 McKay-Dee. They claim 
that, to cover his alleged malpractice, he and a 
McKay-Dee doctor fraudulently transferred Shelly to 
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell further 
allege that Dr. Healy then colluded with his brother, 
attorney Tim Healy, and attorney Roger Sharp to 
prevent Jensen and Hipwell from learning of the 
malpractice Dr. Healy had allegedly committed. 
Jensen and Hipwell made no allegation that McKay-
Dee knew about Dr. Healy's collusion with his 
brother and attorney Sharp. 
In our prior opinion, we held that Jensen and 
Hipwell's allegations of fraud against Dr. Healy were 
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations on their 
claims as long as they retained attorney Sharp. Id. at 
336. However, we remanded to the trial court on the 
issue of whether Dr. Healy's alleged fraud was 
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations after Jensen 
and Hipwell retained independent counsel but before 
that counsel had actual knowledge of the facts 
constituting Dr. Healy's alleged fraud. Id. at 336-
337. The issues we now address are (i) whether Dr. 
Healy's alleged fraud can also act to toll the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee; and (ii) whether 
Jensen and Hipwell's allegations of fraud on the part 
of McKay-Dee are sufficient to toll the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee. These issues were not 
discussed in our initial opinion. 
[91f 101 As to the first issue, whether Dr. Healy's 
fraudulent collusion with Jensen and Hipwell's 
original attorney can toll the statute of limitations as 
to McKay-Dee, the general rule is that fraud 
committed by a third party in concealing a cause of 
action against another defendant will not toll the 
statute of limitations as to that defendant. See 51 A. 
Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 150 (1970). Where, 
however, there is an agency or privity relationship 
between the third party committing the fraud and the 
defendant, our cases indicate that liability for the 
agent's negligent or intentional tort can be imputed to 
the principal if the agent acts in whole or in part to 
carry out the purposes of the principal. See Hodges 
v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1057 
(Utah 1989). fFNll On the record before us, we 
cannot determine whether Dr. Healy's fraud in 
colluding with attorney Sharp and attorney Healy 
should be imputed to McKay-Dee absent two factual 
findings: (i) that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's agent; 
and (ii) that Dr. Healy acted in whole or in part to 
further the aims of McKay-Dee. The complaint 
makes no allegations regarding these issues. We 
remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 
FN1. The cases cited also include two other 
factors to consider in determining whether 
an agent's conduct will be imputed to the 
principal in the employment context: (i) 
whether the employee's conduct is of the 
general kind the employee is expected to 
perform; and (ii) whether the employee's 
conduct occurred within the hours of the 
employee's work and ordinary spatial 
boundaries. Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156; 
Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1056-57. As Dr. Healy 
was not McKay-Dee's employee, these 
criteria would not seem to apply to the 
question of whether Dr. Healy's acts fall 
within the scope of any agency relationship 
he may have had with McKay-Dee. 
If the trial court finds that Dr. Healy was McKay-
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Dee's agent and that he acted at least in part to further 
McKay-Dee's aims, it should impute liability for Dr. 
Healy's fraud to McKay-Dee and toll the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee to the same extent it is 
tolled as to Dr. Healy. [FN21 If, on the other hand, 
the trial court finds either that Dr. Healy was not 
McKay-Dee's agent or that Dr. Healy acted "entirely 
on personal motives unrelated to [McKay-Dee's] 
interests," Hodges, 811 P.2d at 157, then Dr. Healy's 
fraud does not toll the statute of limitations as to 
McKay-Dee and Jensen and Hipwell's claims against 
McKay-Dee are barred. 
FN2. We note, however, that this issue will 
be moot if the fact finder determines, 
pursuant to our prior opinion, that Jensen 
and Hipwell's complaint was not timely filed 
because Dr. Healy's fraud did not toll the 
statute of limitations long enough. See 
Jensen, 944 P.2d at 337. 
Moving to the second issue raised on rehearing, 
Jensen and Hipwell argue that the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee should be tolled 
because of fraud allegedly committed by McKay-
Dee, through one of its doctors, in participating in an 
allegedly fraudulent transfer of Shelly Hipwell from 
McKay-Dee to University Hospital. Jensen *339 
and Hipwell did not originally argue that McKay-Dee 
had committed fraud that would toll the statute of 
limitations. Their complaint did, however, include a 
count of constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. 
The trial court held first that the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations, section 78-14-4 of the Code, 
barred Jensen and Hipwell's claim of constructive 
fraud against McKay-Dee. In the alternative, the 
trial court ruled that the claim was "unsupported by 
the facts" and that there was "insufficient evidence to 
submit this matter to a jury as the fact finder." In our 
original opinion, we upheld the trial court's finding 
that Jensen and Hipwell's claim for constructive fraud 
amounted to nothing more than a claim for medical 
malpractice, which would be barred by the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations. Jensen, at 337. 
We did not address, however, the contention that 
Jensen and Hipwell's allegations of constructive fraud 
on the part of McKay-Dee would be sufficient to toll 
the statute of limitations on Jensen and Hipwell's 
medical malpractice claims against McKay-Dee. 
We find that the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment to McKay-Dee, ruling that Jensen and 
Hipwell's constructive fraud claim was insufficiency 
supported by the evidence and therefore could not be 
used to toll the statute of limitations. 
Addressing the merits of this claim requires a careful 
analysis of the relative burdens of proof and 
production involved in making and opposing a 
motion for summary judgment. As noted above, 
when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we 
view all facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Id. at 328. On a motion for 
summary judgment, the moving party bears the 
burden of proof for its motion, namely, the burden of 
proving that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. However, in opposing 
a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff still has 
the ultimate burden of proving all the elements of his 
or her cause of action. Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, 
Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). Further, once 
challenged, the party who opposed such a motion 
must come forward with sufficient proof to support 
his or her claim, particularly when that party has had 
an opportunity to conduct discovery. Celotex Corp. 
v. CatretU 411 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 
2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party 
opposing a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his [or her] pleading, but his [or her] 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial" Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e) (emphasis added). Put another way, once the 
moving party has brought forth evidence either 
tending to prove a lack of genuine issue of material 
fact or challenging the existence of one of the 
elements of the cause of action, the nonmoving party 
then bears the burden of "provid[ing] some evidence, 
by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the essential 
elements of his [or her] claim." Thayne, 874 P.2d at 
124. 
ril][121 In this case, Jensen and Hipwell failed to 
provide any such evidence to support their claim of 
constructive fraud. Constructive fraud requires two 
elements: (i) a confidential relationship between the 
parties; and (ii) a failure to disclose material facts. 
See Blodzett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301-02 (Utah 
1978); 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § § 4, 15 
(1968). Jensen and Hipwell's complaint alleges both 
(i) that McKay- Dee's employee, Dr. Baughman, had 
a confidential relationship with Shelly and her family 
as one of her treating physicians, and (ii) that Dr. 
Baughman failed to disclose that he had committed 
medical malpractice in treating Shelly. McKay-Dee's 
motion for summary judgment did not challenge 
Jensen and Hipwell's assertion that Dr. Baughman 
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had a confidential relationship with Shelly and her 
family. McKay-Dee's motion, however, did dispute 
Jensen and Hipwell's allegation that Dr. Baughman 
failed to disclose his alleged malpractice. McKay-
Dee produced the deposition of Dr. Baughman, 
wherein he states, "I have no question at all that 
[Shelly] received care that's exemplary, that could be 
used as an example of the management of a good 
operation." Dr. Baughman further indicated that he 
held that belief at the time he provided Shelly's care. 
McKay-Dee properly challenged Jensen and 
Hipwell's allegation that Dr. Baughman had failed to 
discharge *340 his duty to disclose material facts to 
them, namely, the fact that he had committed 
malpractice, by producing Dr. Baughman's deposition 
in which he states that he did not believe and does not 
believe that he committed malpractice. 
Jensen and Hipwell, however, as the nonmoving 
parties, utterly failed to meet their burden of coming 
forward with evidence to contradict Dr. Baughman's 
deposition testimony. In their opposition to McKay-
Dee's motion for summary judgment, Jensen and 
Hipwell simply reiterate the allegations of their 
complaint and provide no support for their claim that 
Dr. Baughman failed to tell them that Shelly had 
been "left to bleed internally for several hours before 
accurately diagnosing her illness." Dr. Baughman's 
deposition testimony specifically and directly 
challenges Jensen and Hipwell's assertion, and they 
failed to provide any evidence to support their claim. 
Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that there was 
insufficient evidence to submit the matter to a jury. 
Because Jensen and Hipwell's claim of constructive 
fraud against McKay-Dee was insufficiently 
supported by the evidence, such a claim cannot be 
used to toll the statute of limitations on their medical 
malpractice claims against McKay-Dee. 
We remand to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Shelly HIPWELL, an individual by and through her 
guardians, Sherrie 
JENSEN and Shayne Hipwell, Plaintiffs and 
Appellees, 
v. 
Roger SHARP, Tim W. Healy, and Does I through X, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 920218. 
Aug. 11,1993. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 1993. 
Client brought legal malpractice action in connection 
with settlement of medical malpractice action. The 
District Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, 
J., denied attorneys' motion for summary judgment. 
Attorneys appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., 
held that reasonableness of legal advice on settling 
medical malpractice claim for Governmental 
Immunity Act's $250,000 damages cap had to be 
judged on law existing at time services were 
rendered. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, Associate C.J., concurred in the result. 
West Headnotes 
HI Attorney and Client € = > H 2 
45kll2 
Reasonableness of legal advice in settling medical 
malpractice claim for Governmental Immunity Act's 
$250,000 damages cap had to be judged on law 
existing at time services were rendered, including 
Supreme Court decision in Condemarin v. University 
Hospital holding that Act's damage recovery limit 
was unconstitutional as applied to hospital. U.C.A. 
1953,63-30-34(1). 
121 Attorney and Client €=>105 
45kl05 
Evaluation of reasonableness of attorney's services 
must be based on law as it existed at time services 
were rendered, not after subsequent legal malpractice 
action is filed. 
*987 Richard D. Burbidge, Stephen B. Mitchell, 
Gary R. Johnson, Salt Lake City, and Simon H. 
Forgette, Kirkland, WA, for plaintiffs. 
Glenn C. Hanni, David R. Nielson, Salt Lake City, 
for Sharp. 
Thomas L. Kay, Mark O. Morris, Paul D. Newman, 
Salt Lake City, for Healy. 
Intervenor R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Debra J. 
Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendants Roger Sharp and Tim Healy filed this 
interlocutory appeal after the trial court denied their 
motions for summary judgment. We affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendants' motions and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. FACTS 
"[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." TFN11 We state the facts here 
accordingly. 
FN1. Hizzins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231, 233 (Utah 1993); Smith v. Batchelor, 
832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992). 
This is a legal malpractice action filed on behalf of 
Shelly Hipwell ("Hipwell") by her guardians Sherrie 
Jensen and Shayne Hipwell. Hip well's guardians 
brought suit against her former attorneys for 
allegedly failing to adequately research and 
investigate her medical malpractice claim against the 
University of Utah Medical Center before settling 
that claim for $250,000. 
Hipwell's ordeal began on December 13, 1988, when 
the twenty-six-year-old was admitted to McKay-Dee 
Medical Center in Ogden, Utah, suffering from 
complications in connection with her pregnancy. 
She was transferred to the University Hospital (the 
"Hospital") in Salt Lake City for further *988 
treatment on December 23, 1988. On January 18, 
1989, a resident physician punctured and lacerated 
Hipwell's heart while attempting to perform a bone 
marrow biopsy. The error caused her to become 
comatose and suffer severe brain damage, rendering 
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her totally and permanently disabled. She died on 
May 27, 1992, after this suit was filed. 
On February 10, 1989, Hipwell's guardians retained 
defendants to represent Hipwell's interests in a 
medical malpractice action. Approximately three 
months later, defendants advised Hipwell's guardians 
to enter into a settlement agreement with the 
University Medical Center, releasing it from all 
claims that Hipwell may have had against the 
Hospital or its employees. No lawsuit was ever filed 
on Hipwell's behalf, and no doctors or other 
employees who were present when the allegedly 
negligent procedure was performed were interviewed 
by defendants before the claim was settled. 
In the complaint in this action, Hipwell's guardians 
alleged that defendants breached the duty of care 
owed to her by failing to adequately research and 
investigate the relevant facts and law before settling 
her malpractice claim for an amount far less than her 
actual damages. Specifically, she claimed that 
defendants advised settlement without taking into 
consideration our decision in Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, TFN21 which was decided six 
days before the settlement agreement was finalized. 
FN2. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
In Condemarin, we declared that the $250,000 
damage recovery limit (the "cap") in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") was 
unconstitutional as applied to the Hospital. [FN31 
Hipwell's guardians allege, among other things, that 
the case was worth far more than $250,000 and that 
encouraging settlement for that amount when the cap 
did not apply to the Hospital constituted legal 
malpractice. 
FN3. Id. at 366. The damage recovery limit 
provision is located at Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-34(1). 
Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that Condemarin's invalidation of the cap was 
incorrect or, alternatively, that a 1987 amendment to 
the Act remedied any constitutional infirmity that the 
cap presented in Condemarin. Hence, defendants 
alleged, settling Hipwell's malpractice claim for the 
maximum amount permitted under section 63-30-
34(1) of the Act was reasonable as a matter of law. 
The trial court denied defendants' motions, and this 
Copr. © West 2002 No 
interlocutory appeal followed. 
On appeal, defendants ask us to reexamine our 
holding in Condemarin regarding the 
constitutionality of the cap. They againclaim that if 
we find that Condemarin was flawed or that the 1987 
amendment remedied the Act's constitutional 
deficiency, then their decision to settle cannot be 
negligent and summary judgment in their favor 
should be granted. 
The parties have presented interesting arguments 
concerning the continuing viability of our decision in 
Condemarin. However, this case does not present 
the situation in which those arguments can be 
addressed.. The sufficiency of the professional 
advice rendered by defendants must be judged based 
on the law as it existed when such advice was 
actually given. 
II. GOVERNING LAW 
HI Defendants ask this court to rule that 
Condemarin^ holding as to the Hospital's liability is 
incorrect and then retroactively apply a decision 
addressing Condemarin to protect them from a 
negligence claim arising from their representation of 
Hipwell in 1989. This court had just decided 
Condemarin when defendants recommended that 
Hipwell's guardians settle the claim against all 
potential defendants associated with the Hospital. 
Condemarin held that the cap, which limited the 
amount injured plaintiffs could recover from the 
Hospital for the negligent acts of hospital employees, 
violated article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
and was unconstitutional. [FN41 Hence, under the 
*989 law existing at the time, Hipwell's recovery 
against the Hospital, where she was a patient, was not 
limited to $250,000._[FN5] 
FN4. Condemarin, 115 P.2d at 366. A 
majority of the court agreed that because the 
open courts clause was implicated, the cap 
must be analyzed under a heightened level 
of scrutiny for constitutional purposes. 
However, the court disagreed as to whether 
the correct constitutional analysis should be 
under the state equal protection or due 
process doctrine. Id. at 352-66 (Durham, 
J.); id. at 366 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); 
id. at 369 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
FN5. Defendants claim that Condemarin, 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
858P.2d987 
(Cite as: 858 P.2d 987) 
Page 3 
which was limited to the Hospital, does not 
apply to the facts of this case because the 
allegedly negligent physician was employed 
by the college of medicine, not by the 
Hospital. Whether the Hospital was 
sufficiently involved in Hipwell's injury 
such that Condemarin applies should be 
determined on remand. 
[2] It is well settled that an evaluation of the 
reasonableness of an attorney's services must be 
based on the law as it existed at the time such 
services were rendered, not after a subsequent legal 
malpractice action is filed._[FN6] As the Supreme 
Court of California stated in a legal malpractice 
action: 
The defendants challenge Condemariris premise that 
both the state (and therefore the state-owned 
Hospital) and municipal corporations were subject to 
suit at common law when exercising proprietary 
functions._[FN8J Defendants assert that at common 
law the state was actually completely immune from 
suit regardless of whether it was engaged in a 
governmental or a proprietary function. Therefore, 
the argument continues, a legislative limitation on the 
amount of recovery against the state does not 
abrogate a common law right, and the open courts 
clause is not implicated. The common law 
distinction between the state and municipal 
corporations was not raised by the parties in 
Condemarin and thus was not addressed by the court 
in that case. 
FN6. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal.3d 349, 118 
Cal.Rptr. 621, 625, 530 P.2d 589, 593 
(1975), overruled on other grounds by In re 
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 126 
Cal.Rptr. 633, 641, 544 P.2d 561, 569 
(1976); Gruse v. Belline, 138 Ill.App.3d 
689, 93 Ill.Dec. 297, 302, 486 N.E.2d 398, 
403 (1985); Martin v. Northwest 
Washington Legal Servs., 43 Wash.App. 
405, 717 P.2d 779, 782 (1986); see also 
McCafferty v. Musat, 817 P.2d 1039, 1043 
(Colo.Ct.App. 1990); Walker v. Bangs, 92 
Wash.2d 854, 601 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1979). 
See generally 1 Roland E. Mallen & Jeffrey 
M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 14.11 (3d 
ed. 1989). 
We cannot, however, evaluate the quality of 
defendant's professional services on the basis of the 
law as it appears today. In determining whether 
defendant exhibited the requisite degree of 
competence in his handling of plaintiffs divorce 
action, the crucial inquiry is whether his advice 
was so legally deficient when it was given.... 
FFN71 
FN7. Smith, 530 P.2d at 593 (emphasis 
added). 
Therefore, the reasonableness of defendants' decision 
to recommend settlement against all potential 
defendants in Hipwell's medical malpractice claim is 
governed by Condemarin, which was the applicable 
law at the time. 
FN8. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 349-51. 
In any event, the merits of defendants' argument 
need not be addressed at this time. Even if we were 
to revisit Condemarin now, any change we might 
make could not be utilized by defendants. The 
"serendipity defense," in which an attorney attempts 
to use case law decided after he or she rendered 
allegedly negligent advice to fend off a malpractice 
claim, has been rejected. [FN91 Therefore, whether 
this court chooses to reevaluate a case long after the 
alleged negligent advice was given can have no effect 
on the present malpractice suit against defendants. 
FN9. See Aloy v. Mash, 38 Cal.3d 413, 212 
Cal.Rptr. 162, 166-68, 696 P.2d 656, 661-62 
(1985) (court rejected attorney's argument 
that he was not negligent because the claim 
he failed to assert in 1971 "luckily turned 
out to be worthless in 1981," when he was 
sued for malpractice). 
Defendants also claim that the 1987 amendment to 
section 63-30-2 of the Act, which was not discussed 
specifically by the Condemarin court, remedied the 
Act's constitutional deficiency and reinstated the cap 
as to the Hospital. rFNIOl Defendants claim that 
*990 subsection 63-30-2(4) reimposed governmental 
immunity for the Hospital by obliterating the 
distinction between "governmental" and "non-
governmental" and "essential" and "non-essential" 
that Condemarin relied on in determining that the 
Hospital does not qualify for immunity under the Act. 
The 1987 amendment, defendants point out, was in 
place when the decision to settle Hipwell's case was 
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FN12. Defendants moved to strike Hipwell's 
reply brief filed on appeal. Because we 
FN10. In 1987, the legislature added have resolved the issues contained in the 
subsection 63-30-2(4), which states in brief on other grounds, we need not rule on 
pertinent part: the motion to strike, 
(a) "Governmental function" means any act, 
failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity 
whether or not the act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking is 
characterized as governmental, proprietary, 
a core governmental function, unique to 
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, 
essential to or not essential to a government 
or governmental function, or could be 
performed by private enterprise or private 
persons. 
The constitutional status of subsection 63-30-2(4) 
was not at issue in Condemarin. However, 
changing the language of that section cannot by itself 
remedy the Act's constitutional deficiency as set forth 
in Condemarin. TFN111 Moreover, there is no 
indication in the record in this case that defendants 
were aware of the amendment or relied on it when 
they made the decision to settle. On the contrary, 
defendants' testimony to the probate court when 
receiving approval for the settlement on Hipwell's 
behalf reveals that they actually were aware of the 
Condemarin decision striking the cap and considered 
it to be the applicable law. Nonetheless, defendants 
advised settlement against all prospective medical 
malpractice defendants for the amount available 
under the cap. Therefore, the 1987 amendment does 
not protect defendants from the legal malpractice 
claim. 
FN11. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 372, 
where Justice Stewart states, "In any event, 
the statute cannot resolve a constitutional 
issue." 
To summarize, we hold that any assessment of the 
reasonableness of defendants' advice to Hipwell's 
guardians must be based on the law as it existed at 
the time such advice was rendered. Even if we were 
to review Condemarin, any decision made today 
concerning that case could not be applied 
retroactively to protect defendants from a malpractice 
claim arising from a decision made over four years 
ago.JFN12] 
We affirm the trial court's denial of defendants' 
motions for summary judgment and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the result. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and 
SHAYNE HIPWELL, individually, 
and on behalf of all other 
heirs of Shelly Hipwell, 
and Ashley Michele Hipwell and 
Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell 
appearing by Shayne Hipwell 
as Guardian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba 
McKay-Dee Hospital, MICHAEL 
J. HEALY, M.D., and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(Jury Trial Demanded) 
Civil No. 920904182 CV 
Judge Glen K. Iwasaki 
1 
Plaintiffs complain of Defendants and, demanding trial by jury, allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Shayne Hipwell is the surviving spouse and an heir of Shelly Hipwell 
("Shelly"), who died at age 29, on May 27,1992, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants1 
negligence. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of all adult and minor heirs of the decedent. 
2. Plaintiff Sherry Jensen is the surviving mother, former guardian and an heir of 
Shelly. 
3. Plaintiff Ashley Michele Hipwell, appearing by and through her Guardian Ad 
Litem, Shayne Hipwell, is a surviving daughter and heir of Shelly. 
4. Plaintiff Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell, appearing by and through her Guardian Ad 
Litem, Shayne Hipwell, is a surviving daughter and heir of Shelly. 
5. Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. ("IHC"), is a Utah corporation in the business of 
owning and operating hospitals. IHC is the owner/operator of McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-
Dee") in Ogden. 
6. Defendant Michael J. Healy ("Dr. Healy") is a physician who, at all times relevant 
hereto, practiced as an obstetrician and gynecologist at McKay-Dee, and was the attending 
obstetrician to Shelly. 
7. Does I through X are individuals or entities who were in active concert with 
Defendants in the provision of medical services to Shelly and in the commission of the negligent 
acts that directly and proximately caused her damages and death, recovery for which is sought in 
this Complaint. Does I through X are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiffs with other named 
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Defendants. The true identify of Does I through X is presently unknown to Plaintiffs and when 
their true identity is known, the Complaint will be amended to identify them by name. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
8. This court has jurisdiction of this action in accordance with the general 
jurisdictional provisions of § 78-3-4 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. Venue of this action is 
proper in this court in accordance with the provisions of § 78-13-7 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended, on the grounds and for the reasons that IHC is a resident of Salt Lake County. 
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS 
9. Plaintiffs seek recovery from Defendants herein for: (a) Defendants1 negligence in 
failing to properly diagnose and treat medical complications, including those associated with a 
condition known as HELLP Syndrome suffered by Shelly during the latter stages of her 
pregnancy during 1988, which resulted in devastating injuries to Shelly and ultimately caused her 
death in May, 1992; (b) for fraud and fraudulent concealment of Shelly's negligence claims 
against Defendants, including Dr. Healy's continuation of efforts to conceal the medical 
negligence by his conspiracy to steer Shelly's case for medical malpractice to Dr. Healy's brother, 
Attorney Timothy Healy ("Attorney Healy") and to attorney Roger Sharp ("Sharp"), the brother-
in-law of Dr. Healy's sister, and by making it appear that an investigation of Defendants' possible 
negligence had been conducted when in fact any investigation was a sham; and (3) Defendant 
Healy's constructive fraud in failing to disclose their malpractice to Plaintiffs despite the 
confidential relationship which existed between them, especially given Dr. Healy's conduct in 
3 




10. In 1988, Shelly and her husband, Shayne, were expecting their second child. 
Around the thirty-seventh week of Shelly's pregnancy, Defendant Michael Healy ("Dr. Healy"), 
Shelly's obstetrician and gynecologist, decided to induce Shelly's labor because Shelly and the 
baby were exhibiting intrauterine growth retardation. Induction of labor was scheduled for 
December 13, 1988. 
11. On December 12,1988, a day prior to the scheduled induction of her labor, Shelly 
reported to the emergency room at McKay-Dee looking and feeling extremely ill and 
complaining of severe abdominal pain along the costal margin. She informed the emergency 
room personnel of the severity of her pain and that it definitely was not heartburn. In fact, Shelly 
was exhibiting and complaining of symptoms of HELLP Syndrome (hemolysis, elevated liver 
function and low platelet count), which, if not properly diagnosed or properly treated, can cause 
severe injury or death. 
12. The emergency room personnel at McKay-Dee summarily diagnosed musculo-
skeletal pain and abjectly failed to analyze and properly diagnose Shelly's severe abdominal pain. 
They sent Shelly home with Tylenol that evening, where her pain continued, and told her to 
report back to the hospital the following day for the scheduled induction of her labor. 
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13. Although severe abdominal pain is a symptom identified in basic internal 
medicine texts as something to be carefully analyzed and diagnosed, and with an expectant 
mother as a symptom of the onset of HELLP Syndrome, the emergency room personnel at 
McKay-Dee performed none of numerous simple and non-invasive diagnostic tests to determine 
if the abdominal pain was incident to the onset of HELLP Syndrome or some other serious 
affliction. 
14. Although Shayne Hipwell had contacted Dr. Healy the night of Sheliys visit to the 
emergency room, Dr. Healy did not seek or receive any report from the emergency room 
personnel, did not order tests of any kind, and did not go to the hospital to examine Shelly; nor 
did Dr. Healy determine whether Shelly had a tender liver, even in view of the higher incidence 
of HELLP Syndrome among pregnant women exhibiting intra-uterine growth retardation. 
15. Shelly's pain did indeed evidence the onset of HELLP Syndrome, but Defendants 
entirely overlooked the diagnosis until Sheliys health and well-being were grievously 
compromised. If Defendants had diagnosed HELLP Syndrome and immediately delivered 
Sheliys baby, they could have precluded the catastrophic developments and events that followed. 
16. On December 13,1988, the day scheduled to induce Shelly's labor and the day 
after she reported to the emergency room, Shelly reported to McKay-Dee still complaining about 
the same severe abdominal pain. Upon information and belief, by that time the capsule of 
Shelly's liver had begun to stretch preparatory to rupture and catastrophic sequelae. 
17. Prior to her babys delivery by caesarean section, Defendants performed a 
complete blood count on Shelly showing her platelet count had dropped from 172,000 the night 
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before to 128,000 the next day, which was yet another symptom pointing directly to HELLP 
Syndrome. 
18. While Shelly's abdomen was open during the caesarean delivery, Dr. Healy did 
not examine her liver or her other viscera to determine the source of the serious pain about which 
she had been complaining. 
19. At approximately 9:00 p.m. on December 13,1988, Shelly was received in the 
recovery room from the delivery room still complaining of severe chest and abdominal 
discomfort. By that time her blood pressure had risen markedly, signaling pre-eclampsia, a 
diagnosis that should have been obvious by that time and, if Defendants had obtained liver 
function tests from the night before, would have been unquestionable. 
20. Sherry Jensen asked Defendants why Shelly was still suffering from intense 
abdominal pain following the delivery. Mrs. Jensen was told that the pain was "due to the 
epidural" that had been administered to Shelly. 
21. Shelly's blood pressure continued to rise and on December 14, 1988, she was 
noted to be groggy and pale at 9:00 a.m. Half an hour later, the attending nurses noted that 
petechiae were apparent — a clear signal of low platelet count and another clear marker of the 
onset of HELLP Syndrome. Dr. Healy had seen Shelly half an hour earlier, but failed to notice 
the appearance of petechiae and overlooked the implications of Shelly's tender liver and her 
plummeting platelet count. 
22. By the time the charge nurse was summoned with reference to the petechiae, at 
10:30 a.m. on December 14,1988, Shelly was pale, the petechiae were all the more apparent and 
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Shelly was suffering from tachycardia, or rapid heartbeat. Her pulse was recorded at 160 beats 
per minute. 
23. Upon information and belief, at least by 10:30 a.m. on December 14,1988, 
Shelly's liver had ruptured and she was bleeding internally. Her abdomen was distending and 
Defendants should have suspected internal bleeding, whether by hepatic rupture or some other 
cause. Nonetheless, Defendants made no such diagnosis, notwithstanding the ease with which 
said diagnosis could have been accomplished with ultra-sound, CT scanning, percussion tests on 
the abdomen or a sample of abdominal fluid. 
24. Defendants had all of the necessary information to have realized that they had 
failed to properly diagnose HELLP Syndrome and that Shelly was massively hemorrhaging 
internally no later than 11:00 a.m. on December 14, 1988. By 1:00 p.m. on December 14,1988, 
Dr. Baughman, an intensivist at McKay-Dee, had concluded that Shelly was suffering from 
probable HELLP Syndrome. From approximately 10:30 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. on December 14, 
1988, Sheliys blood pressure and blood platelet count continued to plummet and Shelly 
continued bleeding internally, suffering from progressive hypovolemic shock. 
25. As Shelly's condition worsened, Sherry Jensen spoke with Dr. Healy and Dr. 
Baughman before they reopened Shelly's abdomen. Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman told Mrs. 
Jensen that they had no idea what was wrong with Shelly. 
26. Notwithstanding Sheliys rapidly worsening condition, Defendants waited until 
6:30 p.m. on December 14,1988, before they finally performed corrective surgery. At that time 
the surgeon reported finding 3,000 ccfs of blood in Sheliys abdominal cavity, or approximately 
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two-thirds of her entire blood volume, at which time Defendants attempted corrective surgery to 
patch her ruptured liver. 
27. Following corrective surgery, Dr. Alder told Mrs. Jensen that Sheliys liver had in 
fact ruptured. Nothing was said to Mrs. Jensen or Mr. Hipwell by Dr. Healy or anyone on behalf 
of McKay-Dee regarding Defendants' failure to perform the cesarean section delivery sooner, 
Defendants' failure to properly and timely diagnose and treat HELLP Syndrome or the resulting 
internal hemorrhaging from which Shelly suffered. 
28. By the time Defendants took steps to address Shelly's internal hemorrhaging, 
they had set in motion and directly and proximately caused a series of major afflictions and 
medical complications. Defendants allowed Shelly to suffer such prolonged hypertensive 
shock that oxygen deprivation damaged her bodily tissues, which, along with hypovolemic 
shock to Shelly's lungs, caused Shelly to develop Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
("ARDS"). Moreover, with severely compromised internal organs, Shelly had to be 
respirated. Because of her body's diminished ability to fend off micro-organisms and the 
many new avenues for them to enter her, Shelly developed sepsis, fever and nosocomial 
(hospital-borne) infections. 
29. If Defendants had properly and timely diagnosed and treated the HELLP 
Syndrome from which Shelly suffered, and had arrested Shelly's internal hemorrhaging and 
prevented her substantial hypovolemic shock, Shelly would not have suffered the severe 
injury to which she was subjected, would not have developed complications such as ARDS, 
would not have acquired the infections and sepsis and thus would not have required extensive 
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additional medical treatment and exposure to the later medical malpractice hereinafter 
described directly and proximately related to Defendants1 acts and omissions. 
30. After Shelly's condition had deteriorated, Dr. Healy and the IHC physician 
with whom he was consulting at McKay-Dee decided she should be shipped to the burn 
center at the University of Utah Hospital on what was, on information and belief, a mere 
pretext, Le., to determine whether she was suffering from necrotic fascitis (dead tissue at the 
surgical incision site). The doctors at the University of Utah Hospital found no evidence of 
necrotic fascitis. On information and belief, the presence of necrotic fascitis could have been 
diagnosed at McKay-Dee and the negative finding would have made it apparent that there 
was no reason to ship Shelly to the University of Utah Hospital. The purpose for shipping 
Shelly to the University of Utah Hospital was to conceal the medical negligence of IHC and 
Healy. 
31. While Shelly was at the University of Utah Hospital,.however, a hematology 
resident decided that a marrow biopsy would aid the diagnosis of her thrombocytopenia, or 
low platelet count, and infections. Toward that end, the resident attempted to aspirate 
Shelly's sternum and he negligently pierced and tore a hole in her heart in the process. 
32. By the time another surgeon was able to perform emergency open chest heart 
massage, Shelly had suffered anoxic brain damage, leaving her in a pain-sensitive comatose 
state. 
The Conspiracy to Conceal Shelly's Claims 
33. Upon learning of Shelly's injuries, Dr. Healy in a continuation of the scheme 
to conceal the negligence of EHC and Healy and acting in furtherance thereof, and as an agent 
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or acting in privity with IHC embarked upon a conspiracy with his brother, Attorney Healy, 
and attorney Roger Sharp ("Sharp") (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
"Conspirators"), in or about December, 1988, to fraudulently conceal Shelly's causes of 
action against Defendants as is hereinafter alleged. The conspiracy had the following primary 
objectives: (a) to solicit Shelly's case against the University of Utah Hospital for Attorney 
Healy and Sharp; (b) to create the appearance that potential claims against Dr. Healy and 
McKay-Dee had been duly investigated by Shelly's attorneys, thus commencing the running 
of the statute of limitations; (c) to settle Shelly's case against the University of Utah Hospital 
as quickly as possible, irrespective of Shelly's actual financial and medical needs; (d) to 
convince Shelly's guardians, Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell, that neither Dr. Healy nor 
McKay-Dee had committed any medical malpractice; and (e) to create the appearance, with 
Sherry Jensen's and Shayne Hipwell's signatures on a "Release of All Claims" that all of 
Shelly's claims against these Defendants had indeed been released. 
34. Upon information and belief, the actions and omissions of the Conspirators 
hereinafter alleged were intentionally performed or omitted as part of the conspiracy and 
within the scope thereof intentionally to further the purposes of the conspiracy. 
35. On information and belief, following learning that Shelly's sternum being 
punctured and her heart lacerated, Dr. Healy contacted his brother, Attorney Healy, and the 
two engaged in v/hat Attorney Healy later described, in a letter dated February 13,1989, as 
in-depth discussion of the case. 
36. After the Healy brothers' discussions of Shelly's case, Attorney Healy spoke 
with their sister, Diane DeVries, who was the Relief Society President in Shelly's LDS Ward. 
10 
At the behest of her brothers, DeVries made an unsolicited phone call to Sherry Jensen in 
order to solicit Shelly's malpractice case for Sharp. 
37. DeVries did not tell Sherry Jensen that she was the sister of Dr. Healy and at 
no time did DeVries intimate to Mrs. Jensen that DeVries1 brothers had put her up to making 
the phone call. Nor did DeVries tell Mrs. Jensen that her other brother, Attorney Healy, 
would be involved with Sharp on the case. 
38. In the company of Shayne Hipwell, Mrs. Jensen met and entered into a 
Retainer Agreement with Sharp on or about February 10,1989, by which Sharp purported to 
agree to investigate and pursue any and all causes of action on Shelly's behalf as against her 
numerous care providers. Upon information and belief, Sharp and Attorney Healy later 
agreed to divide any fee as between them with 60% going to Sharp and 40% going to 
Attorney Healy. They kept their fee-splitting arrangement secret from Plaintiffs. 
39. Although Attorney Healy acted with Sharp as counsel for Shelly at all 
pertinent times, neither Sharp nor Attorney Healy nor Dr. Healy informed Sherry Jensen or 
Shayne Hipwell about Attorney Healy1 s involvement until Sharp mentioned it for the first 
time just before Sherry and Shayne were appointed as Shelly s guardians by the probate court. 
At that time, Sharp told Mrs. Jensen that there was absolutely no conflict of interest or 
problem presented by Attorney Heaiys involvement in the case because neither Dr. Healy nor 
McKay-Dee had committed any medical malpractice. 
40. Upon information and belief, as part of the conspiracy alleged herein, Sharp 
and Attorney Healy never conducted a genuine investigation of the care provided Shelly by 
Defendants. In the letter dated February 13,1989, in which Attorney Healy proposed the 
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above-referenced fee-splitting arrangement with Sharp, Attorney Healy, prior to any 
investigation of his brother or McKay-Dee, stated the following to Sharp: "I have alerted my 
brother to the fact that you may be requesting copies of his medical records which is a routine 
procedure at this point. I have advised him that Shellie's [sic] family had not expressed any 
concern or dissatisfaction over this treatment." 
41. In fact, Sharp conspired to create the appearance that he had obtained the 
entire set of Shelly's medical records for the subject period by sending to Shayne Hipwell 
copies of the requests for medical records from Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. Sharp engaged 
only one expert to review medical records from Defendants for the subject period, however, 
and in Sharp's letter of transmittal of medical records to that expert, Sharp stated he was 
sending only a "very abbreviated set." Sharp did not send to Plaintiffs a copy of the records 
transmittal letter he sent to the expert. 
42. Upon information and belief, the "very abbreviated set" of medical records 
Sharp sent to the expert was carefully selected to steer that expert away from opining that Dr. 
Healy and McKay-Dee had breached the standard of care. Upon information and belief, the 
purported "investigation" of Defendants by Sharp and Attorney Healy was merely a sham and 
in fact was part and parcel of a continuation of the conspiracy to shield Dr. Healy and 
McKay-Dee, from liability for their breach of the standard of care in treating Shelly, while 
enriching Attorney Healy with a share of Shelly's settlement with the University of Utah 
Hospital. 
43. For the remaining three years of her life following the puncture of her heart, 
Shelly struggled miserably in a pain-sensitive comatose state. As a direct and proximate 
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result of Defendants' negligence, Shelly died while at St. Benedicts Hospital, on May 27, 
1992. As a direct result of the conspiracy to fraudulently conceal Defendants' malpractice 
and/or of Defendants' constructive fraud, as alleged herein, no cause of action was asserted 
against Defendants for their malpractice until this lawsuit was filed. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence/Wrongful Death) 
44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 43 of this Fourth Amended Complaint. 
45. Defendants were negligent in their treatment of Shelly while a patient at the 
McKay-Dee emergency room on December 12, 1988. Defendants' negligence continued 
through Shelly's stay at McKay-Dee prior to her shipment to the University of Utah Medical 
Center. Defendants' negligence included, but is not limited to, Defendants' failure to properly 
diagnose Shelly's reports of abdominal pain when she reported to the emergency room, 
Defendants' failure to perform the necessary examination and diagnosis that would have 
revealed the presence of HELLP Syndrome, Defendants' failure to properly diagnose Shelly's 
severe internal hemorrhaging after the rupture of her liver, Defendants' failure to respond to 
Shelly's state of hypovolemic shock within a reasonable time and Defendants' exposure of 
Shelly to further foreseeable medical complications and medical malpractice at the University 
of Utah burn center. 
46. The standard of care applicable to Defendants was to properly diagnose a 
serious internal problem and to conduct further diagnostic procedures to identify or rule out 
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the serious problem from which Shelly in fact suffered. The above-referenced facts, at a 
minimum, clearly called for consultation in the emergency room with an obstetrician in 
consideration of possible HELLP syndrome. Post-operatively, the applicable standard of care 
called for Defendants to properly diagnose Shelly as suffering from some manner of hepatic 
dysfunction and, after her liver ruptured, of internal hemorrhaging and to properly treat those 
complications. 
47. Defendants' negligence directly and proximately caused Shelly to suffer severe 
pain and anguish for the three years following her treatment at McKay-Dee and the 
University of Utah Hospital burn center, and directly and proximately caused her death. 
48. Shelly's entitlement to damages for three years of suffering, and her loss of 
ability to enjoy and live her life, survived her death. Plaintiffs are entitled, in Shelly's stead to 
recover from Defendants all damages incurred and suffered by Shelly including, but not 
limited to, damages for Shelly's suffering, loss of ability to enjoy and live her life for three 
years, loss of income and the cost and expense of proper medical and custodial treatment, all 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
49. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants, as set forth 
above, Plaintiffs and Shelly's other heirs have suffered severe losses and are entitled to 
recover against Defendants for such losses, including, but not limited to, the loss of support, 
loss of assistance and services to the family, loss of probability of inheritance and loss of 
society, companionship, happiness of association, care, support, advice, guidance and 
nurturing of wife and mother, and financial losses and expenses of medical and custodial care 
and burial expenses. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Fraud/Fraudulent Concealment) 
50. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 49 of this Fourth Amended Complaint. 
51. Dr. Healy, acting in furtherance of his efforts with IHC to conceal their 
medical negligence, and acting as agent for or in privity with IHC, conspired to commit fraud 
and to fraudulently conceal Shelly!s claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee by omitting to 
state material facts and making numerous misrepresentations regarding material facts, for 
which Dr. Healy is responsible and culpable as if he had made said representations or 
omissions himself. The misrepresentations and omissions concerned presently existing 
material facts including, but not limited to, the following: 
(a) Dr. Heaiys intentionally omitting to inform Plaintiffs, at any time 
while he was Shelly's physician, of the particulars of Defendants' breach of the 
standard of care as alleged hereinabove, and his representation that he did not 
know what was wrong with Shelly at the time she was under his care; 
(b) Dr. Heaiys representation to Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell, in or 
around December, 1988, that it was necessary to ship Shelly to the University 
of Utah Burn Center for diagnosis and treatment of necrotic fascitis when, in 
fact, the purported presence of necrotic tissue could have been diagnosed at 
McKay-Dee and would have obviated any purported need to ship Shelly to the 
University of Utah Hospital; 
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(c) Dr. Healy!s repeated failure, despite regular contact with Sherry Jensen 
and Shayne Hipwell following Shelly's heart puncture, to inform Sherry or 
Shayne of his role in shepherding the case into the hands of his brother, 
Attorney Healy, and Sharp; 
(d) Dr. Healy's failure to disclose the conversations with his brother, 
Attorney Healy, respecting Shelly's legal claims; and 
(e) The failure of Dr. Healy to disclose the express or tacit understanding 
that only certain records relating to Dr. Healy's care of Shelly would be 
reviewed and that Dr. Healy would be assured only a "routine" review of his 
care would be made. 
52. The Conspirators knew that the misrepresentations were false when they were 
made, knew the omissions were material, and knew, or should have known, of their duty to 
inform Shelly and Plaintiffs of the material facts relating to Defendants' various breaches of 
the standard of care. The Conspirators made those misrepresentations and omissions for the 
purpose of concealing the claims against Defendants and intended Plaintiffs to rely upon the 
misrepresentations and omissions. 
53. Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell, acting reasonably and in ignorance of the 
omissions and the falsity of the representations, did in fact rely upon those representations 
and were thus induced to sign a contingency agreement on behalf of Shelly with Sharp, to 
forego the prosecution of a malpractice action against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. 
54. As a direct and proximate result of the fraud, as set forth above, Shelly, as 
well as her heirs, have suffered severe losses and are entitled to recover against Defendants 
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for such losses including, but not limited to, the pain and suffering of Shelly in the last 
months of her life and all damages accrued as a result of Defendants' negligence as alleged 
above. Additionally, the heirs of Shelly are entitled to recover against Defendants for their 
severe losses including, but not limited to, the loss of support, loss of assistance and services 
to the family, loss of probability of inheritance and loss of society, companionship, happiness 
of association, care, support, advice, guidance and nurturing of wife and mother, and 
financial losses and expenses of medical and custodial care. 
55. Based upon the intentionally false misrepresentations as alleged above, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages in the amount that is reasonable according to the 
proof adduced at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Constructive Fraud Against Dr. Healy) 
56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 55 of this Fourth Amended Complaint. 
57. Dr. Healy held a special position of trust and confidence with respect to Shelly 
and her guardians, which position arose by virtue of their relationship to Shelly as her 
caretakers and physicians. Additionally, Dr. Healy assumed further fiduciary responsibilities 
to Shelly and her guardians when he undertook affirmative actions directly and indirectly to 
obtain and secure legal counsel for Shelly in the form of his family members and relations 
who purportedly agreed to represent Shelly in possible claims against Dr. Healy, McKay-Dee 
and the University of Utah Hospital. 
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58. Defendants knew, or should have known, that they had breached the standard 
of care with respect to their failure to properly and timely diagnose and treat the HELLP 
Syndrome and internal hemorrhaging from which Shelly suffered. 
59. Despite the fiduciary and confidential relationship they had with Shelly, 
Defendants failed to inform Shelly, or Shelly's guardians, of the material facts relevant to 
Defendants1 breach of the standard of care. Plaintiffs further allege, on information and 
belief, that Drs. Healy and Baughman affirmatively misrepresented to Sherry Jensen that, 
prior to reopening Shelly!s abdomen, they did not know what was wrong with her. 
Defendants' failure to disclose the material facts relevant to that malpractice constitutes a 
breach of the trust and confidence Shelly placed in Defendants. 
60. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants1 breaches and violations of the 
confidence and trust placed in them by Shelly, Shelly and Plaintiffs, her family, have been 
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
61. In performing the actions hereinabove alleged, Defendants acted maliciously 
and with the intent of injuring Shelly, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to recover punitive damages 
in an amount that is reasonable according to the proof adduced at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief against Defendants as follows: 
1. For special damages, including the costs and expenses of medical and 
custodial treatment, funeral and burial, lost income and other economic losses in amounts to 
be proven at trial; 
2. For general damages, including damages for wrongful death, damages for the 
conscious pain and suffering of decedent Shelly suffered by her prior to her death as a result 
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of the negligent treatment of Defendants, and other general damages, all in amounts to be 
proven at trial; 
3. On the Second and Third Cause of Action, for punitive damages in the amount 
that is reasonable according to the proof adduced at trial. 
4. For Plaintiffs' costs herein and attorney's fees as allowed by law; and 
5. For such other and further relief as is appropriate and just in the 
circumstances. , 
DATED th i s^ / day of January, 2000. 
BURBIDGE & M: 
klCHARDE>rk«B©G£ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, individually and on 
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X, 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 920904182 CV 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
May 19, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Defendants' Joint Motion 
to Confirm Dismissal of Fraud Claims. The Court heard oral 
argument with respect to the motions on May 15, 2000. Following 
the hearing, the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
With their Fourth Amended Complaint, plaintiffs seek to amend 
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what they characterize as "fraud/fraudulent concealment" and 
constructive fraud claims against Dr. Healy and IHC on the theory 
that Dr. Healy acted as an agent of, or in privity with, IHC. 
Defendants jointly oppose the motion and seek dismissal of 
plaintiffs' fraud claims arguing the Supreme Court has already 
ruled that plaintiffs cannot "proceed on their separate claims for 
common law fraud." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 
331 (Utah 1997). Accordingly, it is defendants' position dismissal 
is appropriate. 
Plaintiffs in opposition to defendants' motion argue what the 
Supreme Court rejected were not their causes of action for fraud, 
but instead, plaintiffs' contention that a three year statute of 
limitations, rather than a two year statute of limitations, should 
apply to them. According to plaintiffs, the issue of damages 
caused by the defendants' fraud has never been before the Supreme 
Court of Utah. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the 
Jensen decision, the Court is persuaded defendants are correct in 
their analysis of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, despite 
some rather contradictory dicta, it is clear the Supreme Court in 
Jensen rejected the existence of plaintiffs' independent fraud 
claim. Notably, the Supreme Court stated the following in its 
original opinion: 
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Shelly's family argues that it has made a 
general fraud claim and a constructive fraud 
claim in addition to, and distinct from, their 
claims of fraudulent concealment discussed 
above: However, we can find nothing in their 
allegation of fraud or constructive fraud that 
is in any way different from their claims of 
fraudulent concealment. All the allegations 
raised by Shelly!s family surround their claim 
that Dr. Healy acted to divert the familyf s 
attention away from his alleged malpractice 
when he had a duty to disclose the facts of 
his relationship with attorneys Healy and 
Sharp. The only damages arising out of 
Shelly' s familyf s claims for fraud and 
constructive fraud relate to the possibility 
that they were prevented from discovering the 
facts constituting their claim for medical 
malpractice. While we acknowledge that there 
may be cases where a doctor commits fraud on a 
patient in a way that would not be covered by 
the medical malpractice actf s fraudulent 
concealment provision, this is not such a 
case. Given the specific facts alleged in this 
case, we cannot agree that Shelly's family!s 
fraud claim amounts to anything more than or 
is different from a claim of fraudulent 
concealment of medical malpractice. See 
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Inst., 782 P.2d 
506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989) (rejecting 
attempts to recast claim for damages arising 
out of regulators1 licensing decision as claim 
for negligence to avoid governmental 
immunity). 
Id. at 336. (Emphasis added). 
Based upon this wording, it is apparent the Supreme Court 
intended to allow allegations of fraud to continue in this case 
only to the extent they related to the fraudulent concealment 
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provisions of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. 1 
Indeed, their citing of the Gillman case seems to confirm this. 
Finally, a review of this Court's Memorandum Decision makes 
clear that the issues before it at that time were limited solely to 
the issue of whether plaintiffs had pled allegations of agency and 
privity sufficient to toll the statute of limitations against IHC. 
Indeed, the Court specifically stated: 
With this motion, defendant contends Dr. 
Healy' s alleged fraud does not toll the 
statute of limitations because (1) as 
recognized by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs' 
complaint makes no allegations either that Dr. 
Healy was the agent of McKay-Dee or that he 
acted to further the aims of McKay Dee; (2) 
Dr. Healy was, in fact, not an agent of McKay 
Dee because, as noted in the case of Tolman v. 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 382 (D. Utah 
C D . 1986), an independently acting "physician 
could not act as agent of the hospital"; and 
(3) even if Dr. Healy had been McKay-Dee's 
agent, his fraudulent concealment was not 
within the scope of his agency. Indeed, 
asserts defendant, as noted in the affidavit 
of Thomas Hanrahan, Dr. Healy's fraudulent 
actions would have been contrary to McKay-
Dee's interest to review, evaluate, and 
correct patient care problems through its 
quality improvement program. 
In light of the forgoing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is 
denied and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Independent 
Fraud Claims is granted. Counsel for defendants is asked to 
xThe fraudulent concealment claim has been mooted by the 
recent jury verdict. 
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prepare the appropriate order. 
DATED this day of May, 2000 
Case No. 920904182 
C e r t i f i c a t e of Mailing 
I ce r t i fy tha t on the 19th day of May, 2000, I sent by f i r s t 
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Attorneys for Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
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Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
JAMES W GILSON (A1197) 
SCOTT C. PUGLSEY (A2662) 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC. 
36 South State Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 533.8282 
RICHARD W CASEY (A0590) 
ANDREW G DEISS (A7184) 
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Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. dba McKay-Dee Hospital 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE HIPWELL, 
individually and on behalf of all other heirs of 
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele Hipwell and 
Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell appearing by Shayne 
Hipwell as Guardian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs, 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAY-DEE 
HOSPITAL; MICHAEL J. HEALY, M.D. and 
DOES I through X, 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS 
FRAUD CLAIMS 
Civil No. 920904182CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs3 Motion to Amend Complaint and Defendants5 Joint Motion to Confirm 
Dismissal of Fraud Claims came on for hearing before the Court on May 15, 2000, 
pursuant to proper notice. Plaintiffs were represented by Richard D. Burbidge and Simon 
H. Forgette. Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. was represented by Richard C. Casey, James 
W Gilson and Andrew G. Deiss. Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. was represented by 
Elliott J. Williams and Kurt M. Frankenburg. 
The Court reviewed the motions, memoranda, and supporting materials on file, and 
heard oral argument by counsel for plaintiffs and defendants. Having taken the matter 
under advisement, and having subsequently issued its written Memorandum Decision, 
dated May 19, 2000, which is incorporated herein by reference, and good cause appearing 
therefor, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, requesting leave to file a Fourth Amended 
Complaint, is denied. 
2. Defendants3 Motion to dismiss plaintiffs5 fraud claims is granted. All of 
plaintiffs3 claims set forth under the Second Cause of Action and Third Cause of Action, of 
the Third Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The date of this Order shall be deemed the effective date of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision. 
DATED this day of 5^<g^ 2000. 
BY THE CO 
vll ~»s:fKP* 
District Court Judge \ O j 
Hi 
Approved as to Form: 
BURBID 
By: 
RICHABD D. B 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, individually, and on 
behalf of all other heirs of 
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley 
Michelle Hipwell and Kaycie 
Shaylene Hipwell appearing by 




IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay-
Dee Hospital, MICHAEL J. HEALY, 
M.D., and DOES I through X. 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 920904182CV 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
March 21, 2001 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
several pretrial motions. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to the motions on March 21, 2001. Following the hearing, 
the Court ruled from the bench with respect to all motions, except 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Evidence of Admissions by Conduct on 
the Part of Defendant Dr. Healy and Defendants' Joint Motion in 
Limine to Exclude Selected Testimony of Dr. Greggory DeVore and Dr. 
Barry Schifirin. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS Page 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Turning first to plaintiffs' motion, as an initial matter, the 
Court finds that dismissal of plaintiffs' fraud claim does not 
render inadmissible probative evidence that Dr. Healy obstructed 
justice as regards a potential medical malpractice claim against 
him by Shelly Hipwell. 
This having been said, the parties do not dispute the law in 
Utah is that wrongdoing by a party "amounting to an obstruction of 
justice," can be regarded as an admission by conduct. See State v. 
Garcia, 663 P.12d 60, 65 (Utah 1993) (citing McCormick's handbook 
of the Law of Evidence, § 273 at 660 (2d ed. 1972). Applying the 
aforementioned to the facts in the record, the Court finds a jury 
could reasonably conclude Dr. Healy obstructed justice regarding a 
potential medical malpractice claim against him. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs' motion is granted to the extent plaintiffs have 
evidence of Dr. Healy's direct conduct from which a reasonable 
inference could be drawn that such conduct amounted to an 
obstruction of justice. 
With respect to defendants' joint motion regarding Drs. DeVore 
and Schifirin, assuming proper qualifications and the laying of 
sufficient foundation, the Court finds these individuals qualified 
to testify regarding the matters at issue. With specific regard, 
JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS Page 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
however, to testimony addressing Ms. Hipwell's emergency room care, 
the Court finds Drs. DeVore and Schifirin are not qualified to 
testify regarding her treatment during triage stages, specifically, 
prior to her being diagnosed as needing obstetric care. 
Accordingly, forgoing any new information regarding these doctors' 
qualifications, their testimony will be limited in this manner. 
Finally, the Court, although aware of the potential need to 
rebut a credibility attack, admonishes the parties to mindful in 
avoiding the use of cumulative and duplicative testimony. 
This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the matters 
addressed herein. No further order is required. 
DATED this *£ * day of March, 2001. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
IHC HOSPITALS, et al., 
Case No. 920904182 
Defendants. By 
FIIEI DISTRICT COURT 
Th«rd Judicial DisMct 
AUG 16 200! 
i SALT LAKE COUNT 
Deputy Clerk 
HEARING ON MOTIONS MARCH 23, 2001 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
ORIGINAL 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 2001; 2:24 P.M. 
2 HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: The matter before the Court is Jensen and 
5 Hipwell v. IHC, et al., 920904182. The record will reflect 
6 that Mr. Forgette and Mr. Burbidge are present on behalf of 
7 plaintiffs; Mr. Williams, Mr. Frankenburg on behalf of 
8 Dr. Healy; Mr. Fishier, Mr. Gilson, Mr. Casey and Mr. Deiss on 
9 behalf of IHC. 
10 And I don't know the young lady. 
11 MR. ?: (inaudible) our office. 
12 THE COURT: Very well. This is before the Court on 
13 defendants' joint motion for a clarification of a minute-entry 
14 ruling, plaintiffs' response to defendants' joint motion for 
15 clarification of minute-entry ruling. 
16 Before you begin, Mr. Williams, my answer is yes, and 
17 the answer is yes in that defendants interpret this to mean 
18 that the only evidence that plaintiffs will be permitted to 
19 argue or introduce in this regard is evidence of things 
20 Dr. Healy personally did or said, and this will be allowed only 
21 if it is sufficient to create a reasonable inference of 
22 unlawful obstruction of justice. And the evidence, direct or 
23 indirect, of written or oral statements made or things done by 
24 others is not allowed as evidence of admission by conduct. 
25 And the answer is yes to Mr. Burbidge when he says 
1 attempting to arrest Thomas after he observed him dropping a 
2 body off within an area close to East High. And a passerby 
3 happened to come by, and the officer, true, simply stuck a 
4 finger in Thomas's back and indicated that was a gun, and he 
5 was holding him at bay. When the passerby came by, the officer 
6 said, "Come help me," and Thomas said, "Don't. I'll kill you." 
7 And I said, you know, that shouldn't be allowed. The 
8 Supreme Court disagreed with me. It's funny how, if you're 
9 around long enough, you start seeing — 
10 MR. BURBIDGE: Good job, Judge. 
11 THE COURT: — products of your - yeah. Good job. 
12 That's right. He still may be doing five to life. 
13 MR. BURBIDGE: Let's hope so. 
14 THE COURT: But in that regard, I'm conscious of what 
15 the statement was in Garcia, what the ruling was, and I want to 
16 further clarify that because I understand the possibility of 
17 prejudice to allow more than the direct evidence of the 
18 inferences and everything else like that, I'm going to hold as 
19 close as I can to direct evidence of Dr. Healy's conduct, what 
20 he did, what he said, what he was heard saying, what he was 
21 observed doing, and then the reasonable nexus and inferences 
22 from thereon. 
23 But if - for example, in the Sanders case, that was a 
24 case in which a defendant was present at a meeting. There was 
25 something said, and he didn't say anything one way or the 
1 three acts of conduct on the part of Dr. Healy. One is that 
2 he, in a conversion with his brother and their wives, at which 
3 time he related what had happened at the University Hospital, 
4 and made a comment that some attorney's going to clean up on 
5 this. 
6 THE COURT: And that may be subject to putting it in 
7 context as to when it was said and under what circumstances. 
8 MR. WILLIAMS: But not - right? If it's that 
9 conversation, then we have no problem with that. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. WILLIAMS: The second discussion was about a 
12 claim that Dr. Healy failed to produce copies of his records to 
13 Roger Sharp at the time he was requested to do so and that 
14 there are inferences to draw from that. I'd like to just take 
15 a second and address that, if I may, your Honor. 
16 May I approach? 
17 THE COURT: You may. 
18 MR. WILLIAMS: I think you will recognize the 
19 traditional two documents as exhibits attached to the 
20 plaintiffs' memorandum, the documents that were allegedly 
21 incriminating, and those were the ones that were not produced 
22 to Mr. Sharp and were in fact concealed. 
23 The first document I gave you is Roger Sharp's letter 
24 of February 10, 1989, requesting Dr. Healy to produce the 
25 records. You will note that's dated February 10, 1989. There 
1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. WILLIAMS: That surprisingly wasn't furnished to 
3 him. The letter is dated April 27, 1989 -
4 THE COURT: Right. 
5 MR. WILLIAMS: — more than two and a half months 
6 after the records were furnished to Mr. Sharp. So I don't know 
7 what inferences is going to be drawn by not producing records 
8 that were not in existence at the time those records were 
9 produced, but I wanted to call that to the Court's attention. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Well, I appreciate the 
11 heads-up. 
12 Do you care to respond to that, Mr. Burbidge? 
13 MR. FORGETTE: Yes, your Honor. First of all, there 
14 were a number of records in Dr. Healy's chart that were not 
15 produced. He kept medical records on the right side, financial 
16 records on the left side. These were on the left side of his 
17 chart. The right side of the chart is what went to Mr. Sharp. 
18 In his deposition, we compared what Mr. Sharp got with what was 
19 actually in Dr. Healy's chart, and they were different. 
20 Mr. Sharp did not get a complete copy of even the right side of 
21 the chart. 
22 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
23 MR. FORGETTE: These records were on the left side. 
24 They are signed and dated after Mr. Sharp's request for 
25 records. However, they are prepared well before Mr. Sharp and 
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1 think in fairness to us, in view of the potential prejudice 
2 that going over the line would cause to us — and I know their 
3 intention was ultimately to show that the inadequate settlement 
4 with the University Hospital was Dr. Healy' s fault, and that 
5 the jury ought to make up for it now. And if that kind of 
6 pitch is made to the jury, you know, it's obviously a 
7 prejudicial effect would be to us. 
8 THE COURT: Do you care to respond to that anymore? 
9 MR. BURBIDGE: Thank you, Judge. 
10 MR. FORGETTE: As long as we're all here discussing 
11 the matter, the evidence that we have that's direct evidence 
12 regarding the conduct of Dr. Healy basically amounts to 
13 Dr. Healy's deposition testimony. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. FORGETTE: There will be some discussion from the 
16 plaintiffs regarding what they were told. 
17 THE COURT: By Dr. Healy. 
18 MR. FORGETTE: By either Dr. Healy or his brother in 
19 terms of the end of the settlement, but it'll be brief. 
20 There's only one contemporaneous memorialization of the conduct 
21 between Dr. Healy and his brother, and that was Exhibit 2 to 
22 our original motion. That's the letter that attorney Healy 
23 sends to Roger Sharp, and it outlines the contact that he's had 
24 with his brother, Dr. Healy, in terms of assuring him that it's 
25 a routine and not to worry about it, and the case has been 
9 
1 with my brother, this case should be substantial." 
2 And he concludes: 
3 "It should not involve the need for 
4 litigation." 
5 THE COURT: Right. 
6 MR. FORGETTE: Again, this is the only 
7 memorialization of this conduct by a participant that exists, 
8 and it's direct evidence on what Dr. Healy is learning and 
9 doing and getting. And the Supreme Court actually addressed 
10 this document, and it said: 
11 "The letter from attorney Healy to attorney 
12 Sharp makes clear that attorney Healy was 
13 communicating with Dr. Healy" — so there's 
14 conduct — "about attorney Sharp's investigation, 
15 and implies" — here comes a reasonable 
16 inference — "that attorney Sharp's investigation 
17 of Dr. Healy's treatment was to be minimal." 
18 If we look at Dr. Healy's deposition, and we attached 
19 that as Exhibit 1, page 19 — do you have that? 
20 THE COURT: No, I don't. 
21 MR. FORGETTE: I'll just read it. There's a whole 
22 bunch of examples, but these are two of the — probably the most 
23 important. At page 19 at the bottom, I'm asking about this 
24 exhibit, Exhibit 1, and I read him the "I have alerted my 
25 brother" portion, and I ask him: 
11 
1 February of 1989 you were aware that your 
2 brother was helping Roger Sharp on Shelly's 
3 case? 
4 "A I really do not know when I first 
5 found that out. I mean as far as saying it 
6 was February, I don't know if I knew that then 
7 or not. 
8 "Q Well, did you understand when he came 
9 to you and may have let you know that you were 
10 a potential defendant, that told you that Sharp 
11 would be requesting —" 
12 He interrupts me: 
13 "A Oh, certainly on that. I mean I 
14 certainly knew that he was associated with the 
15 case at that time. 
16 yyQ That would have been sometime prior 
17 to February 13th, 1989, wouldn't it? 
18 "A Well, it would have been whenever that 
19 conversation was. I don't know when that 
20 conversation was. 
21 "Q He's alluding to that conversation in 
22 this letter as having already taken place. So 
23 would that be your assumption, looking at the 
24 letter, assuming that's correct? 
25 "A Right. 
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1 try to go back on to what Dr. Healy did. But you can use it 
2 for any other reason that is permissible. 
3 MR. FORGETTE: All right, your Honor. Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: Okay? 
5 MR. WILLIAMS: While we're discussing the issue, why 
6 is Tim Healy's representation of the Hipwells relevant to 
7 Dr. Healy's conduct? 
8 MR. BURBIDGE: Why is it? 
9 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. It's not conduct of Dr. Healy, 
10 and if the ruling is that it's only conduct of Dr. Healy that 
11 is at issue, what Tim did, ethically or unethically, to secure 
12 that case, it's his conduct, not Dr. Healy's. It's where — I 
13 think this issue is so dangerously close to being so 
14 prejudicial that that's why we're so worried about it. 
15 MR. FORGETTE: Your Honor, bad conduct is always 
16 prejudicial. We can't do anything about that. But Dr. Healy 
17 can't act in a vacuum. He has to act with his brother in order 
18 to accomplish what he wants to accomplish, or what the 
19 inference is, he's trying to accomplish protection. 
20 THE COURT: And I appreciate everyone giving me a 
21 kind of preview on things. That makes it easier when the 
22 ultimate decision has to be made, but I'll take these under 
23 consideration and be thinking about them when the ultimate 
24 objections come up — 
25 I MR. BURBIDGE: You're looking -
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1 to issue a separate ruling on, one of which is the conduct- So 
2 your ruling is subject to whatever disposition you make of the 
3 conduct." 
4 Now, if in connection with the conduct that 
5 settlement is relevant, and we lay the proper foundation, it 
6 comes in. If I sign their form of the order, you've knocked it 
7 out, irrespective of what your decision was. 
8 THE COURT: The order was as you indicated as to that 
9 motion, but I do recall Mr. Burbidge saying that, and it very 
10 well may be that, if necessary — and I know that's what you 
11 don't want to get in at all, but that's a possibility, and it 
12 may come in at some other time under — with proper foundation. 
13 MR. WILLIAMS: As an admission of conduct by 
14 Dr. Healy? 
15 THE COURT: Well, I don't know exactly how it may 
16 come in, but I'm just saying there's a possibility it'll come 
17 in. I can't preclude evidence right now in a vacuum, 
18 Mr. Williams. 
19 MR. WILLIAMS: All right. I thought that was - that 
20 the rule of law is that a settlement's amount is not relevant 
21 to the jury's determination of the issues in this case — 
22 THE COURT: Unless -
23 MR. WILLIAMS: — only that there was a settlement. 
24 THE COURT: And I don't have the statute in front of 
25 I me, but the rule says that unless it's used for other purposes, 
17 
1 MR, BURBIDGE: Well, I hadn't heard from the other 
2 side that they agreed to the form. They've indicated that's 
3 fine. I've had a copy faxed to Janet. And I've got the 
4 settlement here. My concern is I don't want to be sued, and 
5 I'm uncomfortable producing the settlement until your Honor 
6 that signs the order. 
7 THE COURT: Well, I will sign the order, but I also 
8 want to know from all counsel here, who I have identified on 
9 the record, that you are going to be bound by this order of 
10 confidentiality, as you know what it is, and even prior to me 
11 signing it. Is that true? Does anyone object to that? 
12 MR. WILLIAMS: Not at all, your Honor. 
13 MR. BURBIDGE: Got it covered? 
14 THE COURT: Done. 
15 MR. BURBIDGE: All right. 
16 THE COURT: Okay? Anything else? 
17 MR. CASEY: Yes, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. CASEY: One other premium issue, which is I think 
20 a real issue today and will become an issue, at least starting 
21 Monday, because we will be filing a motion, filing a motion 
22 in limine. That has to do with Dr. Devore's Showtime 
23 presentation that we brought to the attention of the Court. 
24 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
25 MR. CASEY: The first item, your Honor, is pursuant 
19 
1 whistles, none of the — I think itfs been converted into 
2 another language from its original language that is used in the 
3 software. 
4 So to us it's just a bunch of pictures, which is an 
5 inaccurate and incomplete — 
6 THE COURT: Okay. I see what -
7 MR. CASEY: — of what they're going to be using, or 
8 trying to use, on Wednesday. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. CASEY: So, your Honor, I think what we would 
11 like is that if in fact they are using anything other than the 
12 images in this presentation, that that be produced to us by the 
13 end of the day today. Otherwise, they ought to be precluded. 
14 Now, for a variety of other reasons, we're going to 
15 object to its use, both in terms of it in its totality and in 
16 terms of pieces. 
17 THE COURT: Is this the motion in limine that you 
18 said you were going to file? 
19 MR. CASEY: Yes, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. CASEY: And let me just -
22 MR. BURBIDGE: And I can - I could short-circuit this 
23 real fast if I'm allowed to be heard. I don't want to 
24 interrupt. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 
1 met with Dr. Devore, and I said, "Dr. Devore, this is going to 
2 be very complicated. We're going to have a jury sitting there 
3 listening to intrauterine growth retardation, preeclampsia, 
4 HELP syndrome, hemolysis, elevated liver platelet count — or 
5 hemolysis-elevated liver enzymes and low platelet counts, and 
6 their eyes are going to glaze over. Can you help me teach 
7 that, put together a picture, as we do in all cases? This is a 
8 picture of the body. This is preeclampsia." This is how we've 
9 done it. 
10 And these folks want it. So I said — so he put — he 
11 went to the labor of putting together a CD-ROM that has each of 
12 the scenes; that is, what is going to be shown. It doesn't 
13 move, and there's no animation, and it doesn't have sound, and 
14 Mickey Mouse doesn't jump out of it. But it does have the 
15 pictures so we can very expeditiously — I don't have to walk 
16 over here. I can push the computer, and then the image comes 
17 up. 
18 And now they have it all. A lot of work, a lot of 
19 time, a lot of expense. Now they have it all. 
20 THE COURT: So what they have is the visual aids, 
21 absent his discussion on it. 
22 MR. BURBIDGE: Well, what's going to happen, Judge -
23 you know, there's no way in the world that we're going to punch 
24 a button and put on a video show. They know how to try a case, 
25 So we're going to ask a question, and if he's got a 
23 
1 IHC — and he was the director of obstetric care — if there was 
2 a policy, and assuming I can lay the foundation and 
3 demonstrate, that when a third-trimester patient comes in with 
4 an obstetric-related problem, you've got refer them out to 
5 labor and delivery. Now, you do whatever you do, you know, but 
6 whatever you do, triage — I'm not going to get into — but 
7 you've got to refer them out. Or if this body of information 
8 now became part of the record, should other people have been 
9 responding to it? 
10 And I'm going to ask the question — and once your 
11 Honor rules that I haven't laid sufficient foundation — that 
12 once the ER doctor says follow up with obstetrician, if he 
13 doesn't do that, that's a breach of the standard of care, or if 
14 he followed up and the obstetrician didn't do anything, that's 
15 a breach of the standard of care. That's fair game. 
16 I'm going to be very, very careful to avoid the area 
17 that you were concerned about, so I'm going to alert him in 
18 advance. When I prep him, I'm going say, "I do not want to 
19 talk about ER triage." 
20 So there's nothing tricky about this. All it is is I 
21 know that I've got a jury here with a limited attention span, 
22 and I've got to teach these principles of medicine, which are 
23 going benefit everybody to understand the case, and I can't do 
24 it with just words. I've got to have pictures, or they won't 
25 get it. 
25 
1 every image. I've never done this before, Judge. I'm goosey, 
2 and I want to make sure I don't cross any lines. I've never 
3 given them all of my doctor's - essentially of my doctor's 
4 exhibits in advance in the order in which they're going to be 
5 covered. 
6 THE COURT: Right. 
7 MR. BURBIDGE: Well, that's what it is. 
8 MR. CASEY: Two things, your Honor. One, if 
9 Mr. Burbidge after the hearing will tell us what the software 
10 is and what this proprietary program or whatever is, that 
11 would — I think he ought to be ordered to do that, or his 
12 client or his witness do that so we know that. 
13 But, two, your Honor, let's be careful, because you 
14 heard him say that in his eyes Dr. Devore is here to teach, not 
15 to testify, but to teach, and we've seen him, and we know 
16 what's coming, and that's why we're trying to alert the Court 
17 to what this may track, what the plaintiff will try to have 
18 this end up as. 
19 Now, your Honor, I think it's clear the plaintiffs 
20 are going to try to get around your Honor's order on the ER. 
21 And if I may approach the bench, this is just an example from 
22 Dr. Devore's presentation, and he has listed there five or six 
23 reasons why the ER doc was negligent. And that, your Honor, is 
24 absolutely contrary to your order. 
25 THE COURT: Well, I don't know if it is or isn't. I 
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1 opportunity to look at the slides or look at what is being 
2 used. You're going to have an opportunity to argue anything 
3 more specific on a motion in limine that you will file, and you 
4 will give courtesy copies to Mr. Burbidge. And if anybody 
5 wants a hearing on it, I'll set it at, what, 3:00 o'clock, 3:15 
6 on Monday afternoon. 
7 MR. BURBIDGE: If I could just tell your Honor, we're 
8 going to have to do some trial work. 
9 THE COURT: Well, and I understand that. 
10 MR. CASEY: If I could just tell your Honor, as an 
11 officer of this court, they have the screens that will be 
12 presented to the jury. 
13 THE COURT: And maybe after they look at everything, 
14 they won't do a motion in limine. I don't know. 
15 MR. BURBIDGE: No. He's saying I've got something to 
16 do animation and sound. I don't have that. 
17 THE COURT: I understand. 
18 MR. BURBIDGE: Charlton Heston was going to narrate, 
19 and he's busy. He's getting guns out to people, and supplying 
20 schools or something. I don't know. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. BURBIDGE: We have the order, a copy of the 
23 order, we can submit to your Honor on the settlement. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. BURBIDGE: If I could approach the bench. 
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1 known to plaintiffs' counsel that our law firm represented 
2 Mr. Sharp. 
3 We got a waiver of any conflict from Mr. Sharp about 
4 a month ago after which I immediately filed a notice of 
5 appearance. I spoke to Mr. Forgette - and I hope I'm saying 
6 that - and Mr. Burbidge, and we have agreed that in the event 
7 Mr. Sharp is called to testify, or any other person is called 
8 to testify, no one will delve into or try to make anything of 
9 the fact that our law firm at one time represented Mr. Sharp. 
10 The thing that triggers my thinking in this is during 
11 the dialogue with counsel, the Court said the, quote, coverup. 
12 And we're sensitive to that, and if Mr. Sharp has to take the 
13 stand, I would not want it said that as an extension of this 
14 alleged coverup the fact that IHC now has the same lawyer that 
15 Mr. Sharp had some time ago, if anyone has any idea of making 
16 anything of that, I need to withdraw before the end of the day. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. 
18 MR. FISHLER: I think we're clear on that. 
19 THE COURT: Does anybody take any different position? 
20 MR. BURBIDGE: No. When I give my word, Judge, you 
21 can take that to the bank. 
22 THE COURT: Anybody else? Okay. Done, Mr. Fishier. 
23 MR. FISHLER: Thank you. 
24 THE COURT: You're sticking onto this case. 
25 MR. BURBIDGE: Can I do a tit for tat, just say you 
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1 relationship. 
2 THE COURT: Their grief is about the loss. 
3 MR. BURBIDGE: Well, of course, but we're not go 
4 over — for example, we're not going to go — we have not made a 
5 claim for their psychiatric treatment or the psychological — 
6 separate psychological injury that's been inflicted. We're not 
7 going to go into that. 
8 MR. FRANKENBURG: Well, I think we talk about 
9 circumstances prior to the death and what the family has lost 
10 on that basis. 
11 MR. BURBIDGE: Well, all I could do - I take it 
12 you're not going to talk about Shayne, girlfriends, and — 
13 MR. FRANKENBURG: Well, it depends on what evidence 
14 you — it depends on what — 
15 THE COURT: Well, I guess what you're saying, 
16 Mr. Frankenburg, is that if he brings up evidence that Shayne 
17 is a bereaved widower — 
18 MR. FRANKENBURG: Right. 
19 THE COURT: - and his life has gone to hell since the 
20 death, then you're going to be able to bring up the fact that 
21 he's married and has a kid. 
22 MR. FRANKENBURG: Well, it's not even a marriage, 
23 your Honor. (Over talking) We're not going to do that. 
24 THE COURT: I mean that's the extreme, but that's 
25 what you're saying. 
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1 MR. BURBIDGE: Thanks, Judge. 
2 THE COURT: - I'll see you Monday afternoon. If not, 
3 I' 11 expect — 
4 MR. BURBIDGE: You don't need to see us. You don't 
5 need to see us Monday afternoon, assuming no — 
6 THE COURT: Well, depending if whether or not 
7 Mr. Casey wants to do any formal motion in limine on the — 
8 MR. BURBIDGE: But you don't need us for the voir 
9 dire, and we just send that in to you. 
10 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. You just send that in. 
11 Oh, one more thing. I'm sorry. Sit down. One more 
12 thing. I'm sorry. 
13 You all got your copies of the questionnaire. On the 
14 top of the questionnaire is your jury list, and they're 
15 already — that'll be how it's going to — that's how they're 
16 going to be seated. How I'm going to do it is, I'm going put 
17 three seats in the front here and fill up the box. That gives 
18 me 13. I'm going to put a seat on the small benches, one, two, 
19 three, four chairs on the small benches, and go four across. 
20 And so that's going to be 32 in the audience. And so 32 and 
21 13, that's 45. We have 44 jurors. 
22 So keep it a minimum — well, I would suggest don't 
23 bring them in at all, people that are interested in - parties, 
24 because we're not have enough room. And plaintiffs' table is 
25 going to be congested as it is. Okay? 
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1 THE COURT: — on that side. Now, didn't I hear I 
2 would see — or Dr. Healy talked about using their own system 
3 for overheads? 
4 MR. FRANKENBURG: Well, I think we've agreed that -
5 MR. BURBIDGE: Well, we're make ours available. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. You're going to use theirs. Okay. 
7 So that only makes sense, then, then you shift, and then when 
8 it's defense case — yeah. Then they have it right in front of 
9 them. 
10 MR. BURBIDGE: Yeah. Or, if you want, we'll be happy 
11 to turn it on, show you how to use it, and you can just come 
12 over and whatever you want. 
13 THE CLERK: 8:45. 
14 THE COURT: What's 8:45? Oh, okay. Thank you. 
15 Yeah. 
16 I want everyone here at 8:45. The jury will be 
17 brought in at right around 9:00 o'clock. Rosie will have them 
18 in order. They will be seated, starting with number 1 at the 
19 first seat in front, and go all the way back as I said. 
20 MR. BURBIDGE: That's always left to right? 
21 THE COURT: It'll be number 1, 2, 3, starting 4, 5, 
22 6, 7, and then 10, and then starting over there and across. 
23 MR. BURBIDGE: Could we have a very short break -
24 when we get through with the voir dire, we need a very short 
25 break ^cause we've had to pull out the wires so we don't get in 
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'laintiffs complain of Defendants and, demanding trial 
3y Jury> allege as follows: 
5 
1IIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Shayne Hipwell is the surviving spouse and an heir of Shelly Hipwell 
'Shelly"), who died at age 29^ on May 27, 1992, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' 
egligence. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of all adult and minor heirs of the decedent. 
2. Plaintiff Sherry Jensen is the surviving mother, former guardian and an heir of Shelly. 
3. Plaintiff Ashley Michele Hipwell, appearing by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, 
hayne Hipwell, is a surviving daughter and heir of Shelly: 
4. Plaintiff Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell, appearing by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, 
hayne Hipwell, is a surviving daughter and heir of Shelly. 
5. Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. ("IHC"), is a Utah corporation in the business of owning 
ad operating hospitals. IHC is the owner/operator of McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay^Dee") in 
>gden. 
6. Defendant Michael J. Healy ("Dr. Healy") is a physician who, at all times relevant 
ereto, practiced as an obstetrician and gynecologist at McKay-Dee, and was the attending 
bstetrician to Shelly. 
7. Does I through X are individuals or entities who were in active concert with 
defendants in the provision of medical services to Shelly and in the commission of thejiegligent 
:ts that directly and proximately caused her damages and death, recovery for which is sought in 
lis Complaint. Does I through X are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiffs with other named-
2 
2 
efendants. The true identify of Does I through X is presently unknown to Plaintiffs and when their 
ae identity is known, the Complaint will be amended to identify them by name. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
8. This court has jurisdiction of this action in accordance with the general jurisdictional 
-ovisions of § 78-3-4 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. Venue of this action is proper in this 
)urt in accordance with the provisions of § 78-13-7 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, on the 
-ounds and for the reasons that IHC is a resident of Salt Lake County. 
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS 
9. Plaintiffs seek recovery from Defendants herein for: (a) Defendants' negligence in failing 
) properly diagnose and treat medical complications, including those associated with a condition 
nown as HELLP Syndrome suffered by Shelly during the latter stages of her pregnancy during 
988, which resulted in devastating injuries to Shelly and ultimately caused her death in May, 
992; (b) for Dr. Ilealy's fraud and fraudulent concealment of Sheliyis negligence claims against 
)efendants, including aDr. Healv's continuation of efforts to conceal the medical negligence by his 
onspiracy to steer Shelly's case for medical malpractice to Dr. Healy's brother, Attorney Timothy 
lealy ("Attorney Healy") and to attorney Roger Sharp ("Sharp"), the brother=in-law of Dr. Healy's 
ister, and by making it appear that an investigation of Defendants' possible negligence had been 
onducted when in fact any investigation was a sham; and (3) Defendants'Defendant Healv's 
onstructive fraud in failing to disclose their malpractice to Plaintiffs despite the confidential 
elationship which existed between them, especially given Dr. Healy's conduct in-
3 
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btaining counsel to purportedly represent Shelly's interests, all as is more fully hereinafter alleged. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
'he Malpractice 
10. In 1988, Shelly and her husband, Shayne, were expecting their second child. Around the 
lirty-seventh week of Shelly's pregnancy, Defendant Michael Healy ("Dr. Healy"), Shelly's 
bstetrician and gynecologist, decided to induce Shelly's labor because Shelly and the baby were 
xhibiting intrauterine growth retardation. Induction of labor was scheduled for December 13, 
988. 
11. On December 12, 1988, a day prior to the scheduled induction of her labor, Shelly 
sported to the=emergency room at McKay-Dee looking and feeling extremely ill and complaining 
f severe abdominal pain along the costar margin. She informed the emergency room personnel of 
le severity of her pain and that it definitely was not heartburn. In fact, Shelly was exhibiting and 
omplaining of symptoms of HELLP Syndrome (hemolysis emolysis, tElevated liver function and 
)w platelet count), which, if not properly diagnosed or properly treated, can cause severe injury or 
eath. 
12. The emergency room personnel at McKay-Dee summarily diagnosed musculoskeletal 
ain and abjectly failed to analyze and properly diagnose Shelly's severe abdominal pain. They sent 
helly home with Tylenol that evening, where her pain continued, and told her to report back to the 
ospital the following day for the scheduled induction of her labor. 
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13. Although severe abdominal pain is a symptom identified in basic internal medicine texts 
something to be carefully analyzed and diagnosed, and with an expectant mother as a symptom 
the onset of HELLP Syndrome, the emergency room personnel at McKay-Dee performed none 
numerous simple and non-invasive diagnostic tests to determine if the abdominal pain was 
:ident to the onset of HELLP Syndrome or some other serious affliction. 
14. Although Shayne Hipwell had contacted Dr. Healy the night of Shelly's visit to the 
lergency room, Dr. Healy did not seek or receive any report from the emergency room- personnel, 
d not order tests of any kind, and did not go to the hospital to examine Shelly; nor did Dr. Healy 
termine whether Shelly had a tender liver, even in view of the higher incidence of HELLP 
mdrome among pregnant women exhibiting intra-uterine growth retardation. 
15. Shelly's pain did indeed evidence the onset of HELLP Syndrome, but Defendants 
ttirely overlooked the diagnosis until Shelly's health and well-being were grievously 
>mpromised. If Defendants had diagnosed HELLP Syndrome and immediately delivered Shelly's 
iby, they could have precluded the catastrophic developments and events that followed. 
16. On December 13, 1988, the day scheduled to induce Shelly's labor and the day after she 
ported to the emergency room, Shelly reported to McKay-Dee still complaining about the same 
rvere abdominal pain. Upon information and belief, by that time the capsule of Shelly's liver had 
sgun to stretch preparatory to rupture and catastrophic sequelae. 
17. Prior to her baby's delivery by caesarean section, Defendants performed a complete 
lood count on Shelly showing her platelet count had dropped from 172,000 the night-
5 
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efore to 128,000 the next day, which was yet another symptom pointing directly to HELLP 
yndrome. 
8, 
i-8-rWhile Shelly's abdomen was open during the caesarean delivery, Dr. Healy did 
ot examine her liver or her other viscera to determine the source of the serious pain about which 
le had been complaining. 
19. At approximately g-Go9:00 p.m. on December 13, 1988, Shelly was received in 
le recovery room from the delivery room still complaining of severe chest and abdominal 
iscomfort. By that time her blood pressure had risen markedly, signaling pre-eclampsia, a 
iagnosis that should have been obvious by that time and, if Defendants had obtained liver function 
:sts from the night before, would have been unquestionable. 
20. Sherry Jensen asked Defendants why Shelly was still suffering from intense 
^dominal pain following the delivery. Mrs. Jensen was told that the pain was "due to the epidural" 
lat had been administered to Shelly. 
21.-
Shelly's blood pressure continued to rise and on December 14, 1988, she was noted 
> be groggy and pale at 9:00 a.m. Half an hour later, the attending nurses noted that petechiae were 
^parent — a clear signal of low platelet count and another clear marker of the onset of HELLP 
yndrome. Dr. Healy had seen Shelly half an hour earlier, but failed to notice the appearance of 
stechiae and overlooked the implications of Shelly's tender liver and her plummeting platelet 
Dunt. 
22. By the time the charge nurse was summoned with reference to the petechiae, at-
3:30 a.m. on December 14, 1988, Shelly was pale, the petechiae were all the more apparent and-
6 
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lelly was suffering from tachycardia, or rapid heartbeat. Her pulse was recorded at 160 beats per 
inute. 
23. Upon information and belief, at least by 10:30 a.m. on December 14, 1988, Shelly's 
vtv had ruptured and she was bleeding internally. Her abdomen was distending and Defendants 
lould have suspected internal bleeding, whether by hepatic rupture or some other cause, 
onetheless, Defendants made no such diagnosis, notwithstanding the ease with which said 
lagnosis could have been accomplished with ultra-sound, CT scanning, percussion tests on the 
Ddomen or a sample of abdominal fluid. 
24. Defendants had all of the necessary information to have realized that they had failed to 
roperly diagnose HELLP Syndrome and that Shelly was massively hemorrhaging internally no 
iter than 11:00 a.m. on December 14, 1988. By 1:00 p.m. on December 14, 1988, Dr. Baughman, 
n intensivist at McKay-Dee, had concluded that Shelly was suffering from probable HELLP 
yndrome. From approximately 10:30 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. on December 14, 1988, Shelly's blood 
ressure and blood platelet count continued to plummet and Shelly continued bleeding internally, 
uffering from progressive hypovolemic shock. 
25. As Shelly's condition worsened, Sherry Jensen spoke with Dr. Healy and Dr. 
Jaughman before they reopened Shelly's abdomen. Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman told Mrs. Jensen 
hat they had no idea what was wrong with Shelly. 
26. Notwithstanding Shelly's rapidly worsening condition, Defendants waited until 6:30 
).m. on December 14,_1988, before they finally performed corrective surgery. At that time the 
>urgeon reported finding 3,000 cc's of blood in Shelly's abdominal cavity, or approximately-
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wo-thirds of her entire blood volume, at which time Defendants attempted corrective surgery to 
atch her ruptured liver. 
27. Following corrective surgery, Dr. Alder told Mrs. Jensen that Shelly's liver had in fact 
uptured. Nothing was said to Mrs. Jensen or Mr. Hipwell by Dr. Healy or anyone on behalf of 
IcKay-Dee regarding Defendants' failure to perform the cesarean section delivery sooner, 
)efendants' failure to properly and timely diagnose and treat HELLP Syndrome or the resulting 
iternal hemorrhaging from which Shelly suffered. 
28. By the time Defendants took steps to address Shelly's internal hemorrhaging, they had 
st in motion and directly and proximately caused a series of major afflictions and medical 
omplications. Defendants allowed Shelly to suffer such prolonged hypertensive shock that 
xygen deprivation damaged her bodily tissues, which, along with hypovolemic shock to Shelly's 
mgs, caused Shelly to develop Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome ("ARDS"). Moreover, with 
sverely compromised internal organs, Shelly had to be respirated. Because of her body's 
iminished ability to fend off micro-organisms and the many new avenues for them to enter her, 
helly developed sepsis, fever and nosocomial (hospital-borne) infections. 
29. If Defendants had- properly and timely diagnosed and treated the HELLP Syndrome 
ropcrly and timely diagnosed from which Shelly suffered, and had arrested Shelly's internal 
emorrhaging and prevented her substantial hypovolemic shock, Shelly would not have suffered 
le severe injury to which she was subjected, would not have developed complications such as 




ditional medical treatment and exposure to the later medical malpractice hereinafter 
scribed directly and proximately related to Defendants' acts and omissions. 
30. After Shelly's condition had deteriorated, Dr. Healy and the IHC physicians with 
horn he was consulting at McKay-Dee decided she should be shipped to the bum center at the 
niversity of Utah Hospital on what was, on information and belief, a mere pretext, JTne:t to 
rtermine whether she was suffering from necrotic fascitis (dead tissue at the surgical incision 
te). The doctors at the University of Utah Hospital found no evidence of necrotic fascitis. On 
formation and belief, the presence of necrotic fascitis could have been diagnosed at McKay-
ee and the negative finding would have made it apparent that there was no reason to ship 
tielly to the University of Utah Hospital. The purpose for shipping Shelly to the University of 
tah Hospital was to conceal the medical negligence- of IHC and Healy. 
31. While Shelly was at the University of Utah Hospital, however, a hematology 
jsident decided that a marrow biopsy would aid the diagnosis of her thrombocytopenia, or low 
latelet count, and infections. Toward that end, the resident_attempted to aspirate Shelly's 
;ernum and he negligently pierced and tore a hole in her heart in the process. 
32. By the time another surgeon was able to perform emergency open chest heart 
lassage, Shelly had suffered anoxic brain damage, leaving her in a pain-sensitive comatose 
tate.-
he Conspiracy to Conceal Shellyv's Claims 
33. Upon learning of Shelly's injuries, Dr. Healy in a continuation of the scheme to 
onceal the negligence of IHC and Healy and acting in furtherance thereof, and as an agent 
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r acting in privily with IHC embarked upon a conspiracy with his brother, Attorney Healy, and 
ttorney Roger Sharp f~!Sharp""Sharp") (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
Conspirators"), in or about December, 1988, to fraudulently conceal Shelly's causes of action 
gainst Defendants as is hereinafter alleged. The conspiracy had the following primary 
bjectives: (a) to solicit Shelly's case against the University of Utah Hospital for Attorney Healy 
nd Sharp; (b) to create the appearance that potential claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee 
ad been duly investigated by Shelly's attorneys, thus commencing the running of the statute of 
mitations; (c) to settle Shelly's case against the University of Utah Hospital as quickly as 
ossible, irrespective of Shelly's actual financial and medical needs; (d) to convince Shelly's 
uardians, Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell, that neither Dr. Healy nor McKay-Dee had 
ommitted any medical malpractice; and (e) to create the appearance, with Sherry Jensen's and 
hayne Hipwell's signatures on a ^ Release of All Claims" that all of Shelly's claims against 
lese Defendants had indeed been released. 
34. Upon information and belief, the actions and omissions of the Conspirators 
ereinafter alleged were intentionally performed or omitted as part of the conspiracy and within 
le scope thereof intentionally to further the purposes of the conspiracy. 
35. On information and belief, following learning that Shelly's sternum being punctured 
id her heart lacerated, Dr. Healy contacted his brother, Attorney Healy, and the two engaged in 
rhat Attorney Healy later described, in a letter dated February 13, 1989, as in-depth discussion 
f the case. 
36. After the Healy brothers' discussions of Shelly's case, Attorney Healy spoke with 
leir sister, Diane DeVries, who was the Relief Society President in Shelly's LDS Ward.-
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the behest of her brothers, DeVries made an unsolicited phone call to Sherry Jensen in order 
solicit Shelly's malpractice case for Sharp. 
37. DeVries did not tell Sherry Jensen that she was the sister of Dr. Healy and at no time 
d DeVries intimate to Mrs. Jensen that DeVries1 brothers had put her up to making the phone 
11. Nor did DeVries tell Mrs. Jensen that her other brother, Attorney Healy, would be involved 
ith Sharp on the case. 
38. In the company of Shayne Hipwell, Mrs. Jensen met and entered into a Retainer 
greement with Sharp on or about February 10, 1989, by which Sharp purported to agree to 
vestigate and pursue any and all causes of action on _Shelly's behalf as against her numerous 
ire providers. Upon information and belief, Sharp and Attorney Healy later agreed to divide 
ly fee as between them with 60t% going to Sharp and 4(F£g going to Attorney Healy. They 
jpt their fee-splitting arrangement secret from Plaintiffs. 
39. Although Attorney Healy acted with Sharp as counsel for Shelly at all pertinent 
mes, neither Sharp nor Attorney Healy nor Dr. Healy informed Sherry Jensen or Shayne 
ipwell about Attorney Healy's involvement until Sharp mentioned it for the first time just 
sfore Sherry and Shayne were appointed as Shelly's guardians by the probate court. At that 
me, Sharp told Mrs. Jensen that there was absolutely no conflict of interest or problem 
resented by Attorney Healy's involvement in the case because neither Dr. Healy nor McKay-
»ee had committed any medical malpractice. 
40. Upon information and belief, as part of the conspiracy alleged herein, Sharp and 
attorney Healy never conducted a genuine investigation of the care provided Shelly by 
defendants. In the letter dated February 13, 1989, in which Attorney Healy proposed the-
11 
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Dove-referenced fee-splitting arrangement with Sharp, Attorney Healy, prior to any 
lvestigation of his brother or McKay-Dee, stated the following to Sharp: "I have alerted my 
rother to the fact that you may be requesting copies of his medical records which is a routine 
rocedure at this point. I have advised him that
 =Shellie's [sic] family had not expressed any 
Dncern or dissatisfaction over this treatment." 
41. In fact, Sharp conspired to create the appearance that he had obtained the entire set 
f Shelly's medical records for the subject period by sending to Shayne Hipwell copies of the 
^quests for medical records from Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. Sharp engaged only one expert to 
>view medical records from Defendants for the subject period, however, and in Sharp's letter of 
ansmittal of medical records to that expert, Sharp stated he was sending only a "very 
)breviated set." Sharp did not send to Plaintiffs a copy of the records transmittal letter he sent 
> the expert. 
42. Upon information and belief, the "very abbreviated set" of medical records Sharp 
jnt to the expert was carefully selected to steer that expert away from opining that Dr. Healy 
id McKay-Dee had breached the standard of care. Upon information and belief, the purported 
nvcstigation^investigation" of Defendants by Sharp and Attorney Healy was merely a sham 
id in fact was part and parcel of a continuation of the conspiracy initiated by Dr. Healy and his 
-other, Attorney Ilcaly, to shield Dr. Healy and, in the process, McKay-Dee, from liability for 
leir breach of the standard of care in treating Shelly, while enriching Attorney Healy with a 
lare of Shelly's settlement with the University of Utah Hospital. 
43. For the remaining three years of her life following the puncture of her hearf, Shelly 
ruggled=miserably in a pain-sensitive comatose state. As a direct and proximate-
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suit of Defendants' negligence, Shelly died while at St. senedictsBenedicts Hospital, on May 
7
, 1992. As a direct result of the conspiracy to fraudulently conceal Defendants' malpractice 
id/or of Defendants' constructive fraud, as alleged herein, no cause of action was asserted 
gainst Defendants for their malpractice until this lawsuit was filed. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Negligence/Wrongful Death) 
44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 43 
f this Sccond[sic]Fourth Amended Complaint. 
45. Defendants were negligent in their treatment of Shelly while a patient at the McKay-
lee emergency room on December 12, 1988. Defendants' negligence continued through 
helly's stay at McKay-Dee prior to her shipment to the University of Utah Medical Center. 
>efendants' negligence included, but is not limited to, Defendants' failure to properly diagnose 
helly's reports of abdominal pain when she reported to the emergency room, Defendants' 
ailure to perform the necessary examination and diagnosis that would have revealed the 
resence of HELLP Syndrome, Defendants' failure to properly diagnose Shelly's severe internal 
emorrhaging after the rupture of her liver, Defendants' failure to respond=to Shelly's state of 
hypovolemic shock within a reasonable time and Defendants' exposure of Shelly to further 
oreseeable medical complications and medical malpractice at the University of Utah burn 
enter. 
46. The standard of care applicable to Defendants was to properly diagnose a serious 
nternal problem and to conduct further diagnostic procedures to identify or rule out-
he serious problem from which Shelly in fact suffered. The above-referenced facts, at a 
ninimum, clearly called for consultation in the emergency room with an obstetrician in 
consideration of possible HELLP syndrome. Post-operatively, the applicable standard of care 
called for Defendants to properly diagnose Shelly as suffering from some manner of hepatic 
dysfunction and, after her liver ruptured, of internal hemorrhaging and to properly treat 
thosexomplications. 
47. Defendants' negligence directly and proximately caused Shelly to suffer severe pain 
and anguish for the three years following her treatment at McKay-Dee and the University of 
Utah Hospital burn center, and directly and proximately caused her death. 
48. Shelly's entitlement to damages for three years of suffering, and her loss of ability to 
enjoy and live her life, survived her death. Plaintiffs are entitled, in Shelly's stead to recover 
from Defendants all damages incurred and suffered by Shelly including, but not limited to, 
damages for Shelly's suffering, loss of ability to enjoy and live her=life for three years, loss of 
income and the cost and expense of proper medical and custodial treatment, all in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
49. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants, as set forth above, 
Plaintiffs and Shelly's other heirs have suffered severe losses and are entitled to recover against 
Defendants for such losses, including, but not limited to, the loss of support, loss of assistance 
13 
id services to the family, loss of probability of inheritance and loss of society, companionship, 
appiness of association, care, support, advice, guidance and nurturing of wife and mother, and 
nancial losses and expenses of medical and custodial care and burial expenses. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
raud/Fraudulent Concealment Against Dr. Healy) 
50. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 49 
this Sccond[sic]Fourth Amended Complaint. 
51. The ConspiratorsDr. Healy, acting in furtherance of his efforts with 1HC to conceal 
eir medical negligence, and acting as agent for or in privily with IHC, conspired to commit 
aud and to fraudulently conceal Shelly's claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee by 
nitting to state material facts and making numerous misrepresentations regarding material 
cts, for which Dr. Healy is responsible and culpable as if he had made said representations or 
nissions himself. The Conspirators t 
isrepresentations and omissions concerned presently existing material facts including, but not 
mited to, the following: 
_(a) Dr. Healy's intentionally omitting to inform Plaintiffs, at any time while he was 
helly's physician, of the particulars of Defendants' breach of the standard of care as alleged 
sreinabove, and his representation that he did not know what was wrong with Shelly at the 
me she was under his care; 
_(b) Dr. Healy's representation to Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell, in or around 
December, 1988, that it was necessary to ship Shelly to the University of Utah Burn Center for 
iagnosis and treatment of necrotic fascitis when, in fact, the purported presence of necrotic 
ssue could have been diagnosed at McKay-Dee and would have obviated any purported need 
) ship Shelly to the University of Utah Hospital; 
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(c) Dr. Healy's repeated failure, despite regular contact with Sherry Jensen-
and Shayne Hipwell following Shelly's heart puncture, to inform Sherry or 
Shayne of his role in shepherding the case into the hands of his brother,-
Attorney Healy, and Sharp; 
(d) Dr. Healy's failure to disclose the conversations with his brother,-
Attorney Healy, respecting Shelly's legal claims; and 
(e) The failure of Dr. Healy to disclose the=express or tacit understanding-that only 
certain records relating to Dr. Healy's care of Shelly would_be-=reviewed and that Dr. 
Healy would be assured only a "routine" review of his-care would be made. 
52.- The Conspirators knew that the misrepresentations were false when they were-
ade, knew the omissions were material, and knew, or should have known, of their duty to-
form Shelly and Plaintiffs of the material facts relating to Defendants' various breaches of-
e standard of care. The Conspirators made those misrepresentations and omissions for the-
irpose of concealing the claims against Defendants and intended Plaintiffs to rely upon the-
isrepresentations and 
missions-. 
53. Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell, acting reasonably and in ignorance of the 
nissions and the falsity of the representations, did in fact rely upon those representations and 
sre thus induced to sign a contingency agreement on behalf of Shelly with Sharp, to forego the 
osecution of a malpractice action against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. 
54. As a direct and proximate result of the fraud of Dr. Healy, as set forth above, Shelly, 
well as her heirs, have suffered severe losses and are entitled to recover against Defendants-
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• such losses including, but not limited to, the pain and suffering of Shelly in the last months 
her=life and all damages accrued as a result of Defendants-f negligence as alleged above. 
Iditionally, the heirs of Shelly are entitled to recover against Defendants for their severe 
sses including, but not limited to, the loss of support, loss of assistance and services to the 
nily, loss of probability of inheritance and loss of society, companionship, happiness of 
sociation, care, support, advice, guidance and nurturing of wife and mother, and financial 
sses and expenses of medical and custodial care. 
55. Based upon the intentionally false misrepresentations as alleged above, Plaintiffs are 
[titled to punitive damages in the amount that is reasonable according to the proof adduced at 
al. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Constructive Fraud Against All DefendantsDr. Heah) 
56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 55 
f this Second[sic]Fourth Amended Complaint. 
57. DefendantsDr. Healy held a special position of trust and confidence with respect to 
helly and her guardians, which position arose by virtue of their relationship to Shelly as her 
aretakers and physicians. Additionally, Dr. Healy assumed further fiduciary responsibilities to 
helly and her guardians when he undertook affirmative actions directly and-=indirectly to 
btain and secure legal counsel for Shelly in the form of his family members and relations who 
urportedly agreed to represent Shelly in possible claims against Dr. Healy, McKay-Dee and the 
Iniversity of Utah Hospital. 
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58. Defendants knew, or should have known, that they had breached the standard of 
are with respect to their failure to properly and timely diagnose and treat the HELLP 
yndrome and internal hemorrhaging from which Shelly suffered. 
59. Despite the fiduciary and confidential relationship they had with Shelly, 
•efendants failed to inform Shelly, or Shelly's guardians, of the material facts relevant to 
•efendants' breach of the standard of care. Plaintiffs further allege, on information and 
slief, that Drs. Healy and Baughman affirmatively misrepresented to Sherry Jensen that, 
rior to reopening Shelly's abdomen, they did not know what was wrong with her. 
efendants' failure to disclose the material -facts relevant to that malpractice constitutes a 
reach of the trust and confidence Shelly placed in Defendants. 
60. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breaches and violations of the 
mfidence and trust placed in them by Shelly, Shelly and Plaintiffs, her family, have been 
imaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
61. In performing the actions hereinabove alleged, Defendants acted maliciously and 
ith the intent of injuring Shelly, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to recover punitive 
aims against Dr. 
tah Hospital. 
rior to 
tcts relevant to that malpractice constitutes a the trust and confidence Shelly placed in 
images in an amount that is reasonable according to the proof adduced at trial. 
THEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief against Defendants as follows: 
1. For special damages, including the costs and expenses of medical and custodial 
eatment, funeral and burial, lost income and other economic losses in amounts to be proven 
trial; 
2. For general damages, including damages for the loss of a wife and mothcrwrongful 
|ath, damages for the conscious pain and suffering of decedent Shelly suffered by her prior 
> her death as a result-
18 
18 
'the negligent treatment of Defendants, and other general damages, all in amounts to be 
oven at trial; 
3. On the Second and Third Causes of Action, for punitive damages in the amount 
at is reasonable according to the proof adduced at trial. 
—4. For Plaintiffs' costs herein and attorney's fees as allowed by law; and 
5. For such other and further relief as is appropriate and just in the circumstances. 
\TED this ~ ~ day of September, 1993. 
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United States District Court, S.D. New York. 
Mildred WURZBERG and Edward Wurzberg, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Louis LAPID, M.D., and Mt. Sinai Hospital, 
Defendants. 
No. 92 Civ.4586(LBS)(NRB). 
Sept. 16, 1993. 
OPINION 
BUCHWALD, United States Magistrate Judge. 
*1 This is an action for medical malpractice and 
fraud against defendants, Louis Lapid, M.D. ("Dr. 
Lapid"), and Mt. Sinai Hospital ("Mt. Sinai"). 
Defendants have moved for summary judgment 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and for sanctions 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. For the following 
reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment 
is granted, plaintiffs' complaint is ordered dismissed 
and defendants' motion for sanctions is denied. 
FACTS 
Except as noted, the undisputed facts are as 
follows. 
A. The 1986 Operation and Related Reports 
The events that underlie plaintiffs' complaint began 
in 1986 when a routine pelvic sonography revealed a 
5cm ovarian cyst on the right ovary of plaintiff, 
Mildred Wurzberg, who was then 61 years old. On 
December 4, 1986, upon the advice of Dr. Lapid, a 
gynecological surgeon, plaintiff underwent a total 
abdominal hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomy ("TAHBSO" or the "1986 operation") 
to remove her uterus, cervix, both fallopian tubes 
and ovaries. Dr. Lapid and Dr. Hay worth, an 
employee of Mt. Sinai, performed the operation. 
During the course of the surgery, Dr. Lapid 
removed plaintiff's right ovary, labelled it with an 
"A" for identification, and sent it for a "frozen 
section," a procedure that provides an immediate 
diagnosis of whether a cyst is cancerous. After 
learning that the cyst was benign, Dr. Lapid 
removed additional reproductive organs from 
plaintiff, which were labeled "B" for identification, 
and sent them to a pathologist for examination-the 
"permanent section" (or "B" section). 
The final pathology report of the "B" section, 
prepared by Michael May, M.D., and co-signed by 
Mamoru Kaneko, M.D., describes an examination 
of a right ovary and fallopian tube, uterus, cervix 
and partial left fallopian tube. The pathology report 
states that the right ovary contained a small benign 
Brenner's tumor and that the left ovary was "not 
identified." After reviewing both the permanent 
report on the "A" section [FN1], which confirmed 
the intraoperative finding of a benign serous cyst, 
and the report on the "B" section, Dr. Lapid 
informed plaintiffs that the TAHBSO had been 
successfully completed and no malignancy had been 
found. 
In his operative report, dictated contemporaneously 
with the operation, Dr. Lapid first describes 
removing the right ovary with the cyst intact and 
sending it for an immediate frozen section analysis. 
Dr. Lapid then describes, inter alia, cutting both the 
round and the left infundibulopelvic ligaments and 
removing the cervix and uterus. Although the 
operative report does not specifically detail the 
removal of the left fallopian tube or ovary, Dr. 
Lapid asserts that the surgical techniques he 
described would have encompassed the removal of 
the remaining reproductive organs, including the left 
ovary. [FN2] Further, Dr. Lapid maintains that he 
then included the left ovary in the "B" section, 
although the pathology report of the "B" section is to 
the contrary. 
*2 When Dr. Lapid received the final pathology 
report of the "B" section, he noticed that it referred 
to an examination of the right ovary and partial left 
tube. According to Dr. Lapid, he realized that the 
pathologist, Dr. May, had transposed the orientation 
of the uterus; Dr. Lapid maintains that he did not 
seek to correct the report because the mistake had no 
impact on plaintiff's post-operative treatment. 
Plaintiff's post-operative treatment ended on or 
about June 29, 1987, but she continued under Dr. 
Lapid's medical care for routine gynecological 
check-ups. 
B. The 1991 Diagnosis and Subsequent Treatment 
In June 1991, Dr. Lapid found a trace of blood in 
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plaintiff's stool and referred her to her internist for 
treatment. On August 5, 1991, Mrs. Wurzberg had 
a colonoscopy and a biopsy from that procedure 
revealed the presence of cancerous cells. On 
August 29, 1991, Mrs. Wurzberg was admitted to 
Mt. Sinai for exploratory abdominal surgery. 
According to the operative report, a mass was seen 
in her colon and a specimen was taken for frozen 
section. The specimen sent for frozen section was 
diagnosed as ovarian cancer. Confirming the 
frozen section analysis, the final pathology report 
analyzed the tumor as a "metastatic papillary 
adenocarcinoma [a category of cancer that includes 
ovarian cancer] consistent with an ovarian primary 
[source]" ("the 1991 diagnosis"). Subsequent 
medical records of her treatment refer to Mrs. 
Wurzberg as having ovarian cancer. 
Presumably in an effort to determine the primary 
source of her cancer, plaintiff had three separate 
procedures performed: 1) a CAT scan of the 
abdomen and pelvis on June 27, 1991; 2) an 
exploratory laparotomy [FN3] in September 1991; 
and 3) a CAT scan on February 2, 1992. None of 
these procedures indicated the presence of an ovary 
or any other reproductive organ that could have been 
such a primary source. 
On July 2, 1992, plaintiffs filed a complaint in this 
Court alleging that Dr. Lapid committed medical 
malpractice during the December 4, 1986 operation 
by failing to remove Mrs. Wurzberg*s left ovary. 
[FN4] Plaintiffs further allege that the left ovary is 
the source of Mrs. Wurzberg's cancer and that its 
removal would have prevented the development and 
spread of the cancer. In addition, the plaintiffs 
allege that Dr. Lapid fraudulently concealed his 
malpractice by failing to disclose that he had not 
removed plaintiff's left ovary and by affirmatively 
asserting that he had removed both ovaries. 
Discovery has been completed and the parties filed a 
joint pre-trial order on April 4, 1993. 
In their current motion, defendants assert, in 
essence, that, because the statute of limitations on 
plaintiffs' medical malpractice claim ran in 
December 1989, two-and-one-half years after the 
postoperative treatment by Dr. Lapid ended, and 
because plaintiffs fail to raise a genuine issue of fact 
with respect to a claim for fraudulent concealment, 
they are entitled to summary judgment. In 
response, plaintiffs maintain that Dr. Lapid's 
fraudulent concealment is not only a cause of action 
in its own right with a six year statute of limitations, 
but also estops the defendants from asserting a 
statute of limitations defense. [FN5] 
DISCUSSION 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
*3 At the outset, we note that summary judgment is 
appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). As a general rule, all 
factual disputes should be resolved and all 
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Id. at 586; Levin v. Analysis & 
Technology, Inc., 960 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir.1992). 
The party seeking summary judgment always bears 
the initial burden of informing the court of the basis 
of its motion, Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 112 
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1983); Dell'Orfano v. Scully, 
692 F.Supp. 226, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) 
), and where the nonmoving party bears the burden 
of proof as to a particular issue, the moving party 
may satisfy its burden under Rule 56 by 
demonstrating an absence of evidence to support an 
essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. 
Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 
191 (2d Cir.1991) (citing Celotex, All U.S. at 323). 
The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to 
come forward with persuasive evidence that there is 
a genuine issue of fact for trial. Binder, 933 F.2d at 
191. At that stage the question for the court 
becomes: "is there sufficient evidence to reasonably 
expect a jury could return a verdict in favor of the 
nonmoving party." Id. Viewing the evidence 
produced in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, if a rational trier of fact could not 
find for the nonmoving party, then there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and entry of summary 
judgment is appropriate. Id.; see Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 586 (stating that the nonmoving party must 
raise more than a metaphysical doubt as to the 
material facts). 
Putting aside defendants' statute of limitations 
arguments, plaintiffs' malpractice and fraud claims 
can both be reduced to the issue of whether Mrs. 
Wurzberg's left ovary was removed during the 1986 
operation. This is because in order to maintain an 
action for fraud against Dr. Lapid and Mt. Sinai, 
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plaintiffs must prove "knowledge on the part of the 
physician of the fact of his malpractice and of his 
patient's injury in consequence thereof coupled with 
a subsequent intentional, material representation by 
him to his patient known by him to be false at the 
time it was made, and on which the patient relied to 
his damage...." Simcuski v. Saeli, 406 N.Y.S.2d 
259, 264 (1978). In other words, maintenance of a 
fraud action against a physician for concealing sub-
standard medical treatment necessarily involves a 
finding of malpractice. Accordingly, the crux of 
plaintiffs' claims turns on whether Dr. Lapid was 
negligent in his performance of the 1986 operation. 
*4 Without a finding of negligence in the first 
instance, obviously plaintiffs' malpractice claim 
does not survive, and without a viable claim for 
malpractice, plaintiffs lack the requisite predicate 
for their fraudulent concealment claim. Only if 
plaintiff can demonstrate that the operation was 
negligently performed must the court reach the 
question of whether a subsequent failure to disclose 
this negligence gives rise either to an independent 
action for fraud or to a toll to the statute of 
limitations. Therefore, logic dictates that we first 
examine whether plaintiff has come forward with 
specific facts which would allow a rational trier of 
fact to conclude that Mrs. Wurzberg's left ovary 
was not removed during the 1986 operation. See 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87. 
Applying the general standards related to summary 
judgment, we will examine the evidence upon which 
the parties rely and the inferences they draw 
therefrom. Factually, the parties' dispute revolves 
around the interpretation of various reports 
pertaining to the 1986 operation and the 1991 
diagnosis that plaintiff suffers from "papillary 
adenocarcinoma consistent with an ovarian 
primary." In addition, defendants maintain that the 
results of Mrs. Wurzberg's exploratory surgery and 
CAT scans are medically conclusive. We will 
address these disputes in turn. 
A. The 1986 Operation and Related Reports 
Addressing first the 1986 reports, defendants 
acknowledge that the permanent pathology report on 
the "B" section refers to: a right ovary, which 
contained a small Brenner's tumor; a right fallopian 
tube and a partial left tube; as well as the uterus and 
cervix. In addition, the "B" section pathology 
report specifically states that the left ovary "is not 
identified.J' While taken on its face this report 
would indicate that the left ovary was not included 
in the organs sent for analysis, defendants contend 
that when the permanent analysis of the "B" section 
is read in conjunction with the frozen section 
analysis, the Operative Report and Dr. Lapid's own 
recollection of the procedure, it is clear that the 
pathologist mistakenly labelled the organs that he 
had received. [FN6] 
In support of their interpretation of the final 
pathology report, defendants assert that the ovary 
sent for the frozen section and the ovary included in 
the organs sent for permanent analysis could not 
have been the same. First, prior to the operation 
Dr. Lapid had identified a 5cm cyst in Mrs. 
Wurzberg's right ovary and described the removal 
of the right ovary in his operative report. The ovary 
identified in the "B" section analysis as the right one 
was not described as containing a cyst nor was it 
described as having been sliced, in part, for a frozen 
section. Aff. of Michael May, M.D., \ 9 ("May 
Aff."), Defs' Aff. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 
Second, the fallopian tube identified in the final 
pathology report as the left tube was approximately 
half the size of the one identified as the right tube. 
This is significant because the tube that had been 
connected to the ovary that was sent for a frozen 
section would have been shortened and sutured 
during the initial phase of the operation, and the 
other tube would have remained intact. Id., H 11. 
Finally, defendants point out that the ovary that was 
detached during the operation and sent for frozen 
section would not have been available for 
identification in the final pathology report. Id., % 9. 
Based on the frozen section report and Dr. Lapid's 
Operative Report, defendants argue that the ovary 
that was not identified must have been the right one. 
*5 In response, plaintiffs argue that defendants' 
explanation that the "entire matter is one of a 
simple 'labelling mistake' " is incorrect. Supporting 
affidavits were submitted from several physicians, 
including Dr. Carlos Urmacher, a pathologist, who 
addressed the interpretation of the 1986 frozen 
section analysis. Aside from contradicting several 
minor points that Dr. May made in his affidavit 
[FN7], Dr. Urmacher maintains that according to 
the frozen section report specimen "A" consisted of 
only a benign serous cyst and did not include the 
ovary from which the cyst was removed. [FN8] 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
1993 W L 362374 
(Cite as: 1993 W L 362374, *5 (S.D.N.Y.)) 
Page 8 
Therefore, plaintiffs reason, the ovary described in 
the "B" section could have been the ovary that 
originally contained the cyst~in other words, the 
right ovary--and Dr. May may not have been 
mistaken after all. 
2. The 1991 Diagnosis and Subsequent Treatment 
Next, defendants assert that plaintiffs misconstrue 
Mrs. Wurzberg's 1991 diagnosis of papillary 
adenocarcinoma, consistent with an ovarian 
primary, and maintain that in fact this diagnosis is 
not inconsistent with the more precise diagnosis of 
primary peritoneal adenocarcinoma, a cancer that 
originates in the peritoneum. 
In support of this position, Dr. Kaneko, a 
pathologist at Mt. Sinai who co- signed the 1986 
"B" section report and the 1991 diagnosis, states that 
papillary adenocarcinomas are cancers that can have 
more than one possible primary site. Kaneko Aff. K 
8. Dr. Kaneko also states that in a 65-year-old 
female, such as Mrs. Wurzberg, the more common 
primary site would be the ovaries. Id. In addition, 
primary peritoneal papillary adenocarcinoma and 
papillary adenocarcinoma, consistent with ovarian 
primary are histologically similar and demonstrate 
similar patterns of spread through the colon. Thus, 
a pathologist, who is routinely provided with only 
basic information about the patient such as age and 
sex, would normally evaluate a papillary 
adenocarcinoma found in the colon as consistent 
with ovarian primary, an attribution that does not 
rule out other possible primary sites. Therefore, 
when plaintiff's 1986 operation, the total abdominal 
hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy is 
considered, Dr. Kaneko concludes that the proper 
diagnosis of the mass removed from plaintiff's colon 
in 1991 is primary peritoneal adenocarcinoma. 
Furthermore, the chemotherapeutic treatment is the 
same for these types of cancer, id., U 9, which 
presumably means that there was no reason to refine 
the 1991 diagnosis. 
With respect to the interpretation of the 1991 
diagnosis, plaintiffs' experts essentially reiterate the 
1991 pathology report. In addition, plaintiffs point 
out that Mrs. Wurzberg's medical records contain 
repeated references to ovarian cancer and Mrs. 
Wurzberg underwent a treatment regimen applicable 
to ovarian cancer. Aff. of Stephen Allen, f 4(P) 
("Allen Aff."), Pis' Aff. in Opp'n to Mot. for 
Summ. J., Ex. B. Furthermore, plaintiffs 
emphasize that no extra-ovarian primary site has 
been identified. However, aside from the 
conclusory statements of plaintiffs' witnesses that it 
is their medical opinion that Mrs. Wurzberg has 
ovarian cancer which originated in her left ovary 
after the 1986 operation, Allen Aff. \ 5, Aff. of 
Stephen Davis, M.D., 1) 5, plaintiffs do not 
endeavor to refute defendant's assertions that 
primary peritoneal adenocarcinoma is histologically 
the same, and would involve the same 
chemotherapeutic treatment as ovarian cancer. Nor 
do plaintiffs dispute that Mrs. Wurzberg's 1991 
diagnosis is consistent with forms of cancer other 
than ovarian cancer. 
3. Results of Exploratory Laparotomy and Other 
Tests 
*6 In addition to their interpretation of the 
December 1986 pathology reports, Dr. Lapid's 
Operative Report and the 1991 diagnosis, defendants 
submit Dr. Feffer's statement, which was 
unchallenged by plaintiffs, that "there was no ovary 
found during the exploratory laparotomy [performed 
in 1991], which in my medical opinion, is 
indisputable evidence that a left ovary was not left 
behind." Aff. of Paul Feffer, M.D., U 9 ("Feffer 
Aff."), Defs' Mot. for Summ. J. To bolster this 
conclusion defendants point to the CAT scans and 
sonography that plaintiff underwent in June 1991 
and February 1992, each demonstrating a complete 
absence of reproductive organs. Nowhere in the 
affidavits in opposition to the current motion do 
plaintiffs' experts dispute or comment on any of 
these evidentiary facts, nor note the effect, if any, 
that the failure of Mrs. Wurzberg's left ovary to be 
visualized during these procedures had on their 
conclusions. 
4. Conclusion 
To summarize, on first blush plaintiffs' reading of 
the 1986 pathology and Operative Reports raises a 
question of whether Dr. Lapid and Dr. Hay worth 
actually removed Mrs. Wurzberg's left ovary during 
the 1986 operation. That question is further 
complicated by her doctors' use of the imprecise 
designation of her condition as ovarian cancer or 
cancer consistent with an ovarian primary. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs do not dispute that Mrs. 
Wurzberg's 1991 diagnosis and subsequent treatment 
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do not preclude a primary source other than the 
ovary. Furthermore, plaintiffs offer no response to 
defendants' position that the subsequent procedures 
performed in an attempt to locate the allegedly 
cancerous left ovary, namely two CAT scans and a 
laparotomy, establish that plaintiff has no left ovary. 
Moreover, plaintiffs do not challenge the assertion 
that these tests are medically conclusive. Nor do 
plaintiffs endeavor to proffer a theory as to how 
these test results could be consistent with their 
theory of malpractice. 
Therefore, in light of defendants' strong and 
uncontroverted evidentiary showing that Mrs. 
Wurzberg underwent medically conclusive tests that 
revealed a total absence of reproductive organs, a 
rational trier of fact could not find that Dr. Lapid 
failed to remove Mrs. Wurzberg's left ovary. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs have not come forward with 
a sufficient showing that there are genuine issues of 
material fact for trial. Thus, defendants' motion 
for summary judgment is granted and the complaint 
is dismissed. [FN9] 
Defendants' Motion for Sanctions 
Defendants also moved for imposition of sanctions 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, claiming that plaintiffs 
and their attorneys filed and maintained a frivolous 
suit. [FN 10] Rule 11 requires the imposition of 
sanctions where, after a reasonable inquiry, a 
competent attorney could not have formed a 
reasonable belief that the pleading was well 
grounded in fact and was warranted by existing law. 
Eastway Constr. Corp v. City of New York, 762 
F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.1985), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 
918 (1987). Thus, Rule 11 creates an affirmative 
duty on the attorney to conduct a reasonable 
investigation of facts and law prior to the submission 
of any pleading, motion or paper. The 
reasonableness of the investigation is to be 
determined in light of the situation existing, and the 
facts known, at the time the pleading, motion or 
paper was submitted. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 
F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986). 
*7 Because the key to Rule 11 lies in the 
certification flowing from the signature to a specific 
pleading, motion or other paper, broad claims of 
frivolous litigation, dilatory tactics or bad faith are 
generally insufficient to support an award of 
sanctions under Rule 11. See Coltrade v. U.S., 973 
F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the 
Second Circuit has held that the court shall impose 
sanctions whenever it is "patently clear that a claim 
has absolutely no chance of success." Eastway 
Constr., 762 F.2d at 254. In exercising their wide 
discretion under Rule 11, the courts must use 
caution when considering Rule 11 sanctions so as 
not to "stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity 
that is the very lifeblood of the law." Id. 
Accordingly, when distinguishing between claims 
that are losing claims and those that are losing and 
sanctionable, courts must avoid hindsight and 
resolve all doubts in favor of the claimant. Id. 
Drawing on essentially the evidence presented to 
the court in support of their motion for summary 
judgment, defendants assert that there is "absolutely 
no physical evidence that Mrs. Wurzberg retained an 
ovary following the 1986 surgery " and that the 
continued prosection of the current lawsuit "can be 
taken as nothing other than ... intentional 
harassment and persecution." Aff. of Norman 
Weitzman, Esq., ffi| 7, 10 (emphasis in original). 
Counsel for plaintiffs asserts that Rule 11 sanctions 
are inappropriate because he retained and consulted 
with three qualified experts, who reviewed 
plaintiff's medical records and the affidavits of 
defendants' experts in support of the motion for 
summary judgment. After their review, all three 
plaintiffs' experts concluded that the claims were 
meritorious. 
In considering sanctions regarding a factual claim, 
the initial focus of the court should be on whether an 
objectively reasonable evidentiary basis for the claim 
was demonstrated. Calloway v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1470 (2d 
Cir. 1988), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. 
Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 
120. Although we hold that plaintiffs' evidence 
was insufficient to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment, we find that plaintiffs' counsel's reliance 
on the 1991 diagnosis and the opinion of his experts 
is objectively reasonable, and thus we deny 
defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
FN1. After a specimen is examined on frozen 
section, it is permanently fixed and examined with 
dyes in order to render a final diagnosis. A 
specimen sent for frozen section therefore will 
have two diagnoses. Aff. of Stephen Davis, 
M.D., H 4(C) ("Davis Aff."), Pis' Aff. in Opp'n to 
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Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C. Evidently, the slides 
prepared during the final frozen and permanent 
sections are available for review. 
FN2. Specifically, the operative report states that 
Dr. Lapis cut and suture ligated the round and the 
left infundibulopelvic ligaments. The 
infundibulopelvic ligament connects the ovary to 
the lateral pelvic sidewall. Defs' Reply Aff. f 15 
(citing Te Lindes, Operative Gynecology (John D. 
Thompson, M.D., and John A. Rock, M.D., eds.) 
(7th ed.)). Therefore, defendants contend that 
because Dr. Lapid cut and suture ligated the left 
ovarian ligamenis, he also must have removed the 
left ovary at that time. 
FN3. A laparotomy is a surgical section of the 
abdominal wall. 
FN4. Under New York law, which provides the 
rule of decision in this diversity action, Edward 
Wurzberg's claim is a derivative one for loss of his 
wife's consortium. 
FN5. Plaintiffs apparently have abandoned their 
position that the statute of limitations for Lapid's 
malpractice was tolled under the continuous 
treatment doctrine. However, in the event that 
our reading is in error, we find that the doctrine is 
not applicable here. Under New York law, the 
continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to an 
ongoing physician-patient relationship unless the 
treatment pertains to the same injury underlying the 
claim of malpractice. Werner v. Kwee, 148 
App.Div.2d 701, 539 N.Y.S.2d 449 (2d 
Dept.1989); see Massie v. Crawford, 78 N.Y.2d 
516 (1991). As plaintiffs do not refute the 
defendants' statement that Mrs. Wurzberg's 
treatment relating to her TAHBSO ended in 1987, 
there appears to be no basis to apply the continuous 
treatment toll to the statute of limitations. 
FN6. Michael May, M.D., was the pathologist 
who prepared the final "B" section report in 1986. 
In his affidavit attached to defendants' motion, Dr. 
May stated that when preparing the final "B" 
section report he had mistakenly transposed the 
orientation of the uterus. 
FN7. For example, Dr. Urmacher challenged Dr. 
May's statement that the left ovary must have been 
the one with the Brenner's tumor by noting that it 
is medically possible for an ovary to contain both a 
Brenner's tumor and a serous cyst. 
FN8. This statement is disputed by both Dr. May, 
May Aff., H 10 and Dr. Kaneko. Dr. Kaneko 
states that he examined the slides prepared from 
the frozen section analysis and they contain "clear 
evidence of ovarian tissue around the ovarian 
cyst." Aff. of Mamoru Kaneko, M.D., \ 5 
("Kaneko Aff."), Defs' Aff. in Supp. of Mot. for 
Summ. J. In contrast, Dr. Urmacher states: 
"According to both the pathology form and the 
pathology report, specimen "A" was a cyst.... 
However, according to the pathology slides and 
report, no such specimen [i.e. ovary] was received. 
The residual ovary and tube have never been 
identified." Aff. of Carlos Urmacher, M.D., fl 
9, 12 ("Urmacher Aff."), Pis' Mot. in Opp'n to 
Mot. for Summ. J. However, it is noteworthy that 
Dr. Urmacher explicitly stated that he had 
reviewed the slides of the "B" section and that he 
did not so state with respect to the "A" section. 
This raises the question of whether he based his 
conclusions on his reading of the "A" section slides 
or whether he is merely relying on the face of the 
"A" section reports and the labelling on the slides. 
FN9. While we have found the physical evidence 
dispositive, we wish to make the observation that it 
is highly regrettable that the imprecision of the 
various reports and diagnoses could contribute to a 
belief that malpractice had been committed and, 
thus, add a wholly unnecessary layer of suffering 
to the physical and emotional suffering resulting 
from plaintiff's medical condition. 
FN10. Rule 11 requires that all pleadings, motions 
and other papers in a civil action must be signed, 
either by the party or the party's attorney. The 
rule provides further that the signature constitutes a 
certificate that the signer has read the paper and 
that, based on the signer's reasonable inquiry, the 
paper is well grounded in fact and in law, and is 
not interposed for any improper purpose. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. 
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